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Abstracts 
 
Paper I: Cooperation in teams: The role of identity, punishment and endowment 
distribution 
Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as crucial means to reduce free 
riding and to promote cooperation in teams. This paper examines the relative importance of 
these two mechanisms under two income distributions in team cooperation. In a repeated 
public good experiment, conditions vary among different combinations of homogeneous or 
heterogeneous endowment, strong or weak identity, and absence or presence of peer 
punishment. We find that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative 
impact of endowment heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases 
cooperation irrespective of income distribution. However, the impact of punishment under 
strong identity depends on the relative strengths of the identity-building activity and the 
effectiveness of punishment. Furthermore, we find no evidence of stronger punishment in 
teams with a strong identity. These findings provide important implications for management 
policy makers in organizations: implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams 
should be done with caution, and the decision of whether identity or punishment is a more 
effective norm enforcement mechanism in teams is rather sensitive to their interaction and 
relative strengths. 
 
Paper II: Session size and its effect on identity building: Evidence from a public good 
experiment  
The effect of session size has largely been ignored in experimental studies, despite the 
possibility that it may affect people’s perception of the strength of the potential link between 
them and consequently the strategies used in the interactions. This paper investigates how the 
effect of an induced common identity on individual cooperative behavior differs depending on 
session size in a repeated public good experiment with constant group size and partner 
matching. We find that induced identity significantly enhances cooperation only when the 
session size is small and only in the initial period. In all other periods, induced identity does 
not have a significant effect on cooperation in either small or large sessions. The same null 
effect of identity in small and large sessions suggests that session size is not a confounding 
factor of identity in repeated interaction settings.  
 
Paper III: Multi-product firms, product mix changes and upgrading: Evidence from 
China’s state-owned forest areas 
Product selection matters for a firm’s productivity and long-run growth. Recent theoretical 
and empirical studies indicate that an important margin of adjustment to policy reforms is the 
reallocation of output within firms through changes in product mix decisions. This paper 
examines the frequency, pervasiveness and determinants of product-switching and upgrading 
activities in firms located in China’s state-owned forest areas during a period of gradual 
institutional and managerial reforms (2004–2008). We find that changes to the product mix 
are pervasive and characterized by adding or churning products rather than only shedding 
products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant contribution to the 
aggregate output growth during our sample period. We also find that firms with different 
characteristics, human capital and market conditions differ in their propensity to diversify and 
upgrade product mix. 
 
Paper IV: Is R&D cash-flow sensitive? Evidence from Chinese industrial firms 
We hypothesize that research and development (R&D) is sensitive to cash-flow fluctuations 
due to asymmetric information and agency problems in the credit market. We adopt a variant 
of the Q model for R&D investment using the value of the firm, physical capital and 
employment to capture firm fundamentals as proxies for investment opportunities. We add 
cash flow to this specification, and estimate the augmented model separately for R&D 
participation and spending using data on Chinese industrial firms for the period 2001-2006. 
We find that R&D spending is sensitive to cash-flow fluctuations, conditional on firm 
fundamentals. We also find that the cash-flow sensitivity of R&D varies across firms 
depending on ownership. We conclude that credit market imperfections pose a constraint for 
R&D in Chinese industry.   
 
 
  
Summary of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers. While at first glance these papers seem to 
address quite distinct issues and use different methodologies, there are indeed some 
underlying links. For example, all of the papers deal with the conditions based on which gains 
from specialization and cooperative production within an economic organization (a firm, a 
household, or a market) can better be obtained. These conditions, together with the structure 
of the organization, are considered the two important problems facing a theory of economic 
organizations (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). It is of critical interest to study these conditions 
for firms since firms play a critical role in the growth and prosperity of a country’s economy.  
The firm is seen as a contract between a multitude of parties (Holmström and Tirole, 
1989). This contractual view is developed based upon the seminal work by Coase (1937). 
Investigating the nature of the firm, Coase (1937) argues that “organizing” production through 
the price mechanism is costly. Establishing a firm and allowing an “entrepreneur” to direct the 
resources can minimize the transaction costs between specialized factors of production. The 
transaction costs include the cost of discovering the relevant prices of the factors, the cost of 
negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction taking place on 
the market, and the cost of the impossibility to state the detailed requirement in a long-term 
contract at the date of contracting. Thus, the purpose of the existence of firms is to facilitate 
exchange and to accommodate contractual constraints rather than production constraints 
(Holmström and Tirole, 1989). 
However, the contract between the parties may be incomplete. A prominent example 
occurs in team production (see, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Suppose that two workers 
cooperate to complete a task as partners. How should they be compensated for their efforts? If 
their inputs are observable and can be contracted upon, the answer is simply to make 
payments in accordance with the costs of their inputs. Under such a circumstance, it will be in 
each worker’s interest to work up to the level that is socially efficient. But what if their inputs 
cannot be verified so that rewards can only be based on the team output? A free-riding 
problem may occur, and it is not possible to detect the cheater(s). Since teams have been 
increasingly viewed as an important way to enhance the efficiency of firms, it is crucial to 
explore the mechanisms to reduce free riding and to promote cooperation in teams. The first 
two papers of the thesis contribute to this discussion by presenting evidence from laboratory 
experiments.  
Paper I examines the relative importance of common identity and peer punishment in 
enhancing team cooperation under two income distributions. Social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979, 1985) implies that once an individual has gone through a cognitive change and 
emotional investment process to categorize herself as part of a unit with shared goals, values, 
and norms, her behavior tends to conform to the norms of that unit, which could lead to a 
higher degree of team cohesion and more effective teamwork (Lembke and Wilson, 1998). 
Moreover, people who are inequity averse and choose to cooperate are willing to sanction the 
free riders at their own cost if they are sufficiently upset by the payoff inequality due to the 
free riding of other people (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Free riders on the other hand could 
perceive the threat of punishment to be credible and thus tend to cooperate (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000). Furthermore, teams are often composed of individuals unequal in productivity, ability, 
and motivation, and payments tend to be differentiated partly to induce greater individual 
effort.  
Under different combinations of conditions on income distribution, identity and 
punishment, we conduct a repeated public good experiment. We vary endowment distribution 
by giving subjects in one team the same or different endowments to create homogeneous or 
heterogeneous teams, manufacture the strength of identity to be strong or weak by conducting 
an identity-building activity or not, and allow punishment of other team members in half of 
the treatments. We also employ two identity-building activities and two sets of punishment 
effectiveness parameters to test the sensitivity of our findings to the relative strengths of 
identity and punishment.  
The results show that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative 
impact of endowment heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases 
cooperation irrespective of income distribution. However, the impact of punishment under 
strong identity depends on the relative strengths of the identity-building activity and the 
effectiveness of punishment. Furthermore, we find no evidence of stronger punishment in 
teams with a strong identity. These findings provide important implications for management 
policy makers in organizations: implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams 
should be done with caution, and the decision of whether identity or punishment is a more 
effective norm enforcement mechanism in teams is rather sensitive to their interaction and 
relative strengths. 
Paper II follows the line of Paper I to study how the effect of an induced common 
identity on individual cooperative behavior differs depending on session size in a repeated 
public good experiment. Session size represents the number of participants in an experimental 
session. The effect of session size has largely been ignored in experimental studies, despite 
the possibility that it may affect people’s perception of the strength of the potential link 
between them and consequently the strategies used in the interactions. While the interactive 
effects of identity and session size on cooperation has real-world implications, this paper 
focuses on the methodological aspect of testing whether session size could be a confounding 
factor of identity.   
We vary the session size to be small or large with 8 or 24 subjects in a session, and 
manufacture the strength of identity to be strong or weak by conducting one of the identity-
building activities from Paper I or not. We find that induced identity significantly enhances 
cooperation only when the session size is small and only in the initial period. In all other 
periods, induced identity does not have a significant effect on cooperation in either small or 
large sessions. The same null effect of identity in small and large sessions suggests that 
session size is not a confounding factor of identity in repeated interaction settings.  
The focus of the last two papers of this thesis is shifted to firm performance in terms of 
the input and output of technological change in firms. In growth theory, continuing advances 
in technological knowledge in the form of new goods, new markets or new processes have 
been considered a necessary condition for sustaining a positive long-run per capita growth, 
regardless of whether technological change is characterized as being exogenous or 
endogenous to the economic system (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Endogenous growth models 
typically treat technological progress in the form of an expansion of the number of varieties of 
products, or of quality improvements for an existing array of products (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003). The link between a country’s technological change and economic growth also 
applies at the industry and firm level.  
Paper III investigates the patterns of product selection, switching and upgrading, and the 
determinants of these activities in firms located in China’s state-owned forest areas during a 
period of gradual institutional and managerial reforms from 2004 to 2008. Product mix 
change is a topical issue in both a macro and micro perspective. At the macro level, 
endogenous growth models suggest that specializing in the production of some products is 
more growth promoting than specializing in others. At the micro level, resource reallocation 
within multi-product firms through adding and dropping products is also an important margin 
of adjustment in response to policy reforms besides firm entry into and exit from an industry 
(Bernard et al., 2010). Having obtained detailed firm-product level data including product 
name and sales, we map all reported product names into the codes of two harmonized national 
standards and define product, industry and sector accordingly.  
Our results show that product-specific value added has a very wide dispersion, indicating 
that what type of product firms produce matters for their overall efficiency and long-run 
development. Within the same industry, multi-product firms tend to be larger, more 
productive and more likely to export than single-product firms. Our results further display that 
changes in firms’ product mix are pervasive and characterized by adding or churning products 
rather than only shedding products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a 
significant contribution to the aggregate output growth during our sample period, accounting 
for approximately 86% of the net increase in the aggregate output with the remaining 14% 
attributed to growth of the existing products. Furthermore, firm age, size, human capital and 
market conditions are important driving factors of product mix change and upgrading 
decisions. 
Technological change in Chinese industry originates from three different sources: time-
driven autonomous change, in-house research and development (R&D), and purchase of 
imported technology (Fisher-Vanden and Jefferson, 2008). As one of the major sources, R&D 
has become an increasingly more important type of investment in China in recent decades. 
Comparing the gross domestic expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP in China with that 
in Japan, which is the world leader in R&D, we see a huge gap in the early 1990s and a rapid 
convergence during the last twenty years: the percentage for China was merely around 20% of 
that for Japan in the early 1990s but increased to approximately 60% in 2012.  
A natural question to ask then is how R&D gets financed. Features of R&D such as 
uncertain return, easy spillover, and lack of collateral value tend to make firms that invest in 
R&D face more pronounced asymmetric information and agency problems than firms that 
invest in physical capital. Hence, it may be more costly to finance R&D through external 
funds. Paper IV estimates the sensitivity of R&D to internal finance conditional on 
controlling for investment opportunities for Chinese industrial firms over the period 2001-
2006. We adopt a variant of the Q model for R&D investment using the value of the firm, 
physical capital and employment to capture firm fundamentals as proxies for investment 
opportunities. We add cash flow to this specification, and estimate the augmented model 
separately for R&D participation and spending. We find that R&D spending is sensitive to 
cash-flow fluctuations, conditional on firm fundamentals. We also find that the cash-flow 
sensitivity of R&D varies across firms depending on ownership. We conclude that credit 
market imperfections pose a constraint for R&D in Chinese industry.  
In sum, this thesis attempts to study issues related to team cooperation and firm 
performance. The findings are expected to contribute to the discussion of accommodating 
contractual and production constraints of firms. 
 
 
References 
Alchian, A.A., and H. Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization.” American Economic Review 62: 777–795. 
Aghion, P., and P.W. Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Barro, R.J., and  X. Sala-i-Martin. 2003. Economic Growth (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Bernard, A.B., S.J. Redding, and P.K. Schott. 2010. “Multi-product Firms and Product 
Switching.” American Economic Review 100(1): 70–97. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, New Series, 4(16): 386–405. 
Fehr, E., and S. Gächter. 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 159–181.   
Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3): 817–868. 
Fisher-Vanden, K., and G.H. Jefferson. 2008. “Technology Diversity and Development: 
Evidence from China’s Industrial Enterprises.” Journal of Comparative Economics 36(4): 
658–672. 
Holmström, B., and J. Tirole. 1989. “The Theory of the Firm.” In R. Schmalensee and R. 
Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization. North-Holland, pp. 61–133. 
Lembke, S., and M.G. Wilson. 1998. “Putting the ‘Team’ into Teamwork: Alternative 
Theoretical Contributions for Contemporary Management Practice.” Human Relations 51: 
927–944. 
Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In S. Worchel 
and W. Austin (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole, pp. 33–47. 
Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1985. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In S. 
Worchel and W. Austin (eds.), The Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Chicago: Nelson-
Hall, pp. 7–24. 
 
  
 
Paper I

1 
 
Cooperation in teams: The role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution 
 
Qian Weng*, Fredrik Carlsson† 
 
 
Abstract 
Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as crucial means to reduce free 
riding and to promote cooperation in teams. This paper examines the relative importance of 
these two mechanisms under two income distributions in team cooperation. In a repeated 
public good experiment, conditions vary among different combinations of homogeneous or 
heterogeneous endowment, strong or weak identity, and absence or presence of peer 
punishment. We find that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative 
impact of endowment heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases 
cooperation irrespective of income distribution. However, the impact of punishment under 
strong identity depends on the relative strengths of the identity-building activity and the 
effectiveness of punishment. Furthermore, we find no evidence of stronger punishment in 
teams with a strong identity. These findings provide important implications for management 
policy makers in organizations: implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams 
should be done with caution, and the decision of whether identity or punishment is a more 
effective norm enforcement mechanism in teams is rather sensitive to their interaction and 
relative strengths. 
 
Keywords: Endowment distribution; identity; punishment; cooperation; public goods 
experiments   
JEL classification: C92; D63; H41; M54  
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1. Introduction 
Teams have been increasingly viewed as an important way to enhance the efficiency of 
organizations and firms. One common underlying philosophy of successful teams is to foster 
cooperation among their members (Che and Yoo, 2001). However, organizations face several 
challenges to efficient teamwork. The benefits of working as a team may be undercut by the 
incentives to free ride, which cannot be completely controlled through formal contracts if 
compensation is based on team output rather than personal input (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Experiments have shown that cooperation typically cannot be sustained by intrinsic 
altruistic motives alone (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010). Rather, (centrally) building a common identity among employees and 
allowing (decentralized) mutual monitoring and sanctioning of team members have been 
considered effective attempts to discipline free riding and to promote cooperation in 
teamwork settings. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1985) has received 
growing interest in the organizational literature (see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 
2008). A number of experiments have shown that salient identification with an organization 
or a team can increase cooperation (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005; McLeish and Oxoby, 
2011).1 Punishment, in terms of both pecuniary consequences such as reduced salaries and 
non-pecuniary ones such as social pressure and disapproval, has also been shown to be an 
important means to increase cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2000b, Masclet et al., 2003; 
Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Mas and Moretti, 2009).2 
An additional aspect of teams is that they are often composed of individuals who are 
unequal in productivity, ability, and motivation. Payments tend to be differentiated partly to 
induce greater individual effort and partly to incentivize employees contributing to the team 
output to stay away from distinct outside options (Balafoutas et al., 2013). Previous public 
goods experiments investigating the role of income distribution (in terms of homogeneous or 
heterogeneous endowment) in cooperation have shown mixed results: Cherry et al. (2005) 
report a negative effect of heterogeneity on aggregate cooperation, Chan et al. (1996), Visser 
and Burns (2006), and Prediger (2011) find the opposite, and Hofmeyr et al. (2007) find no 
significant difference. However, when it comes to individual behavior in unequal income 
                                                            
1 A closely related strand of literature focusing on identity conflict between two groups in general find favoritism 
toward ingroup members and discrimination against outgroup ones in terms of cooperation (e.g., Charness et al., 
2007; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007), coordination (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2014), social 
preferences (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009), and norm enforcement (e.g., Ruffle and Sosis, 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006; 
Goette et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2012a; Goette et al., 2012b).  
2 However, some other studies question the beneficial effects of punishment (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Houser et 
al., 2008; Abbink et al., 2010), and some even find anti-social punishment directed at relatively cooperative 
people (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006). 
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teams, low-income people are ubiquitously found to cooperate relatively more than their high-
income counterparts (e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006; van Dijk et al., 2002). Some studies 
further explore whether the power of punishment in norm enforcement in symmetric settings 
can carry over to asymmetric settings, and obtain an affirmative answer that punishment in 
heterogeneous populations shows similar or even higher efficacy (e.g., Nikiforakis et al., 
2010; Visser and Burns, 2006; Prediger, 2011).3 Nikiforakis et al. (2012) and Reuben and 
Riedl (2013) look particularly at the normative rules underlying contributions to public goods 
in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups as well as the punishment behavior intended to 
enforce the rules. As these papers suggest, heterogeneous income matters for cooperation for 
reasons such as disagreements in fairness principles of equality, equity and efficiency that 
often stipulate different normative rules individuals consider as appropriate for behavior, and 
self-serving selection of the principles that hinders the emergence and enforcement of a 
specific rule governing cooperation.     
In this paper we study the three dimensions affecting team cooperation: identity, 
punishment, and income distribution. While identity and punishment in isolation have been 
shown to increase cooperation, the potential interaction and relative importance of these two 
means have not, to the best of our knowledge, been investigated. Clearly, when deciding on 
team incentives and organization, the relative importance and interaction between identity and 
punishment is central. In addition, there are only a few studies looking at the impact of 
identity on punishment behavior, but the results are inconclusive.4 Chen and Li (2009) find 
that individuals are less likely to punish an ingroup member for misbehavior, whereas 
McLeish and Oxoby (2007) find that unfair offers to ingroup members incur greater use of 
costly punishment than those to outgroup members. This paper will thus provide additional 
evidence on this issue. 
Moreover, although the effect of income distribution on team cooperation both in the 
absence and presence of punishment has been investigated, whether and how income 
distribution affects the role of identity has not. One implication from social identity theory is 
that once an individual has gone through a cognitive change and emotional investment 
process to categorize herself as part of a unit with shared goals, values, and norms, her 
behavior tends to conform to the norms of that unit, which could lead to a higher degree of 
                                                            
3 Apart from endowment heterogeneity, heterogeneity can also be represented by different marginal benefit from 
a public good (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; Fisher et al., 1995; Carpenter et al., 2009; Reuben and Riedl, 2009), 
or different fixed lump-sum payments such as show-up fees (e.g., Anderson et al., 2008).  
4 Besides punishment extended by the same agents playing the previous game, punishment can also take the 
form of third-party punishment (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2012a; Goette et al., 
2012b).   
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team cohesion and more effective teamwork (Lembke and Wilson, 1998). Thus, an additional 
goal of this paper is to demonstrate whether the disagreements and self-serving biases in 
normative rules governing cooperation in heterogeneous income teams can be ameliorated or 
even resolved by building a strong identity such that a contribution norm can be agreed upon 
and enforced.  
We use laboratory experiments to examine the interactive effects of identity and 
punishment and of identity and income distribution on team cooperation, as well as the 
interactive effect of identity and income distribution on punishment behavior. We induce a 
strong common identity via a face-to-face identity-building activity involving all subjects in 
one session; this activity is absent if identity is weak. We use a repeated linear public good 
game to elicit contributions for measuring cooperation. We distinguish two team endowment 
distribution environments in the public good game: in one, endowment is homogeneously 
distributed among team members; in the other, each member is given a different endowment 
according to their productivity ranking within the team, yet the total team endowment is the 
same as that of the homogeneous endowment teams. Productivity ranking is determined by 
the performance in a quiz. To compare the difference in behavior without and with 
punishment, we add a second sub-stage in half of the treatments where subjects are given the 
opportunity to punish other team members.  
We find that at the team level, when punishment is not possible, endowment 
heterogeneity negatively affects cooperation, yet strong identity can counteract this negative 
impact. However, strong identity does not increase cooperation more in heterogeneous than in 
homogeneous teams. The introduction of punishment successfully raises and sustains 
cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous teams and under both weak and strong 
identities. With punishment, cooperation is greater under strong identity in homogeneous than 
in heterogeneous teams, and so is the punishment inflicted. However, strong identity fails to 
further enhance cooperation or pushes punishment in either endowment distribution. Nor does 
strong identity increase cooperation more with punishment than without. Within the 
heterogeneous teams, lower endowment individuals always show the greater degree of 
cooperation relative to endowment, and punish as intensively as higher endowment 
individuals. Strong identity does not play a part in either contribution or punishment behavior.   
Our findings, in particular that punishment is more important than identity may raise the 
question of to what extent this is specific to our experimental design. In order to investigate 
this, we conduct additional treatments where we strengthen identity by establishing it via 
online communication to help team members who will subsequently play the public good 
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game, and weaken punishment effectiveness by making it more costly to the punishers. We 
keep the endowment homogeneous in all the additional treatments. While most of our 
previous findings hold, some do not. Punishment fails to enhance cooperation in presence of 
strong identity, and punishment is lower when identity is strong. These results suggest that the 
interactive effect of identity and punishment indeed depends on the relative strengths of the 
identity-building activity and the cost of punishment. 
 
2. Experimental design  
The experiment uses a 2×2×2 design. In one dimension, we vary the endowment distribution 
by giving subjects in a team the same or different endowment in order to create homogeneous 
or heterogeneous teams. In the second, we make the strength of identity strong or weak by 
conducting or not conducting an identity-building activity. The third dimension concerns 
whether or not subjects have the opportunity to punish other team members. This generates 
eight different combinations of conditions, each of which is a treatment of the experiment as 
summarized in Table 1. The experiment is conducted in three stages. The first stage is an 
identity-building stage. The second stage is an endowment-determination stage. The third 
stage is a repeated linear public good game.  
<Table 1 about here> 
The identity-building stage was included only in the four treatments with strong identity. 
A “human knot” game was played with all subjects in one session in another room before they 
entered the laboratory. Subjects stood shoulder to shoulder, in a circle, facing each other. First 
they were asked to form a knot by lifting both hands and reaching across the circle to hold the 
hands of two other subjects who were not standing directly beside them, left hand to left hand 
and right hand to right hand. After ensuring that a knot had been constructed, subjects were 
asked to untangle the knot to form one or a couple of circles without crossing arms anymore. 
They were not allowed to let go of any hands in the process. Anyone who let go of a hand was 
required to immediately grab the same hand again. The game lasted for approximately ten 
minutes regardless of whether or not the knot was successfully untangled. The reason for 
choosing such an identity-building activity was that it is a typical activity conducted in 
orientation or training programs in real-world organizations to promote mutual understanding, 
raise common objectives, and yield organizational belongingness among new members or 
members from different departments. Communication was allowed during the course of the 
game. The experimenters observed that the game sparked extensive communication among 
team members. After finishing the identity-building activity, the subjects were led to the 
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laboratory. In the four treatments with weak identity, subjects entered the laboratory directly 
once everybody had arrived, yet they did have a chance to meet each other while waiting for 
the experiment to start.   
The rest of the experiment was conducted in the laboratory, where subjects were first 
seated in partitioned computer terminals and then given written instructions while the 
experimenter read the instructions aloud. At the second stage, subjects individually solved a 
six-minute quiz consisting of 20 general knowledge questions. The quiz performance 
determined the endowment levels of subjects in the heterogeneous teams for the public good 
game. That is, the more questions that were answered correctly, the higher the endowment 
level. The quiz was used to create feelings of entitlement over the endowment (see, e.g., 
Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Gächter and Riedl, 2005) and to justify the fairness of 
inequalities within the heterogeneous teams. To enable comparison across treatments, this 
stage was also conducted in the homogeneous endowment treatments, where the endowment 
levels were however not affected by the quiz performance. 
At the third stage, 24 subjects in one session were randomly assigned to six teams of four 
members and each team played a public good game framed as a team production problem for 
10 periods. The reason for using partner rather than stranger matching was that we wanted to 
mimic the situation where people usually worked in relatively fixed teams and interacted 
repeatedly over a period of time.5 The subjects knew that their teams consisted of themselves 
and three other individuals, whereas their identities were kept anonymous throughout the 
experiment.  
At the beginning of each period, each subject was endowed with a fixed amount of 
experimental currency units (ECUs), 𝐸𝑖 . They decided simultaneously and without 
communication how to allocate the endowment between individual and team work (i.e., the 
public good). By freely choosing an amount to contribute to the team work,  𝑐𝑖 , where 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝐸𝑖, the remaining endowment, 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖, was automatically considered the allocation 
to the individual work. Each ECU that a subject kept for individual work generated one ECU 
for herself, whereas the payoff from the team work was 50% of the team’s total contribution. 
That is, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from a contribution to the public good was 
equal to 0.5. In the heterogeneous teams, members were endowed with 80, 60, 40, and 20 
ECUs, respectively, according to their quiz performance ranking within a team. In the 
                                                            
5  See Botelho et al. (2009) for a critical review of the experimental literature on partner and stranger matching. 
The authors further compare behavior under random strangers and perfect strangers matching (where subjects 
meet only once) in a public good experiment, and find a significantly lower proportion of subjects contributing 
in a random strangers than in a perfect strangers protocol.  
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homogeneous teams, each member was endowed with 50 ECUs. Subject i’s period payoff 
was given by 
𝜋𝑖
𝑐 = (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + 0.5�𝑐ℎ4
ℎ=1
                                                              (1) 
In the treatments with punishment, a second sub-stage was added. Subjects were 
informed of the other team members’ proportion of endowment contributed, i.e., contribution 
rate, and were given the opportunity to punish each other.6 To punish, member 𝑖 could assign 
punishment points to member 𝑗 within the same team, 𝑝𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The punishment decisions 
were made simultaneously and without communication. However, punishment points were 
not costless. Each assigned punishment point cost the punished member 3 ECUs and the 
punishing member 1 ECU. Hence, subject 𝑖’s payoff at the end of the period was given by  
𝜋𝑖
𝑝 = 𝜋𝑖𝑐 −�𝑝𝑖𝑗4
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
−  3�𝑝𝑗𝑖4
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
                                                         (2) 
Equation (2) implies that a subject could have a negative payoff in a given period. To reduce 
the probability of this, we constrained the income reduction associated with received 
punishment to not exceed the income from the contribution sub-stage, i.e., 3∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑖4𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
≤ 𝜋𝑖
𝑐. In 
addition, a subject could at most distribute 25 points to each other team member, i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≤25, 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 . Despite the restrictions, negative payoff could still occur in some 
extreme cases where subjects had little income from the contribution sub-stage, attracted 
considerable punishment, and also decided to punish heavily. Negative period payoff 
occurred in three out of 1,920 possible cases (192 subjects × 10 periods); these losses were 
covered by cumulative payments from previous periods. As is common in public goods 
                                                            
6  We reveal relative contribution rather than absolute contribution amount to preserve the anonymity of 
endowment levels and to prevent individual reputation building. We are aware of the possible different impacts 
posed by different feedback formats on cooperation and efficacy of punishment as pointed out by Nikiforakis 
(2010). The author considers three feedback formats – subjects receive information about each team member’s 
contribution, earnings, or both contribution and earnings before making punishment decisions – and finds that 
earnings feedback leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency than contribution feedback. 
Nevertheless, this paper follows the most common format used in public goods experiments with peer 
punishment to adopt the contribution feedback. A potential drawback is that a relative contribution norm is 
exogenously imposed. Brekke et al. (2012) compare the cooperation effect of three ways of framing the decision 
variable in a multi-period threshold public good experiment with unequally endowed participants: absolute 
contributions, contributions relative to endowments, and amounts of endowments kept (i.e., in terms of the 
effects of contributions on final payoffs). They find no significant difference in absolute contribution amounts 
between the absolute and relative framings for both high and low endowment subjects at conventional levels. 
Their finding to some extent mitigates the norm imposing concern in our experiment. Moreover, we are aware of 
the different views on fair contribution rules. See Reuben and Riedl (2013) and Brekke et al. (2012) for detailed 
discussions.  
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experiments with punishment, each subject was also given a one-off lump-sum payment of 50 
ECUs to pay for any eventual loss that might be incurred during the experiment. In our 
experiment, however, nobody incurred such a loss.  
The endowment distribution, the payoff functions, the duration of the experiment (10 
periods), and the instructions were common knowledge to all participants in each treatment. 
Before the commencement of actual decision making, the subjects were required to answer 
control questions to ensure that they had understood the features of the game correctly. In the 
treatment without punishment, at the end of each period the subjects were informed of their 
team’s total contribution, their own income, and the contribution rates of other team members 
in the current period. In the treatments with punishment, at the end of each period the subjects 
were reminded of the income from the contribution sub-stage and the associated cost of the 
punishment points they had assigned. They were also informed of the punishment they 
received in total, the associated income reduction, as well as their final income from that 
period as given by Equation (2). To prevent the possibility of individual reputation formation, 
each of the four subjects in a team was randomly assigned an identification number from 1 to 
4 to identify her actions in a given period and these numbers were randomly shuffled across 
periods.  
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the experimental 
laboratory at Beijing Normal University in May and June 2011. This university is located in 
the center of Beijing and has approximately 20,000 full-time students. The subjects were 
recruited via announcements on a bulletin board system and bulletin boards in teaching and 
accommodation buildings at the university. In total, we had observations from 384 subjects7, 
48 for each treatment. All subjects were allowed to participate in only one session, and they 
did not know about any treatments other than the one in which they participated. To control 
for experimenter effect, the same two individuals, who were unknown to the participants, ran 
all sessions. To keep the outcome of the experiment anonymous, subjects were informed at 
the beginning that they would be paid confidentially and individually in another room and that 
they would leave the laboratory successively so that they would not meet and communicate 
with other subjects after completing the session. The final earnings from the experiment 
totaled the sum of the period payoffs at an exchange rate of 1 ECU to 0.1 Chinese yuan 
(CNY) plus a show-up fee of 10 CNY. The experiment lasted an average of about 76 (104) 
minutes in the treatments without (with) punishment, including above-described stages and a 
                                                            
7 All subjects were Chinese citizens and university students with various academic majors. 
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post-experimental survey covering questions on demographics, academic background, past 
donation behavior, and perceptions about their team in the experiment. The subjects on 
average earned 80.9 (94.6) CNY8 in the treatments without (with) punishment, including the 
show-up fee in all treatments and the lump-sum payment in the treatments with punishment. 
 
3. Behavioral hypotheses  
This section develops behavioral hypotheses on how income distribution and identity strength 
affect cooperation and punishment behavior based on theory and existing empirical evidence. 
Assuming that all people are rational and self-interested exclusively in their material payoffs, 
the standard economic model predicts that people will not contribute anything in a linear 
public good game, irrespective of the income distribution, salience of identity or punishment 
opportunities. However, there is considerable experimental evidence that such a model fails to 
predict actual behavior under many circumstances, suggesting that people are motivated by 
other-regarding preferences and that concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be 
overlooked in social interactions.  
 
3.1 Contributions when punishment is not possible 
It has been well documented in the social psychology and economics literature that a salient 
common organizational or team identity has a positive impact on pro-social behavior. In 
particular, it has been found that a strong identity can reduce free riding in teams with 
homogeneous endowments (see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005). We expect that the positive 
effect of a common identity on contributions carries over to a heterogeneous endowment 
setting. A strong common identity is likely to ameliorate the disagreements and self-serving 
biases in the selection of normative rules underlying contribution behavior by 
heterogeneously endowed subjects. We hence propose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1.1: Team average contribution rate and contribution rate at each endowment 
level will be higher in heterogeneous teams with strong identity (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish) 
than in heterogeneous teams with weak identity (Hetero-Weak-NoPunish) when there is no 
punishment.  
Given that strong identity is expected to increase contribution rates in both homogeneous 
and heterogeneous teams, a related question is if the effect of identity is greater under one of 
these conditions. Although existing theory or evidence cannot provide any comparable 
                                                            
8 The average exchange rate in May and June 2011 was 1 USD = 6.48 CNY. The average hourly wage for 
university students in Beijing at the time of the experiment was approximately 50 CNY. 
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results, we can reason as follows. When a strong identity is built, it is plausible that the 
commonality induced would exert a symmetric positive impact on average contributions in 
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams, since the average endowment is the same across 
these two types of teams. It is also likely that the effect of identity is similar across subjects 
with different endowment levels in heterogeneous teams. At the same time, the potential envy 
from lower endowment subjects to higher endowment teammates in heterogeneous teams 
could be reduced, which would further increase relative contributions from lower endowment 
subjects. For example, Chen and Li (2009) show that participants show a 93% decrease in 
envy when matched with an ingroup member than with an outgroup member. Combining 
these two effects, we formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1.2: A strong identity increases team average contribution rates more in 
heterogeneous teams (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish - Hetero-Weak-NoPunish) than in 
homogeneous teams (Homo-Strong-NoPunish - Homo-Weak-NoPunish) when there is no 
punishment.  
In heterogeneous teams, the question is as well if low and high endowment subjects 
contribute the same (in absolute or relative terms) or not. A number of studies have found that 
individuals with low endowments contribute more relative to endowment than their high-
endowment counterparts (Cherry et al., 2005; Buckley and Croson, 2006). This suggests that 
people are not sufficiently inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Buckley and Croson, 
2006). Rather, they are motivated by normative rules in a self-serving manner that yields them 
the greatest earnings (Nikiforakis et al., 2012). We predict that this pattern will hold or even 
magnify when a strong identity is induced due to the reduced envy from lower endowment 
subjects to higher endowment teammates.     
Hypothesis 1.3: In heterogeneous teams, subjects with lower endowment will give more in 
relative terms than subjects with higher endowment when identity is strong and there is no 
punishment (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish). 
 
3.2 Contributions when punishment is possible 
A well-established finding from repeated public goods experiments is that the existence of 
peer punishment increases and sustains cooperation. Inequity-averse subjects who cooperate 
could be sufficiently upset by the payoff inequality so that they are willing to sanction the free 
riders even at their own cost (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Free riders on the other hand could 
perceive the threat of punishment to be credible and thus would tend to cooperate (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000a). The efficacy of punishment has also been shown to be able to extend to the 
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heterogeneous endowment settings (e.g., Visser and Burns, 2006; Prediger, 2011; Reuben and 
Riedl, 2013). These findings are obtained without an occurrence of strong identity. What if 
identity is strong? The answer depends on the relative strengths of identity and punishment on 
contributions, and the potential interaction between the two. If strong identity increases 
contribution rates substantially, there will be little room left for an additional effect of 
introducing punishment. Vice versa, if the existence of punishment opportunities increases 
contribution rates substantially, there will be little effect of identity on contribution behavior. 
At the same time, there could be reinforcement between the two. In particular, identity could 
affect punishment behavior. As we argue in the next section, we expect punishment of non-
cooperative behavior to increase with a strong identity. We also predict contribution rates to 
increase with the introduction of punishment even when identity is strong since the low 
contributor is likely to raise her contribution to deter punishment. Our hypotheses are that 
both punishment and strong identity affect contribution rates even in the presence of each 
other, thus  
Hypothesis 2.1: The introduction of peer punishment will increase team average contribution 
rates in both homogeneous (Homo-Strong-NoPunish vs. Homo-Strong-Punish) and 
heterogeneous teams (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish vs. Hetero-Strong-Punish) even with the 
presence of strong identity.   
Hypothesis 2.2: Team average contribution rates in teams with strong identity will be higher 
than in teams with weak identity even with the presence of peer punishment irrespective of 
endowment distribution (Homo-Strong-Punish vs. Homo-Weak-Punish, Hetero-Strong-Punish 
vs. Hetero-Weak-Punish).  
Given that we expect strong identity to increase contribution rates both with and without 
punishment, and that identity and punishment tend to reinforce each other, we also 
hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 2.3: A strong identity increases average contribution rates more with punishment 
than without punishment irrespective of endowment distribution ((Homo-Strong-Punish - 
Homo-Weak-Punish) vs. (Homo-Strong-NoPunish - Homo-Weak-NoPunish), (Hetero-Strong-
Punish - Hetero-Weak-Punish) vs. (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish - Hetero-Weak-NoPunish)). 
What about the behavior of subjects with different endowments in heterogeneous teams? 
We have reasoned that within heterogeneous teams people are motivated by normative rules 
in a self-serving manner that yields them the greatest earnings when there is strong identity 
but no punishment. Conditional on the reinforcement between identity and punishment, we 
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would expect that the pattern of individual contributions in heterogeneous teams in the 
absence of punishment carries over to the setting in the presence of punishment. 
Hypothesis 2.4: In heterogeneous teams, subjects with lower endowment will give more in 
relative terms than subjects with higher endowment when identity is strong and there is 
punishment (Hetero-Strong-Punish). 
 
3.3 Punishment behavior 
Previous studies have shown that a substantial fraction of subjects are willing to engage in 
costly punishment of free riders (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Nikiforakis and Normann, 
2008; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Negative emotions toward free riders 
triggered by payoff inequality (i.e., inequity aversion) is the main motive behind this altruistic 
punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fuster and Meier, 2010). How will punishment 
behavior change when a strong identity is induced? Chen and Li (2009) find that individuals 
are more forgiving to ingroup members for misbehavior, whereas McLeish and Oxoby (2007) 
find that unfair offers to ingroup members incur greater use of punishment than those to 
outgroup members. While the existing findings are contradictory, we expect the latter in our 
experiment. First, the proposer-responder game McLeish and Oxoby (2007) used may well 
translate into the public good game we conducted: the allocation of endowment by the 
proposer at the first stage and the punishment assignment by the responder at the second stage 
in the proposer-responder game are simply replaced by actions from every team member in 
the public good game. Second, the sanctioning mechanism in McLeish and Oxoby (2007) 
applies to our experiment as well. Contribution rates lower than the other team members’ 
average contribution rate violate the implicit contribution norm associated with the strong 
common identity. Under such circumstances, the team members are more likely to punish and 
to punish more severely the low contributor than in the absence of a strong identity. Hence, a 
strong identity can help ensure punishment to be pro-social (Goette and Meier, 2011), and we 
expect the intensity of punishment to increase with identity strength.  
Hypothesis 3.1: Punishment will be stronger in teams with strong identity than in teams with 
weak identity irrespective of endowment distribution (Homo-Strong-Punish vs. Homo-Weak-
Punish, Hetero-Strong-Punish vs. Hetero-Weak-Punish).  
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4. Results 
In this section, we analyze the impact of endowment distribution and identity strength on 
contributions to the public good when punishment is absent and present, and on punishment 
behavior.   
 
4.1 Contributions when punishment is not possible 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of average contribution rates over the 10 periods for all 
treatments. For the four treatments without punishment, average contributions start from 30% 
to 50% of subjects’ endowment. This is consistent with previous experimental findings. The 
average contribution rates all rise in the early periods and then decline, although the peaks 
appear at different points in time and the rates of change differ across treatments. As the 
experiment progresses, average contribution rate in the Hetero-Weak treatment becomes 
substantially lower than those of the other three treatments without punishment. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Table 2 reports the average contribution rates over all 10 periods depending on treatment 
(first row) and endowment level (last four rows). Throughout the paper, for team average, the 
unit of observation is team mean over all periods; for subject average, the unit of observation 
is subject mean over all periods. High, Second, Third, and Low refer to endowment levels 
with 80, 60, 40, and 20 ECUs, respectively. In the four treatments without punishment, team 
average contribution rates in Homo-Weak, Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong are at least 50% 
higher than that in the Hetero-Weak treatment (left panel first row).  
<Table 2 about here> 
Since individual cross-period differences and the data structure are not taken into 
consideration in the summary statistics, we now turn to a statistical analysis by regressing 
individual contribution rate on treatment variables of the experiment.9 Since contribution rates 
range between zero and one in each period, i.e., truncated from both above and below, and 
contribution decisions within teams are interdependent across periods, we estimate a subject 
random effects double-censored tobit model with standard errors clustered at the team level. 
We construct one dummy variable for each endowment distribution and identity strength 
combination, i.e., Hetero-Weak, Homo-Weak, Hetero-Strong, and Homo-Strong, equal to one 
if the observation comes from the respective treatment and zero otherwise. Period dummies 
are also included to control for time order effects. To investigate how contribution rates differ 
                                                            
9 We have also conducted non-parametric tests and obtained qualitatively similar results as those from the 
regressions. 
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among subjects with different endowment levels and identity strengths in the heterogeneous 
teams, we use one separate binary dummy variable for each endowment and identity 
combination, i.e., Weak-High, Weak-Second, Weak-Third, Weak-Low, Strong-High, Strong-
Second, Strong-Third, and Strong-Low. Hetero-Weak and Weak-Low are excluded from the 
regressions as the reference groups.   
Table 3 presents the regression results. Models (1) and (2) are estimated for the four 
treatments without punishment. Model (1) includes both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
teams to investigate the aggregate treatment effect, and model (2) includes only 
heterogeneous teams to study the endowment effect. The topmost panel reports the average 
marginal effects of the independent variables. 10  In model (1), when identity is weak, 
homogeneous teams on average contribute 13.2 percentage points more than heterogeneous 
teams. This significant difference is in line with the finding in Cherry et al. (2005). It might be 
explained by the perceived unfairness of endowment heterogeneity, which reduces the 
possibility for a team contribution norm to emerge. When identity becomes strong, the 
significant difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous teams disappears, which 
suggests that building a strong identity can counteract the negative impact of endowment 
heterogeneity on contributions (bottom panel (i)). The bridging of the difference is because 
strong identity significantly and substantially increases contribution rates in heterogeneous 
teams (14.8 percentage points) but it does not have a significant effect on contributions in 
homogeneous teams (bottom panel (ii)). Consequently, Hypothesis 1.1 on the positive effect 
of identity on contribution rates for heterogeneous teams is supported. There are two possible 
interpretations for the null result for homogeneous teams: one is that our identity 
manipulation is not salient enough to exert a significant effect on homogeneous teams (see, 
e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007); the other is that contribution rates are 
already high under weak identity, and therefore the impact of a strong identity is weakened. 
Which interpretation is more appropriate will be discussed in Section 5. Although the increase 
in contribution rates due to strong identity is greater in heterogeneous than in homogeneous 
teams, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (linear combination 
of the model marginal effects ((Homo-Strong-NoPunish - Homo-Weak-NoPunish) - (Hetero-
                                                            
10  Using McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the marginal effect of contribution rates, �𝑐
𝐸
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Strong-NoPunish - Hetero-Weak-NoPunish)) is -0.103, and the standard error is 0.087). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1.2 is rejected.  
<Table 3 about here> 
When breaking heterogeneous teams down to various endowment levels (model (2)), we 
observe that the marginal effects of the endowment level dummies under weak identity are 
negative and statistically significant only except Weak-Third, indicating that low endowment 
subjects on average always contribute the largest proportion of endowment compared to their 
team members with higher endowments under weak identity.11 This result is in line with 
previous findings (e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006; Prediger, 2011). In addition, we also find 
that low endowment subjects contribute relatively more in the Hetero-Strong treatment 
(bottom panel (iii)-(v)). 12 Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.3. Investigating the effect of 
identity for each endowment level, we see that the increase in contribution rates when 
endowment decreases is the same under weak and strong identities (bottom panel (vi)-(viii)). 
This suggests that the effect of identity is similar across subjects with different endowment 
levels. Hence, we reject Hypothesis 1.1 on the positive effect of identity on contribution rates 
at each endowment level. 
 
4.2 Contributions when punishment is possible  
In this section, we examine whether and how contribution behavior changes when peer 
punishment is introduced. Comparing team average contribution rates in each column 
between the left and right panel of Table 2 (first row), we find that contribution rates are 
drastically and significantly higher in the treatments with punishment for all endowment 
distribution and identity strength combinations (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value=0.024 for 
Homo-Weak; p-value=0.002 for Hetero-Weak; p-value=0.002 for Homo-Strong; p-
value=0.043 for Hetero-Strong). Consequently, we find strong support for Hypothesis 2.1 that 
punishment increases contribution rates in both endowment distributions under strong 
                                                            
11 However, it should be noted that the pattern is different if we look at absolute contribution amounts: higher 
endowment subjects always contribute a greater absolute amount.  
12 We believe that it is the endowments rather than using quiz performance to determine endowments that cause 
the effects. First, the general knowledge quiz consists of questions from ten different fields, including astronomy 
and navigation, geography and biology, science and technology. The coverage of questions should not favor 
subjects with certain knowledge structure or social preference. Second, we have compared the team average 
number of correct quiz answers between the heterogeneous endowment treatments and between subject average 
number of correct quiz answers at each endowment level, and find no significant difference in any pairs (Mann-
Whitney U test, p-value<0.1). Third, we have also tested the equality of age, gender, major (natural science or 
social science) and degree (bachelor or master degree) of the subjects of any two endowment levels within each 
heterogeneous endowment treatment, and in general find support for the null hypothesis in these general 
knowledge related characteristics (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value<0.1). 
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identity. It should be noted already here that later on we show that this result is not necessarily 
robust to the identity-building activity and the effectiveness of punishment. The same pattern 
can be found for subjects at the same endowment level when we compare the last four entries 
of column (2) with (6) and (4) with (8) (Mann-Whitney U test, all p-values<0.1). However, 
the magnitude of the increase varies considerably across treatments and endowment levels. 
The strong effect of punishment is not unique to our experiment. Other studies using partner 
matching with similar MPCR and punishment effectiveness parameter as ours obtain a similar 
increase in contribution rates when punishment is introduced (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Reuben and Riedl, 2013). As shown in Figure 1, average contribution rates in the treatments 
with punishment are all at a higher level after a similar starting point as in the treatments 
without punishment, and overall appear to be increasing over time. The evolution of 
contribution rates follows a similar pattern among the four treatments with punishment except 
Homo-Strong, which outstands the others from the beginning of the experiment. The 
divergence between treatments with and without punishment over time confirms the general 
finding from the existing literature that the presence of punishment opportunities is effective 
in improving and sustaining cooperation. However, the average contribution rates do not 
reach the maximum possible level in any of the four treatments with punishment. Full 
contributions account for 40%, 35%, 47%, and 33% of the total observations in Homo-Weak, 
Hetero-Weak, Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong, respectively, suggesting that the contribution 
“ceiling” is not reached by the majority in any of these treatments.  
Models (3) and (4) in Table 3 present the regression results for the four treatments with 
punishment. In model (3), there is only one important and statistically significant difference 
among the treatments: under strong identity team average contribution rates are higher in 
homogeneous teams than in heterogeneous teams (bottom panel (i)). This is an interesting but 
unexpected result, in particular since we find that without punishment strong identity removes 
the contribution difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous teams. This 
contradiction may be interpreted by the different reinforcing effects between punishment and 
identity on relative contributions in homogeneous and heterogeneous teams: punishment of 
non-cooperative behavior under strong identity tends to be more severe in homogeneous than 
in heterogeneous teams, which will be discussed in the next section, and as a consequence 
contributions in the following periods will respond and rise more in homogeneous teams. That 
the other treatment effects are statistically insignificant indicates that we can reject 
Hypothesis 2.2 that contribution rates are higher under strong identity than under weak 
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identity when there is punishment (marginal effect of Hetero-Strong and bottom panel (ii)).13 
From this it also follows that we can reject Hypothesis 2.3 that a strong identity increases 
average contribution rates more with punishment than without (p-value for the cross-
treatment tests ((Homo-Strong-Punish - Homo-Weak-Punish) - (Homo-Strong-NoPunish - 
Homo-Weak-NoPunish)) is 0.595, and p-value for ((Hetero-Strong-Punish - Hetero-Weak-
Punish) - (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish - Hetero-Weak-NoPunish)) is 0.155) 14 . One possible 
explanation for why strong identity does not further raise contributions in either endowment 
distribution may be that peer punishment alone is effective enough to push contribution rates 
to a high level and a strong common identity will not exert any further influence. This finding 
suggests that under this experimental design, peer punishment dominates common identity 
when both are viable in the effect on cooperation enhancement.  
Regarding various endowment levels within heterogeneous teams (model (4)), we find 
that low endowment subjects on average always contribute a significantly greater proportion 
of the endowment than subjects with higher endowments, under both weak and strong 
identities (marginal effects of Weak-High, Weak-Second, and Weak-Third, and bottom panel 
(iii)-(v), except (v) where the difference is insignificant at conventional levels). 15  These 
results could hence be interpreted by similar motives as those underlying behavior in 
heterogeneous teams without punishment, and Hypothesis 2.4 is supported. If we compare 
contribution rates between the weak and strong identity for each endowment level in relation 
to the Low endowment, we see that again there are not statistically significant differences 
(bottom panel (vi)-(viii)). 
 
                                                            
13 The finding of only one statistically significant difference in contribution rates among the four treatments with 
punishment may raise a concern that subjects contribute a high share anyway due to the presence of punishment 
and do not respond to different endowment distributions and identity strengths adequately well. Besides the 
proportion of full contributions in each treatment with punishment, we also look at a less restrictive concept of 
the “ceiling”, which is an arbitrarily high contribution rate but not 1. To test the presence of such a “ceiling 
effect” in contribution rates, we split the observations in the treatments with punishment into two subsamples – 
one with team average contribution rate above the median of each treatment and one below. The average 
contribution rate in the above median subsample is 0.89, 0.88, 0.93, and 0.86 for the Homo-Weak, Hetero-Weak, 
Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong treatments, respectively. These are rather high rates. We also rerun model (3) 
of Table 3 for each subsample separately. We find that in the below median subsample, there are no significant 
treatment effects, whereas in the above median subsample the team average contribution rate in the Homo-
Strong treatment is significantly higher than that in the Hetero-Strong and Homo-Weak treatments at 
conventional levels. This suggests that subjects in the above median subsample respond to the treatments and do 
not contribute anyway at a high level.    
14 For single parameter tests, we calculate 𝑧 = 𝛼𝑗−𝛼�𝑗
�𝛴𝑗𝑗+𝛴�𝑗𝑗
, where 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛼�𝑗 are the two parameters of interest from 
the two regressions, and 𝛴𝑗𝑗 and 𝛴�𝑗𝑗 are the corresponding main diagonal elements in the variance-covariance 
matrix. Since the two parameters come from two separate regressions, their covariance by construction is zero. Z 
follows a standard normal distribution under the null of equality. We report two-sided p-values. 
15 Absolute contribution amounts are also always higher from higher endowment subjects. 
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4.3 Punishment behavior 
We now turn to the analysis of punishment behavior. Table 4 reports the average number of 
punishment points assigned by subject i to j in the same team depending on treatment and 
endowment level. The first row shows that the average number of punishment points allocated 
is around 0.5 out of a maximum of 25 in all four treatments. Punishment occurs in 1,071 out 
of 5,760 possible cases, and boils down to 22% of 1,440 possible cases in Homo-Weak, 17% 
in Hetero-Weak, 19% in Homo-Strong, and 16% in Hetero-Strong. The last four entries in 
columns (2) and (4) demonstrate that there are some variations in punishment assignment 
across endowment levels within heterogeneous teams. Friedman two-way analysis of variance 
by ranks tests reject the null hypothesis that punishment points assigned by subjects of 
different endowment levels are from the same population under either identity strength (p-
values<0.01).       
<Table 4 about here> 
Some regularities regarding punishment behavior have been identified from previous 
public goods experiments (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Carpenter and Matthews, 2009; 
Nikiforakis et al., 2010). In particular, punishment is mostly directed toward team members 
contributing less than the team average, and the severity of punishment increases with the 
difference between the contributions of the target and of the team average. In order to 
investigate this, we conduct a regression analysis of punishment assignment behavior. To 
account for the large number of zero punishment and a handful of full punishment as well as 
the interdependence of punishment decisions across periods among team members, we again 
apply the random effects double-censored tobit model with standard errors clustered at the 
team level. In addition to the treatment variables and period dummies, we include the 
following three independent variables in some of the regressions to capture the regularities in 
punishment behavior: others’ average contribution rate, absolute negative deviation, and 
positive deviation. Others’ average contribution rate is the average value of the team 
members’ contribution rates of subject j (i.e., ∑ �𝑐
𝐸
�
ℎ,𝑡ℎ≠𝑗 /3), excluding that of subject j. 
Absolute negative deviation is the absolute value of the deviation of subject j’s contribution 
rate from the others’ average in case her own contribution is below the average (i.e., max{0, ∑ �𝑐𝐸�ℎ,𝑡ℎ≠𝑗
3
− �
𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑗,𝑡}). This variable is zero if the subject’s own contribution rate is 
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equal or above the others’ average. Positive deviation (i.e., max{0, �𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑗,𝑡 − (∑ �𝑐𝐸�ℎ,𝑡)ℎ≠𝑗 /3}) 
is constructed analogously. 16 
Table 5 reports the regression results. Models (1) and (2) are estimated using both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams, whereas models (3) and (4) are estimated only using 
heterogeneous teams. Models (1) and (3) only include treatment variables, whereas models 
(2) and (4) also account for the punishment regularities. The topmost panel reports the 
average marginal effects of the independent variables.17 The results in model (1) indicate that 
punishment does not vary with identity strength (marginal effect of Hetero-Strong and bottom 
panel (ii)). Thus, we find no support for Hypothesis 3.1 that a strong identity increases 
punishment. Our result is at odds with the findings from both Chen and Li (2009) and 
McLeish and Oxoby (2007), indicating that negative reciprocity is not affected by identity 
strength in our setting. Furthermore, homogeneous teams punish more severely than 
heterogeneous teams under weak identity but not under strong identity (marginal effect of 
Homo-Weak and bottom panel (i)). In model (2), when punishment regularities are accounted 
for, the difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous teams under strong identity also 
becomes statistically significant. This is consistent with our finding in contribution behavior. 
The more vehement punishment in homogeneous teams suggests that negative emotions 
toward low contributors triggered by payoff inequity aversion are stronger when endowments 
are equal. The upward change in marginal effects and significance shows that the effect of 
endowment homogeneity on punishment is underestimated without controlling for 
punishment regularities. The three regularity variables are all statistically significant with 
expected signs. The negative marginal effect of Others’ average contribution rate indicates 
that less punishment is used when a high common team contribution standard has already 
been established. The positive marginal effect of Absolute negative deviation and negative 
marginal effect of Positive deviation show that the extent of punishment increases (decreases) 
                                                            
16  We are aware of other possible punishment regularities within one’s own team such as that based on 
individual contribution comparison between the punisher and the target. That is, individuals often punish team 
members who contribute proportionally less than they do. Although we choose to follow the literature and use 
the most commonly assumed punishment regularities since Fehr and Gächter (2000b) as based on team average 
contribution comparison, qualitatively similar results are obtained when we instead control for individual 
absolute negative deviation (i.e.,  max{0, �𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑖,𝑡 − �𝑐𝐸�𝑗,𝑡} ) and individual positive deviation 
(i.e., max{0, �𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑗,𝑡 − �𝑐𝐸�𝑖,𝑡}).    
17 Using McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the marginal effect of punishment, 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡, is calculated as  
𝜕𝐸(𝑝𝑖|𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝜕 Pr(0 < 𝑝𝑖 < 25|𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
∙ 𝐸(𝑝𝑖|𝐱, 0 < 𝑝𝑖 < 25) + Pr(0 < 𝑝𝑖 < 25|𝐱) ∙ 𝜕𝐸(𝑝𝑖|𝐱, 0 < 𝑝𝑖 < 25)𝜕𝑥𝑗 +  𝜕Pr (𝑝𝑖 = 25|𝐱)𝜕𝑥𝑗 ∙ 25 
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with the size of absolute negative (positive) deviation of the target’s from the others’ average 
contribution rate.  
<Table 5 about here> 
The patterns in punishment behavior discussed above are at an aggregate level for all four 
treatments with punishment. In order to check whether these patterns are common across 
treatments, we examine them separately for each treatment. Table 6 reports the regression 
results. Following Goette et al. (2012b), we test the equality of marginal effects across 
treatments in the bottom panel using two-sided z-tests for single parameter comparison and 
𝜒2-tests for parameter vector comparison.18 In all treatments, the marginal effect of Absolute 
negative deviation is positive and statistically significant, i.e., the more an individual’s 
contribution rate falls below the others’ average, the more she gets punished. The tests 
comparing two marginal effects show no significant difference across treatments (bottom 
panel (ii)). Others’ average contribution rate exerts a negative and statistically significant 
effect only in the Homo-Weak and Hetero-Strong treatments. However, the marginal effects 
do not differ between any of the treatments (bottom panel (i)). In contrast, Positive deviation 
has a significantly negative impact only in the Homo-Strong treatment, but the marginal 
effects do not differ between any of the treatments (bottom panel (ii)). Finally, as expected, 
for all joint response tests (bottom panel (iv)), we fail to find any significant differences 
between treatments.  
<Table 6 about here> 
Models (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the regression results on punishment assignment by 
subjects with different endowment levels in the heterogeneous teams. In model (3), without 
punishment regularities, we find no evidence of any differences between endowment levels 
(marginal effects of Weak-High, Weak-Second, and Weak-Third and bottom panel (iii)-(v)). 
These results are in line with those in Visser and Burns (2006) and Prediger (2011). Thus, 
punishment does not decrease with the relative cost of sanctioning, which contrasts the results 
in Anderson and Putterman (2006) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), but is rather income 
inelastic, which is consistent with the findings in Carpenter (2007). In addition, comparing 
punishment between weak and strong identity for each endowment level in relation to the Low 
endowment, we find that there are no significant differences (bottom panel (vi)-(viii)). When 
punishment regularities are accounted for (model (4)), third endowment subjects with weak 
                                                            
18 For single parameter tests, please refer to footnote 14.  For parameter vector tests, we calculate the analogous 
test statistic 𝜒2 = �𝛃 − 𝛃��′(𝚺 + 𝚺�)−1�𝛃 − 𝛃��, where 𝛃 is a column vector. 𝜒2 follows a Chi-squared distribution 
with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of variables in 𝛃.    
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identity and second endowment subjects with strong identity punish significantly more than 
their low endowment teammates but only at the 10% level. Punishment assignment responds 
to Others’ average contribution rate and to Absolute negative deviation in a similar fashion as 
that in the pooled sample with both homogeneous and heterogeneous teams. However, 
Positive deviation does not have a significant impact on the size of punishment in 
heterogeneous teams, which is consistent with the results in Table 6. 
The final issue we investigate is to what extent the role of the punishment regularities 
depends on the endowment level of the target. We test this by interacting the three variables 
Others’ average contribution rate, Absolute negative deviation, and Positive deviation with 
three dummy variables for the endowment level of the target. The reference group is that the 
target has Low endowment. Results are presented in Table 7.  
<Table 7 about here> 
A few of the interaction terms are statistically significant. To begin with, the influence of 
Others’ average contribution rate on punishment is the strongest if the endowment level of 
the target subject is low or third. This is revealed by the positive sign of the interaction terms 
for the target with high and second endowments. This suggests that a punisher is less likely to 
be influenced by the overall contribution rate when deciding how much to punish a higher 
endowment target. Regarding the interaction terms for Absolute negative deviation and 
Positive deviation, only one of the terms is statistically significant and only at the 10% level. 
This indicates that punishment on the deviations from the average contribution rate does not 
depend on the endowment of the target.  
 
5. Are the findings robust?  
Our findings, in particular that punishment is more important than identity, of course raise the 
question of to what extent they are specific to our experimental design. In order to investigate 
this, we conducted four additional treatments, where we strengthened identity and weakened 
punishment effectiveness. In all the treatments the endowment is homogenous in order to 
keep the amount of sessions at a reasonable level. The new identity-building activity involved 
computerized team communication and was conducted after the endowment-determination 
stage. Subjects were randomly assigned to teams of four members and solved a second quiz of 
four questions similar to those used to determine endowments. They were given 2.5 minutes 
to answer each question and the opportunity to discuss the question with other members of 
their own teams via an online chat program. Participation in the discussion was voluntary. All 
subjects submitted their answers individually without a requirement to conform to a team 
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answer. No reward was attached to correct answers or identical answers from all team 
members. The same four subjects of a team would subsequently play the public goods game. 
We believe that the strength of identity induced by the online chat is elevated from that 
induced by the “human knot” game, because the feeling of generalized reciprocity (e.g., 
Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000) is created over the same small group of people, and the 
discrepancy between the number of people who share a common goal and help each other and 
the number of people who interact in the public goods game is removed.  
We also changed the effectiveness of punishment to make it more costly to the punishers: 
each punishment point now cost the punished member 2 ECUs and the punishing member 1 
ECU; previously it was 3 to 1. The new treatments were conducted at Beijing Normal 
University as well in December 2013. All conditions remained identical to those in the 
original experiments, including number of subjects in each treatment, subject recruitment 
procedure, and experiment implementation process.  
 
5.1 Contribution behavior 
Table 8 reports the average contribution rates for the four new treatments. Compared to those 
in the original homogeneous treatments, average contribution rates are higher in the two new 
treatments without punishment and lower in the two new treatments with punishment.  
<Table 8 about here> 
In order to gauge the relative strengths of our two identity-building activities and two sets 
of punishment effectiveness parameters on promoting cooperation, we estimate one 
regression model for the four new treatments and one for the four original homogenous 
treatments. We again construct one dummy variable for each identity and punishment 
combination. The weak identity with no punishment is used as the reference group and 
omitted from the regressions. Table 9 reports the regression results from these two tobit 
models. It is clear that some of our previous findings are robust, whereas some are not. To 
begin with, when there is no punishment, in the new enhanced identity treatment 
contributions are not higher than those in the treatment with weak identity (marginal effect of 
Strong-NoPunish). This is consistent with our previous finding. Thus, even a stronger 
identity-building activity fails to increase contributions in homogenous teams. We stated two 
possible interpretations for the null result in Section 4.1: one is that our identity manipulation 
is not salient enough to exert a significant effect on homogeneous teams; the other is that 
contribution rates are already high under weak identity, and therefore the impact of a strong 
identity is weakened. The failure of a stronger identity manipulation in increasing 
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contributions in homogenous teams suggests that the second argument is more plausible. 
These findings complement the literature of induced identity by showing that not only the 
salience of identity matters for its effect on cooperation, but also the initial level of 
cooperation needs to be sufficiently low. In addition, with a more costly punishment in the 
new treatments, contributions still increase when identity is weak compared to the case of no 
punishment (marginal effect of Weak-Punish). However, what differs from our original 
results is that punishment fails to enhance contributions in presence of strong identity (third 
panel (ii)). Therefore, these new results suggest that the interactive effect of identity and 
punishment indeed depends on the relative strengths of the identity-building activity and the 
cost of punishment. Do note that compared with the previous treatments, there are two things 
that are different: identity is stronger and punishment is less effective.  
<Table 9 about here> 
At the bottom of Table 9 we make a comparison of marginal effects across the original 
and new treatments. Since contribution behavior in the baseline treatments (Homo-Weak-
NoPunish) is not statistically significantly different between original and new treatments, we 
can make a direct comparison between them. 19 First of all, without punishment there is no 
statistically significant difference between the impacts of the “human knot” game and the 
online chat (bottom panel (iii)). Second, with weak identity, the effect of punishment does not 
vary with the effectiveness of punishment (bottom panel (iv)). Thus, even if there are some 
differences in the strengths of identity and punishment, we fail to find any significant 
differences in contribution behavior. However, when both identity and punishment 
mechanisms are adopted, online chat is equivalent to punishment effectiveness of 2 to 1 in 
terms of the effect on contribution promotion, whereas “human knot” game is not as effective 
as punishment of 1 to 3. Moreover, given that identity is strong, punishment parameter of 3 to 
1 exceeds 2 to 1 in stimulating contributions (bottom panel (vi)).    
 
5.2 Punishment behavior 
The next step is to unravel the effect of the new identity-building activity on punishment 
assignment. Table 8 also reports the average number of punishment points assigned for the 
four new treatments. In relation to those in the original homogeneous treatments, punishment 
is higher in the new treatment under weak identity, but is lower in the new treatment under 
strong identity. Table 10 reports the regression results for the two new treatments with 
                                                            
19 We have compared contribution rates in these two baseline treatments using both Mann-Whitney U test and 
regression and obtained consistent result of statistical equality.     
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punishment and the two original homogeneous treatments with punishment. In the new 
treatments, we find that subjects with strong identity punish significantly less than subjects 
with weak identity (marginal effect of Strong-Punish). This result holds when punishment 
regularities are controlled for in model (2). Hence, Hypothesis 3.1 that a strong identity 
increases punishment is again rejected; on the contrary we find that punishment is lower when 
identity is strong. In the original treatments we find no significant difference between weak 
and strong identity. However, while the marginal effect of strong identity in the new 
treatments is three times as large as that in the original treatments, the large standard errors 
lead to no rejection to the equality of the two marginal effects (bottom panel (i) and (ii)).20  
<Table 10 about here> 
 
6.  Conclusions 
How to foster cooperation in organizations when free-riding incentives prevail and individual 
members are diverse in for example ability and motivation is an important economic problem. 
In this paper, we have investigated the relative importance of common identity and peer 
punishment under homogeneous and heterogeneous income distributions in contribution rates 
to a team public good. There are three key findings. First, when punishment is not possible, 
endowment heterogeneity negatively affects cooperation, yet strong identity can counteract 
this negative impact. However, strong identity does not increase cooperation in homogeneous 
teams, nor increase cooperation more in heterogeneous than in homogeneous teams. Second, 
the introduction of punishment successfully raises and sustains cooperation in both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous teams when identity is weak. Under strong identity, the 
effect of punishment depends on the effectiveness of punishment and the strength of the 
identity-building activity. In the original strong identity treatments we find that punishment 
increases cooperation even under strong identity for both income distributions. However, 
when introducing another stronger identity-building activity and a less effective punishment 
in the robustness test, we find that punishment does not further increase cooperation. 
Moreover, with punishment, cooperation is greater under strong identity in homogeneous than 
in heterogeneous teams, and so is the punishment inflicted. However, strong identity fails to 
further enhance cooperation or to push punishment in either endowment distribution. Third, 
the interaction between the new punishment level and identity suggests that if anything 
punishment is less fierce in teams with strong identity. 
                                                            
20 We have compared punishment assignment in the two baseline treatments (Homo-Weak-Punish) using both 
Mann-Whitney U tests and regression and obtained consistent result of statistical equality. 
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Our findings provide some important implications for our understanding of how teams 
can be organized, for instance in the workplace, in order to induce higher cooperation. First, 
management policy makers should be precautious in implementing ex ante income 
heterogeneity within teams. It leads to lower cooperation than does an ex ante equal income 
scheme when neither building a common identity nor peer punishment is viable. Although 
there is not significantly distinguishable difference from homogeneous income teams any 
more in terms of cooperation when a common identity is induced, some cost incurred in 
changing employees’ identities is not avoidable. Second, when both identity building and peer 
punishment are available, it is not clear what the relative effects of these two are, and what the 
implications of implementing both at the same time are. Our initial evidence suggests that 
punishment is more effective than establishing a common identity. However, when we 
weaken the effectiveness of punishment and strengthen identity, this difference disappears. 
The changes in punishment effectiveness and identity-building activity are not dramatic, and 
in isolation their effects on cooperation are not affected compared to the original measures, 
but the interactive effect between them is affected. Consequently, which of identity and 
punishment could be considered a more effective norm enforcement mechanism in teams is 
rather sensitive to their relative strengths. Finally, our finding regarding punishment and 
identity is interesting, since it suggest that if anything punishment is less prevalent in groups 
with strong identity. 
This study should be viewed as a first step toward considering the interactive effects of 
income distribution, identity, and punishment on cooperation. A natural extension would be to 
conduct the same experiment with real employees and real tasks in real-world workplaces to 
test the external validity of our results. Moreover, it would be interesting to use natural 
identities within existing social groups or primed natural social identities, such as gender, 
ethnicity, and different household registration types to study the same issues.  
 
  
26 
 
References 
Abbink, K., J. Brandts, B. Herrmann, and H. Orzen. 2010. “Intergroup Conflict and Intra-
group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game.” American Economic Review 100 
(1): 420–447.   
Akerlof, G.A., and R.E. Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115(3): 715–753.  
Akerlof, G.A., and R.E. Kranton. 2005. “Identity and the Economics of Organizations.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1): 9–32. 
Akerlof, G.A., and R.E. Kranton. 2008. “Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups.” American 
Economic Review 98 (2): 212–217. 
Alchian, A.A., and H. Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization.” American Economic Review 62: 777–795. 
Anderson, C., and L. Putterman. 2006. “Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of 
Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.” 
Games and Economic Behavior 54 (1): 1–24. 
Anderson, L.R., J.M. Mellor, and J. Milyo. 2008. “Inequality and Public Good Provision: An 
Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Socio-Economics 37: 1010–1028.   
Andreoni, J. 1995. “Cooperation in Public-goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?” 
American Economic Review 85(4): 891–904. 
Balafoutas, L., M.G. Kocher, L., Putterman, and M. Sutter. 2013. “Equality, Equity and 
Incentives: An Experiment.” European Economic Review 60: 32–51. 
Bernhard, H., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher. 2006. “Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm 
Enforcement.” American Economic Review 96(2): 217–221.  
Botelho, A, G.W. Harrison, L.M. Costa Pinto, and E.E. Rutström. 2009. Testing Static Game 
Theory with Dynamic Experiments: A Case Study of Public Goods. Game and Economic 
Behavior 67: 253–265. 
Brekke, K.A., J. Konow, and K. Nyborg. 2012. “Cooperation is Relative: Income and 
Framing Effects with Public Goods.” Memorandum 16/2012, Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo. 
Buckley, E., and R. Croson. 2006. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Voluntary 
Provision of Linear Public Goods.” Journal of Public Economics 90(4): 935–955. 
Carpenter, J. 2007. “The Demand for Punishment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 62 (4): 522–542. 
27 
 
Carpenter, J., S. Bowles, H. Gintis, and S. Hwang. 2009. “Strong Reciprocity and Team 
Production: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71: 
221–232. 
Carpenter, J., and P.H. Matthews. 2009. What Norms Trigger Punishment? Experimental 
Economics 12: 272–288. 
Chan, K.S., S. Mestelman, R. Moir, and R.A. Muller. 1996. “The Voluntary Provision of 
Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions.” Canadian Journal of Economics 
29(1): 54–69. 
Charness, G., L. Rigotti, and A. Rustichini. 2007. “Individual Behavior and Group 
Membership.” American Economic Review 97(4): 1340–1352.  
Che, Y.-K., and S.-W. Yoo. 2001. “Optimal Incentives for Teams.” American Economic 
Review 91(3): 525–541. 
Chen, R., and Y. Chen. 2011. “The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection.” 
American Economic Review 101(6): 2562–2589. 
Chen, Y., and S.X. Li. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American Economic 
Review 99(1): 431–457.  
Chen, Y., S.X. Li, T.X. Liu, and M. Shih. 2014. “Which Hat to Wear? Impact of Natural 
Identities on Coordination and Cooperation. ” Games and Economic Behavior 84: 58–86. 
Cherry, T., S. Kroll, and J. Shogren. 2005. “The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and 
Origin on Public Good Contributions: Evidence from the Lab.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 57(3): 357–365.  
Cinyabuguma, M., T. Page, and L. Putterman. 2006. “Can Second-order Punishment Deter 
Perverse Punishment? Experimental Economics 9: 265–279. 
Eckel, C.C., and P.J. Grossman. 2005. “Managing Diversity by Creating Team Identity.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58(3): 371–392. 
Egas, M., and A. Riedl. 2008. “The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Maintenance 
of Cooperation.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275: 871–878. 
Fehr, E., and S. Gächter. 2000a. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 159–181.   
Fehr, E., and S. Gächter. 2000b. “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods 
Experiments.” American Economic Review 90: 980–994. 
Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3): 817–868. 
28 
 
Fischbacher, U., 2007. “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments.” 
Experimental Economics 10 (2): 171–178. 
Fischbacher, U., and S. Gächter. 2010. “Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free 
Riding in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 100 (1): 541–556. 
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter, and E. Fehr. 2001. “Are People Conditionally Cooperative? 
Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment.” Economics Letters 71(3): 397–404. 
Fisher, J., R.M. Isaac, J.W. Schatzberg, and J.M. Walker. 1995. “Heterogeneous Demand for 
Public Goods: Behavior in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” Public Choice 85: 
249–266. 
Fuster, A., and S. Meier. 2010. “Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect 
on Norm Enforcement.” Management Science 56 (1): 57–70. 
Goette, L., D. Huffman, and S. Meier. 2006. “The Impact of Group Membership on 
Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real 
Social Groups.” American Economic Review 96(2): 212–216. 
Goette, L., D. Huffman, and S. Meier. 2012a. “The Impact of Social Ties on Group 
Interactions: Evidence from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups.” 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4(1): 101–115.  
Goette, L., D. Huffman, S. Meier, and M. Sutter. 2012b. “Competition between 
Organizational Groups: its Impact on Altruistic and Anti-social Motivations.” 
Management Science 58(5): 948–960. 
Goette, L., and S. Meier. 2011. “Can Integration Tame Conflicts?” Science 334: 1356.  
Gächter, S., and A. Riedl. 2005. “Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible 
Claims,” Management Science 51: 249–263. 
Herrmann, B, C. Thöni, and S. Gächter. 2008. “Antisocial Punishment across Societies.” 
Science 319: 1362–1367.  
Hoffman, E., and M.L. Spitzer. 1985. “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental 
Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice.” Journal of Legal Studies 14: 
259–297. 
Hofmeyr, A., J. Burns, and M. Visser. 2007. “Income Inequality, Reciprocity and Public 
Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis.” South African Journal of Economics 75(3): 
508–520. 
Houser, D., E. Xiao, K. McCabe, and V. Smith. 2008. “When Punishment Fails: Research on 
Sanctions, Intentions and Non-cooperation.” Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2): 509–
532. 
29 
 
Isaac, Mark R., and James M. Walker. 1988. “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: 
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(1): 179–
199. 
Kandel, E., and E.P. Lazear. 1992. “Peer Pressure and Partnerships.” Journal of Political 
Economy 100(4): 801–817. 
Lembke, S., and M.G. Wilson. 1998. “Putting the ‘Team’ into Teamwork: Alternative 
Theoretical Contributions for Contemporary Management Practice.” Human Relations 
51: 927–944. 
Mas, A., and E. Moretti. 2009. “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99(1): 112–145. 
Masclet, D., C.N. Noussair, S. Tucker, and M.C. Villeval. 2003. “Monetary and Non-
monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.” American Economic 
Review 93: 366–380. 
McDonald, J. F, and R.A. Moffitt. 1980. “The Uses of Tobit Analysis.” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 62: 318–321.  
McLeish, K.N., and R.J. Oxoby. 2007. “Identity, Cooperation, and Punishment.” IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 2572. 
McLeish, K.N., and R.J. Oxoby. 2011. “Social Interactions and the Salience of Social 
Identity.” Journal of Economic Psychology 32(1): 172–178. 
Nikiforakis, N. 2008. “Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Good Games: Can We 
Really Govern Ourselves?” Journal of Public Economics 92: 91–112. 
Nikiforakis, N. 2010. “Feedback, Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments.” 
Games and Economic Behavior 68: 689–702. 
Nikiforakis, N., and H.T. Normann. 2008. “A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in 
Public-Good Experiments.” Experimental Economics 11: 358–369. 
Nikiforakis, N., H.T. Normann, and B. Wallace. 2010. “Asymmetric Enforcement of 
Cooperation in a Social Dilemma.” Southern Economic Journal 76 (3): 638–659.  
Nikiforakis, N., C.N. Noussair, and T. Wilkening. 2012. “Normative Conflict and Feuds: The 
Limits of Self-Enforcement.” Journal of Public Economics 96: 797–807. 
Prediger, S. 2011. “How Does Income Inequality Affect Cooperation and Punishment in 
Public Good Settings.” MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 38–
2011. 
Reuben, E., and A. Riedl. 2009. “Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged 
Groups.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53: 72–93. 
30 
 
Reuben, E., and A. Riedl. 2013. “Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games 
with Heterogeneous Populations.” Games and Economic Behavior 77(1): 122–137.   
Ruffle, B., and R. Sosis. 2006. “Cooperation and the In-group-Out-group Bias: A Field Test 
on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 60(2): 147–163. 
Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In S. Worchel 
and W. Austin (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole, pp. 33–47. 
Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1985. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In S. 
Worchel and W. Austin (eds.), The Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall, pp. 7–24. 
Van Dijk, F., J. Sonnemans, and F. van Winden. 2002. “Social Ties in a Public Good 
Experiment.” Journal of Public Economics 85: 275–299. 
Visser, M., and J. Burns. 2006. “Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and 
Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods.” Working Paper in Economics No.219. 
University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg. 
Yamagishi, T., and T. Kiyonari. 2000. “The Group as the Container of Generalized 
Reciprocity.” Social Psychology Quarterly 63(2): 116–132.  
   
31 
 
Table 1. Experimental treatments 
Treatment Endowment distribution Identity Punishment 
Homo-Weak-NoPunish Homogeneous Weak No 
Hetero-Weak-NoPunish Heterogeneous Weak No 
Homo-Strong-NoPunish Homogeneous Strong No 
Hetero-Strong-NoPunish Heterogeneous Strong No 
Homo-Weak-Punish Homogeneous Weak Yes 
Hetero-Weak-Punish Heterogeneous Weak Yes 
Homo-Strong-Punish Homogeneous Strong Yes 
Hetero-Strong-Punish Heterogeneous Strong Yes 
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Table 2. Average contribution rates across treatments 
  Without punishment   With punishment 
 
Homo-
Weak 
Hetero-
Weak 
Homo-
Strong 
Hetero-
Strong  
Homo-
Weak 
Hetero-
Weak 
Homo-
Strong 
Hetero-
Strong 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Average 0.46 0.31 0.50 0.46  0.69 0.67 0.79 0.67 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.25) 
High  0.27  0.38   0.65  0.63 
  (0.21)  (0.26)   (0.27)  (0.26) 
Second  0.25  0.42   0.63  0.61 
  (0.14)  (0.27)   (0.27)  (0.30) 
Third  0.32  0.46   0.68  0.72 
  (0.20)  (0.24)   (0.27)  (0.26) 
Low  0.39  0.59   0.74  0.73 
    (0.29)   (0.26)     (0.27)   (0.28) 
Notes: The table reports the average contribution rates depending on treatment (first row) and endowment level 
(last four rows). Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 3. Determinants of contribution rates 
Dependent variable: contribution rate of subject i in period t, �𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑖,𝑡   
 Without punishment With punishment 
 Homo & Hetero Hetero only Homo & Hetero Hetero only   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homo-Weak 0.132**  0.034  
 (0.061)  (0.071)  Hetero-Strong 0.148**  0.011  
 (0.063)  (0.072)  Homo-Strong 0.176***  0.125**  
 (0.054)  (0.063)  Weak-High  -0.141**  -0.090** 
  (0.064)  (0.041) Weak-Second  -0.166**  -0.116*** 
  (0.074)  (0.023) Weak-Third  -0.086  -0.056*** 
  (0.070)  (0.021) Strong-High  -0.027  -0.115 
  (0.095)  (0.072) Strong-Second  0.004  -0.113 
  (0.099)  (0.086) Strong-Third  0.037  -0.027 
  (0.094)  (0.075) Strong-Low  0.173*  0.033 
  (0.099)  (0.083) Observations 1920 960 1920 960 
Wald 𝜒2  120.24*** 186.30*** 84.18*** 93.85*** 
Log-likelihood -748.10 -344.08 -683.29 -346.40 
Left / right censored observations 262 / 185 145 / 93 37 / 746 27 / 325 
Linear combination of the model marginal effects:       
(i) (Homo-Strong) - (Hetero-Strong) 0.028  0.114*    
 (0.062)  (0.064)  (ii) (Homo-Strong) - (Homo-Weak) 0.045  0.091  
 (0.059)  (0.064)  (iii) (Strong-High) - (Strong-Low)  -0.200***   -0.148*** 
  (0.050)  (0.038) (iv) (Strong-Second) - (Strong-Low)   -0.169***  -0.146*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050) (v) (Strong-Third) - (Strong-Low)   -0.136***  -0.061 
  (0.046)  (0.058) (vi) (Strong-High - Strong-Low) - -0.059  -0.058        (Weak-High - Weak-Low)  (0.081)  (0.056) (vii) (Strong-Second - Strong-Low) -  -0.004  -0.030         (Weak-Second - Weak-Low)  (0.093)  (0.055) (viii) (Strong-Third - Strong-Low) -   -0.049  -0.005          (Weak-Third - Weak-Low)   (0.085)   (0.062) 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. Models (1) and (2) are estimated for the treatments 
without punishment, and models (3) and (4) with punishment. Models (1) and (3) are run on both homogeneous 
and heterogeneous treatments, whereas models (2) and (4) are run on heterogeneous treatments only. Entries in 
the topmost panel are the average marginal effects of the independent variables. Period dummies are controlled 
for in the regressions, but the results are not shown here. The bottom panel shows the linear combination of the 
model marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Table 4. Average number of punishment points assigned across treatments 
  Homo-Weak Hetero-Weak Homo-Strong Hetero-Strong 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.36 
 (0.36) (0.44) (0.32) (0.41) 
High  0.68  0.30 
  (1.06)  (0.34) 
Second  0.33  0.57 
  (0.24)  (0.80) 
Third  0.46  0.37 
  (0.50)  (0.69) 
Low  0.41  0.20 
    (0.67)   (0.19) 
Note: The table reports the average punishment points assigned by subject i to j depending on treatment (first 
row) and endowment level (last four rows). Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Determinants of punishment 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡   
 Homo & Hetero Hetero only   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homo-Weak 0.202* 0.205**   
 (0.122) (0.088)   Hetero-Strong -0.038 -0.058   
 (0.111) (0.072)   Homo-Strong 0.090 0.171   
 (0.132) (0.109)   Weak-High   0.176 0.263 
   (0.157) (0.168) Weak-Second   0.070 0.145 
   (0.176) (0.170) Weak-Third   0.148 0.185* 
   (0.230) (0.112) Strong-High   0.008 0.069 
   (0.170) (0.140) Strong-Second   0.284 0.359* 
   (0.251) (0.198) Strong-Third   0.086 0.049 
   (0.181) (0.133) Strong-Low   -0.092 -0.085 
   (0.158) (0.127) Others’ average contribution rate  -0.586***  -0.557*** 
  (0.160)  (0.206) Absolute negative deviation  2.589***  2.334*** 
  (0.200)  (0.254) Positive deviation  -0.402*  -0.231 
  (0.224)  (0.240) Observations 5760 5760 2880 2880 
Wald 𝜒2 71.59*** 432.09*** 60.53*** 377.70*** 
Log-likelihood -4414.68 -3792.35 -1971.61 -1699.95 
Left / right censored observations 4689 / 2 2406 / 1 
Linear combination of the model marginal effects:    (i) (Homo-Strong) - (Hetero-Strong) 0.127 0.230**   
 (0.121) (0.104)   (ii) (Homo-Strong) - (Homo-Weak) -0.112 -0.033   
 (0.137) (0.119)   (iii) (Strong-High) - (Strong-Low)   0.100 0.153 
   (0.185) (0.146) (iv) (Strong-Second) - (Strong-Low)   0.377 0.444* 
   (0.304) (0.228) (v) (Strong-Third) - (Strong-Low)   0.178 0.133 
   (0.222) (0.124) (vi) (Strong-High - Strong-Low) -  -0.076 -0.110 
       (Weak-High - Weak-Low)   (0.229) (0.205) (vii) (Strong-Second - Strong-Low) -  0.307 0.299 
        (Weak-Second - Weak-Low)   (0.366) (0.298) (viii) (Strong-Third - Strong-Low) -    0.031 -0.052          (Weak-Third - Weak-Low)     (0.399) (0.167) 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments, whereas models (3) and (4) on heterogeneous treatments only. 
Models (1) and (3) only include treatment variables, whereas models (2) and (4) also include punishment 
regularity variables. Entries in the topmost panel are the average marginal effects of the independent variables. 
Period dummies are controlled for in the regressions, but the results are not shown here. The bottom panel shows 
the linear combination of the model marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Table 6. Response to punishment regularities by treatment 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡   
  Homo-Weak Hetero-Weak Homo-Strong Hetero-Strong 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Other’s average contribution rate (𝛽1) -0.512* -0.400 -0.736 -0.727* 
 (0.265) (0.304) (0.643) (0.377) Absolute negative deviation (𝛽2) 2.715*** 2.695*** 2.850*** 2.090*** 
 (0.343) (0.454) (0.525) (0.504) Positive deviation (𝛽3) -0.402 -0.114 -1.383** -0.313 
 (0.426) (0.361) (0.609) (0.330) Observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 
Wald 𝜒2  351.76*** 339.79*** 343.74*** 962.57*** 
Log-likelihood -1088.80 -904.75 -970.99 -786.86 
Left / right censored observations 1120 / 0 1196 / 0 1163 / 1 1210 / 1 
Tests across treatments (p-value):     
 
Homo-Weak = 
Hetero-Weak  
Homo-Strong =  
Hetero-Strong 
Homo-Weak = 
Homo-Strong  
Hetero-Weak = 
Hetero-Strong  
(i) Test that 𝛽1 differs 0.781 0.991 0.747 0.499 
(ii) Test that 𝛽2 differs 0.973 0.297 0.829 0.373 
(iii) Test that 𝛽3 differs 0.606 0.123 0.187 0.683 
(iv) Test that 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 differ 0.963 0.105 0.580 0.506 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. Each model is estimated for one treatment with the 
treatment name specified in the column heading. Entries in the topmost panel are the average marginal effects of 
the independent variables. Period dummies are controlled for in the regressions, but the results are not shown 
here. The bottom panel shows two-sided p-values for the cross-treatment tests. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Table 7. Punishment depending on endowment level of the target 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡    
Weak-High 0.316* 
 (0.181) Weak-Second 0.173 
 (0.172) Weak-Third 0.200* 
 (0.118) Strong-High 0.111 
 (0.144) Strong-Second 0.383** 
 (0.195) Strong-Third 0.059 
 (0.133) Strong-Low -0.079 
 (0.115) Other’s average contribution rate -0.754*** 
 (0.231) 
Other’s average contribution rate × target endowment high 0.247** 
 (0.106) 
Other’s average contribution rate × target endowment second 0.251** 
 (0.098) 
Other’s average contribution rate × target endowment third 0.075 
 (0.091) Absolute negative deviation 2.124*** 
 (0.323) 
Absolute negative deviation × target endowment high 0.245 
 (0.431) 
Absolute negative deviation × target endowment second 0.022 
 (0.434) 
Absolute negative deviation × target endowment third 0.322 
 (0.351) Positive deviation -0.167 
 (0.344) 
Positive deviation × target endowment high -0.231 
 (0.789) 
Positive deviation × target endowment second -0.980* 
 (0.584) 
Positive deviation × target endowment third 0.109 
 (0.332) Observations 2880 
Wald 𝜒2 553.22*** 
Log-likelihood -1690.10 
Left / right censored observations 2406 / 1 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. This model is estimated on Hetero-Weak-Punish and 
Hetero-Strong-Punish treatments. Entries in the top panel are the average marginal effects of the independent 
variables. Period dummies are controlled for in the regressions, but the results are not shown here. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 8. Average contribution rates and punishment points across new treatments  
Without punishment   With punishment 
Contribution rates  Contribution rates Punishment 
Homo-Weak Homo-Strong  Homo-Weak Homo-Strong Homo-Weak Homo-Strong 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.52 0.61   0.65 0.62 0.60 0.42 
(0.24) (0.21)   (0.29) (0.20) (0.45) (0.60) 
Notes: The table reports the average contribution rates for the four new treatments. For treatments with 
punishment it also reports the average punishment points assigned by subject i to j. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 9. Determinants of contribution rates in homogeneous treatments: original treatments and 
new treatments 
Dependent variable: contribution rate of subject i in period t, �𝑐
𝐸
�
𝑖,𝑡  
  New treatments Original treatments 
  (1) (2) 
Strong-NoPunish (𝛾1) 0.092 0.043 
 (0.071) (0.058) Weak-Punish (𝛾2) 0.147* 0.259*** 
 (0.079) (0.070) Strong-Punish 0.104 0.353*** 
 (0.070) (0.061) Observations 1920 1920 
Wald 𝜒2 51.30*** 73.90*** 
Log-likelihood -1027.99 -865.67 
Left /right censored observations 99 / 578 127 / 513 
Linear combination of the model marginal effects:   (i) (Strong-Punish) - (Weak-Punish) (𝛾3) -0.043 0.094 
 (0.081) (0.066) (ii) (Strong-Punish) - (Strong-NoPunish) (𝛾4) 0.012 0.311*** 
 (0.071) (0.056) Tests across treatments (p-value):     
(iii) Test that 𝛾1 differs 0.587 
(iv) Test that 𝛾2 differs 0.287 
(v) Test that 𝛾3 differs 0.190 
(vi) Test that 𝛾4 differs 0.001 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the new and 
original homogeneous treatments, respectively. Entries in the topmost panel are the average marginal effects of 
the independent variables. Period dummies are controlled for in the regressions, but the results are not shown 
here. The third panel shows the linear combination of the model marginal effects. The bottom panel shows two-
sided p-values for the cross-treatment tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 10. The interaction between identity and punishment: original treatments and new 
treatments 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡    
 New treatments Original treatments   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong-Punish (𝛿1) -0.327* -0.318* -0.101 -0.031 
 (0.184) (0.179) (0.136) (0.109) Others’ average contribution rate  -0.807**  -0.597** 
  (0.356)  (0.274) Absolute negative deviation  3.421***  2.813*** 
  (0.957)  (0.582) Positive deviation  -0.706**  -0.632 
  (0.330)  (0.399) Observations 2880 2880 2880 2880 
Wald 𝜒2 65.24*** 410.56*** 40.84*** 267.93*** 
Log-likelihood -1901.55 -1594.98 -2436.49 -2082.99 
Left / right censored observations 2484 / 5 2283 / 1 
Tests across treatments (p-value):         
(i) Test that 𝛿1 differs for models without 
punishment regularities 0.323 
(ii) Test that 𝛿1 differs for models with 
punishment regularities 0.170 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and subject 
random effects clustering standard errors at the team level. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the new 
treatments, whereas models (3) and (4) are estimated on the original homogeneous treatments. Models (1) and 
(3) only include treatment variables, whereas models (2) and (4) also include punishment regularity variables. 
Entries in the topmost panel are the average marginal effects of the independent variables. Period dummies are 
controlled for in the regressions, but the results are not shown here. The bottom panel shows two-sided p-values 
for the cross-treatment tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of average contribution rates across treatments 
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Appendix A. Instructions 
Here we provide a sample copy of the experimenter’s instructions we used in our Hetero-
Strong-Punish treatment. The instructions for the other treatments were adapted accordingly. 
The instructions were originally written in Chinese. The first part of the experiment is 
conducted without using computers in an activity room. Instructions are read by an 
experimenter to the participants. After this part, participants are led to the laboratory, and 
the remaining parts are conducted using computers. The instructions are read aloud by an 
experimenter as the participants follow along on their own copies.  
 
In the Activity Room 
Hello, everyone! You are now taking part in an economic experiment. During the experiment, 
all of you will be asked to do some activities and make some decisions. You can earn money 
by making these decisions. The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions you 
make and on the decisions that other participants make.  
 
The experiment has three parts and 24 participants. We will first play a game here, and then 
go to the laboratory to conduct the rest of the experiment using computers. The experiment 
will in total last for approximately 110 minutes. 
 
The game we will play is called the “human knot”. The rules are as follows: Everyone please 
stand shoulder to shoulder, facing each other in a circle. First, please lift your left hand and 
reach across the ring to take the hand of someone standing on the other side. Next, please lift 
your right hand and reach across the ring to take the hand of another person standing on the 
other side. Please make sure that you are not holding hands with someone standing directly 
beside you, and that you are not holding two hands with the same person. Ok, you have 
formed a knot. Now let’s try to untangle the knot to form one or a couple of circles of people 
without letting go of any hand. If you let go of a hand, please grab that hand again 
immediately. You will have 10 minutes to do the untangling. You are free to discuss how to 
untangle the knot.   
 
Next we will conduct the experiment in the laboratory. Please take all your belongings with 
you and go to the laboratory with me.  
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In the Laboratory 
The rest of the experiment is computerized. It consists of two parts. The instructions you have 
now are for the first part. I will read the instructions aloud, and you can follow along on your 
copies. All your decisions and answers to questions will remain confidential and 
anonymous.     
 
It is prohibited to communicate in any way with the other participants during the 
experiment. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the experiment and denied all 
payments. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the 
experimenters will come to help you.  
 
During the experiment we will not speak in terms of Renminbi (RMB), but of experimental 
currency units (ECUs). At the end of the experiment, the total amount of ECUs you have 
earned will be converted to RMB at the following rate: 
1 ECU = 0.1 yuan RMB 
 
Each participant will receive a lump-sum payment of 50 ECUs at the beginning of the 
experiment in addition to the show-up fee of 10 yuan RMB. This one-off payment will be 
used to pay for eventual losses during the experiment. However, you can always avoid 
losses with certainty through your own decisions. At the end of the experiment, your entire 
earnings from the experiment plus the remaining lump-sum payment and the show-up fee will 
be immediately paid to you in cash in private in another room. 
 
The first part 
In the first part of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a quiz individually. You are 
given 6 minutes to answer 20 general knowledge questions. For each question we will provide 
3, 4 or 5 response alternatives, but only one of them is correct. The number of correctly 
answered questions will affect your status in the next part of the experiment.  
 
Each screen will display five questions. In the top right corner of your screen you can see how 
much time remains for you to answer the questions on the current screen. You may change 
your answers as many times as you want; your final decision must be made before the time 
displays 0 seconds by clicking the “Submit” button. Once you have done this, your answers 
can no longer be changed. You may leave the answer blank for any question; the response 
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will then be considered a wrong answer. Even if you do not answer any questions on a screen, 
please still click the “Submit” button to show that you have finished. If you finish before the 
time is up, please wait for the other participants to answer the questions. After all participants 
have submitted their responses, the next screen of questions will appear automatically. Please 
raise your hand if you have any questions.    
 
Quiz screen 
 
 
The second part 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 separate periods, and each period consists of 
two stages. Four participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a team. The 
composition of the teams will stay the same throughout the experiment. It is not possible 
to identify each other. The total income from the experiment will equal the sum of the period 
income.  
 
The first stage  
At the beginning of each period, each member of your team will receive a different amount 
of ECUs according to the quiz performance, from here on referred to as the endowment. The 
team member within your team obtained the most correct answers will receive the highest 
endowment, the one obtained the second-most correct answers will receive the second-highest 
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endowment, and so on. Equal numbers of correct answers will be resolved by a random draw 
of the computer. Thus, there is always a strict ranking of endowments within your four-person 
team. The four endowment levels are 80, 60, 40 and 20 ECUs. For example, if your quiz 
performance is ranked the third in your team, your endowment will be 40 ECUs. Endowments 
of your team members are hence 20, 60 and 80 ECUs, respectively. Your actual endowment 
level will be shown on the screen when you start this part of the experiment, and this level 
will be kept unchanged for all 10 periods.      
 
At the first stage, you and your fellow team members are asked to allocate the endowment 
between two activities - individual work and team work. In particular, your task is to decide 
how much of your endowment to allocate to the individual work and to the team work, 
respectively. You (and the other members of your team) can allocate any proportion of the 
endowment to the individual work or the team work. At the beginning of each period, the 
following input screen at the first stage will appear: 
 
Input screen at the first stage 
 
 
The period number appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right corner, you can 
see how much time remains for you to make your allocation decision. You will have 90 
seconds in the first two periods and 60 seconds in the remaining periods. You make your 
decision by typing an integer number between 0 and your endowment as your allocation to 
46 
 
the team work. The remaining endowment will automatically be considered your allocation to 
the individual work. You can revise your decision as many times as you want, but your final 
decision must be made before the time displays 0 seconds by clicking the “Submit” button. 
Once you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. If you finish before the time 
is up, please wait for other team members to make the decision. 
 
Your income at the first stage of each period consists of two parts: 
(1) Your income from the individual work. The individual work yields 1 ECU for each ECU 
you allocated.  
(2) Your income from the team work. Your earning (and everyone else’s in your team) is 
equal to 0.5 times the total allocation by all members of the team to the team work.     
 
Your income at the first stage of a period = 1 × (allocation to the individual work) + 0.5 
× (team total allocation to the team work) 
 
Each team member’s income from the team work is calculated in the same way. This means 
that each team member receives the same income from the team work. Suppose that the sum 
of the allocation to the team work from all team members is 60 ECUs. In this case, each 
member of the team receives an income from the team work of 0.5×60=30 ECUs. 
 
After all members of your team have made their decision, the following screen will show you 
the total amount of endowment allocated by all four team members to the team work as well 
as your income at the first stage for the period. In the first two periods you will have 45 
seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view this income screen. If you finish 
before the time is up, please click the “Continue” button.  
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Income screen at the first stage 
 
 
The second stage  
At the second stage, you will be informed about how much each of the other team members 
allocated to the team work. At this stage you can reduce the income of each other team 
member by assigning deduction points, or you can leave the income of each team member 
unchanged. The other team members can also reduce your income if they wish to. This can 
be seen from the input screen at the second stage: 
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Input screen at the second stage 
 
 
This screen shows how much each team member allocated to the team work as a percentage 
of his/her endowment in the first stage of the period; that is, the allocation rate. At the 
beginning of each period, each team member will be randomly assigned a number from 1 to 4 
as his/her identification number. Your allocation rate will be shown under the text “You”. 
Those of the other team members will be displayed under the corresponding identification 
numbers. Although the team composition stays fixed, the identification numbers are changed 
randomly in each period. Hence, the same identification number may represent a different 
member for each period.  
 
Your task now is to decide whether, and if so, how many deduction points to assign to each of 
the other three team members. Each point you assign will cost you 1 ECU, and will reduce 
the income from the first stage of the member you assign the point to by 3 ECUs. You can 
assign between 0 and 25 points to each other team member. You must enter an integer 
number for each of them. If you do not wish to change the income of a specific team member, 
you must enter 0.  
 
Suppose that you assign 5 points to one team member. This costs you 5 ECUs and reduces 
that member’s income by 15 ECUs. If you assign 8 points to another member, this costs you 
an additional 8 ECUs and reduces that member’s income by 24 ECUs. If you give the last 
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team member 0 points, this has no cost for you and will not change that member’s income 
either. In this case your total costs of distributing points will be 13 ECUs (5+8+0), and you 
will reduce in total 39 ECUs of income from the first stage of all your team members.  
 
Whether and by how much your income from the first stage is reduced also depends on the 
total points you receive. If you receive 4, 7 and 0 points from the other three team members, 
respectively, your income will be reduced by 33 ECUs (3× (4+7+0)).  
 
Your final income from the two stages of a period consists of three parts: 
(1) Your income from the first stage; 
(2) Income reduction due to the total deduction points you have received in the period; 
(3) Income reduction due to the total deduction points you have assigned in the period, that is, 
sum of the assigned deduction points.  
 
The final income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Final income of a period at the end of the second stage  
= (income from the first stage)                                         (1) 
- 3 × (total deduction points you have received)              (2) 
- (total deduction points you have assigned)                    (3) 
 
If (1) + (2) is greater than or equal to 0, final income of a period is calculated as above; 
If (1) + (2) is smaller than 0, final income of a period = 0 –total deduction points you have 
assigned 
 
 
If any team member receives points that reduce income more than what he/she earned from 
the first stage, his/ her income will be reduced to zero. Please note that one’s income at the 
end of the second stage can be negative if the costs of the assigned points exceed the income 
from the first stage minus the income reduction by the received deduction points. 
 
For your decision you have 180 seconds in the first two periods and 120 seconds in the 
remaining periods. You can move from one input field to the other by pressing the Tab key 
(→|) or by using the mouse.  
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After all members of your team have made their decision, the following screen will show you 
the deduction decision and final income for the period. In the first two periods you will have 
45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view this income screen.  
 
Income screen at the end of the second screen 
 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
 
The decision making is over now. Please remain seated, and complete a survey that is shown 
on your screen in a moment.  
 
  
51 
 
Control questions: 
Before making your actual decision, please first answer all control questions. They serve as a 
test of your understanding of payoff calculations. There is no time limit on answering the 
control questions. 
 
1. Suppose that you have an endowment of 40 ECUs, and the other team members have an 
endowment of 20, 60 and 80 ECUs, respectively. The other three team members together 
allocate a total of 40 ECUs to the team work. What is: 
a. Your income at the first stage of the period if you allocate 0 ECUs to the team work? 
………. 
b. Your income at the first stage of the period if you allocate 10 ECUs to the team work? 
………. 
 
2. Suppose that you have an endowment of 40 ECUs, and the other team members have an 
endowment of 20, 60 and 80 ECUs, respectively. You allocate 18 ECUs to the team work. 
What is: 
a. Your income at the first stage of the period if the other team members together allocate 
a further total of 16 ECUs to the team work? ……….  
b. Your income at the first stage of the period if the other team members together allocate 
a further total of 52 ECUs to the team work? ……….  
 
3. Suppose that your income from the first stage is 60 ECUs. What is your income at the end 
of the period if  
a. You receive a total of 10 deduction points, but do not assign any yourself? ……….  
b. You receive a total of 10 deduction points, and assign a total of 7 points yourself? 
……….…  
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Appendix B. Post-Experiment Survey 
Please answer the following survey questions. All your answers will remain confidential and 
anonymous. (Summary statistics are in italics in parentheses.) 
 
1. What is your age? _____ (Mean 21.5, Std Dev 2.3, Median 21, Min 17, Max 33) 
2. What is your gender?  
(a) Female (69.1%) 
(b)  Male (30.9%) 
3. What is your ethnic group?  
(a) Han (89.4%) 
(b) Zhuang (1.2%) 
(c) Man (2.4%) 
(d) Hui (2.3%) 
(e) Miao (0.4%) 
(f) Weiwu’er (0.7%) 
(g) Tujia (0.7%) 
(h) Yi (0.0%) 
(i) Menggu (0.7%)  
(j) Zang (0.3%) 
(k) Other, please specify _____ (1.9%)  
4. Which kind of household registration did you hold before enrolling into university?  
(a) Rural (43.2%) 
(b) Urban (56.3%) 
(c) No household registration (0.5%)  
5. What was your permanent home address before enrolling into university?  
Province (City) _____ City (District) _____ County _____ (Subjects are from all 31 
provinces of mainland China, plus Taiwan) 
6. How many biological siblings do you have excluding yourself (if you are the single child, 
please write 0)? _____ (0 siblings 46.5%, 1-2 48.6%, 3 or more 4.9%) 
If you have any biological siblings, please specify your order in the siblings _____ 
(a) First (41.2%) 
(b) Second (42.2%) 
(c) Third (12.0%) 
(d) Fourth (2.9%) 
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(e) Fifth (1.3%) 
(f) Sixth (0.3%) 
7. How many siblings, half-blood siblings, cousins have you been living with for more than 
six months of a year (including six months) before enrolling into university (if none, please 
write 0)? _____ (0 siblings 42.2%, 1-2 40.5%, 3 or more 17.3%) 
8. Have you been to a boarding high school?  
(a) Yes (63.4%) 
(b) No (36.6%) 
9. Please choose in which of the following categories that your family (with which you lived 
before enrolling into university) current monthly before-tax total income falls into? _____  
<400 
401-
1000 
1001-
2000 
2001-
3000 
3001-
4000 
4001-
6000 
6001-
8000 
8001-
10000 
10001-
20000 
20001-
30000 
30001-
40000 
> 40001 
1.7% 6.4% 14.2% 14.1% 14.2% 20.5% 9.4% 8.3% 7.1% 2.3% 0.9% 0.9% 
10. What is your major?  
School/Institute/Center___________ Department___________ Major___________ 
11. Are you an undergraduate or graduate student?  
(a) Vocational degree student (2.1%) 
(b) Bachelor student (63.9%) 
(c) Master student (33.8%) 
(d) PhD student (0.2%) 
(e) Post-doctoral student (0.0%)  
12. Which year are you in your program? _____ (Mean 2.0, Std Dev 1.0, Median 2, Min 1, 
Max 5) 
13. Are you a member of the Communist Party?  
(a) Yes (28.8%)  
(b) No (71.2%) 
14. Are you a member of any civic voluntary association (e.g. political, interest groups, 
sports, culture, nonprofit, etc.)?  
(a) Yes. (46.5%) Please specify the full name of all associations that you are a member of, 
with a comma between the names _____ 
(b) No (53.5%) 
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15. Have you ever participated in any economics experimental studies before?  
(a) Yes. (25.7%) Please specify the number of times _____ (Mean 1.3, Std Dev 0.6, 
Median 1, Min 1, Max 5) 
(b) No (74.3%) 
16.  Have you ever participated in any psychology experimental studies before?  
(a) Yes. (62.8%) Please specify the number of times_____ (Mean 3.1, Std Dev 2.9, 
Median 2, Min 1, Max 30) 
(b) No (37.2%) 
17. How many other participants in the session do you know from before (if none, please 
write 0)? _____ (0 other participants 71.7%, 1-2 27.4%, 3 or more 0.9%) 
18. In the past twelve months, have you donated money or goods to or done volunteer work 
for charities or other nonprofit organizations?  
(a) Yes. (71.2%) Please specify the total amount ¥_____ (Mean 140.9, Std Dev 162.7, 
Median 100, Min 0, Max 1050) and/or the number of hours _____ (Mean 47.8, Std 
Dev 86.0, Median 20, Min 0, Max 720)  
(b) No (28.8%) 
19. On a scale from 0 (least) to 10 (most), please rate how closely attached you felt to your 
own team throughout the experiment. _____ (Mean 5.6, Std Dev 3.2, Median 6, Min 0, 
Max 10) 
 Least                                                                                                                                   Most                      
                                                                                           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
20. (For strong identity treatments only) On a scale from 0 (least) to 10 (most), please rate 
how much you think the “human knot” game / the second quiz where you can get help 
from or offer help to other members in your own team helped enhance the sense of being 
in a team.  _____ (Mean 6.2, Std Dev 3.0, Median 7, Min 0, Max 10) 
 Least                                                                                                                                   Most                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Session size and its effect on identity building: Evidence from a public good experiment 
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Abstract 
The effect of session size has largely been ignored in experimental studies, despite the 
possibility that it may affect people’s perception of the strength of the potential link between 
them and consequently the strategies used in the interactions. This paper investigates how the 
effect of an induced common identity on individual cooperative behavior differs depending on 
session size in a repeated public good experiment with constant group size and partner 
matching. We find that induced identity significantly enhances cooperation only when the 
session size is small and only in the initial period. In all other periods, induced identity does 
not have a significant effect on cooperation in either small or large sessions. The same null 
effect of identity in small and large sessions suggests that session size is not a confounding 
factor of identity in repeated interaction settings.  
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1. Introduction 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 1985), social identity describes 
the aspects of an individual’s self-concept derived from perceived membership in social 
groups. Once a person identifies herself as part of a group, her attitudes, values, and norms 
may be shaped by the group, and her behavior hence conforms to the stereotypes associated 
with the group’s identity. Before it was systematically introduced into economic analysis by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), identity had already been recognized as a central concept to 
understand phenomena in social psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science. 
Economic experiments studying the effects of identity on human decision making employ 
three design methods, i.e., using natural identities within existing social groups (e.g., 
Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2012), priming natural social 
identities (e.g., Afridi et al., 2012; Benjamin et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014), and inducing 
artificial group identities. A number of economic experiments using induced identities have 
shown that individual behavior is affected by group identity, and the extent of the effect 
depends on the salience of identity.1 However, to our best knowledge, no previous study has 
considered the potential interaction between induced identity and the number of subjects in 
an experimental session, i.e., session size, which may also affect the salience of identity. In 
this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether session size influences the 
effect of induced identity on individual cooperative behavior.  
Broadly speaking, there are two common approaches to building and enhancing group 
identity in the existing experimental economics literature. One adapts the “minimal group 
paradigm” from social psychology to distinguish the identity between ingroup (with whom 
people identify) and outgroup (with whom people do not identify) members. Typically, two 
distinct group identities are first induced by randomly assigning all subjects in an 
experimental session to two non-overlapping groups based on some trivial tasks such as 
stating preferences for artwork by two different artists (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009; Chakravarty 
and Fonseca, 2010) or no task at all (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2011; Morita and Servátka, 2011). 
                                                            
1 A variety of games have been played to study the effect of induced identity on different individual behavior. 
See, e.g., Eckel and Grossman (2005), Charness et al. (2007), Smith (2011), Chakravarty and Fonseca (2010), 
Drouvelis and Nosenzo (2013) on cooperation; McLeish and Oxoby (2007) on cooperation and punishment; 
Chen and Chen (2011) on coordination; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) on trust; Chen and Li (2009) on 
social preferences; Sutter (2009) on individual and team decision making; Eberlein and Walkowitz (2008) on 
promotion; Morita and Servátka (2011) on relation-specific investment; and Riener and Schacht (2011) on a 
market setting. 
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Group identities are then enhanced within each identity group by various means. 2 After 
identities have been induced (and enhanced), a game, e.g., a public good game, prisoner’s 
dilemma game, or trust game, is played, where a pair or group of subjects from the ingroup 
and/or outgroup interact. The number of subjects in a game-playing pair or group is generally 
smaller than the number of subjects who have the same group identity, and the pairs or 
groups are often re-matched across periods in multiple period games. Experiments using this 
approach generally find ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination when the group 
identity is salient.   
However, in this approach, the number of subjects in a session is usually not controlled. 
The number can vary across experiments or across sessions in the same experiment 
depending partly on the number of people who showed up. No matter how the two identity 
groups are partitioned, the difference in the total number of subjects in a session and 
consequently the number of subjects in each identity group may affect people’s perception of 
the ingroup/outgroup and of the potential interactions that will occur. Increasing the number 
of subjects in each identity group tends to reduce the strength of group identity by making 
subjects feel less connected to the ingroup, which may change people’s perception of the 
strategies employed by their counterparts and consequently their strategies played in 
subsequent interactions.  
The other identity-building approach forms a group membership without introducing an 
identity contrast or in fact even without the existence of an outgroup. The main difference 
from the previous approach is that group identity is built and enhanced only among the 
subjects (e.g., 3 to 5 people) who are randomly assigned to a group and will later interact in 
various games. Group composition always remains fixed throughout the experiment. Studies 
using this method of group identity building show that a salient group membership strongly 
affects individual behavior in both strategic (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005) and non-
strategic (e.g., Sutter, 2009) decision-making situations. Session size, however, may not 
matter much in this approach, since the same small fixed group of people share a common 
identity and play the games.    
The aim of the present paper is to examine how session size may influence the effect of 
induced identity on individual cooperative behavior. We conduct a repeated-play linear 
                                                            
2 Identity-strengthening activities include completion of a group task with own identity group members through 
either face-to-face communication (e.g., McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Smith, 2011) or online chatting (e.g., Chen 
and Li, 2009; Chakravarty and Fonseca, 2010; Chen and Chen, 2011), presence of own group members as 
audience when an individual makes the decision, or payoff sharing among group members (e.g., Charness et al., 
2007). 
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public good experiment, prior to which we manufacture the strength of identity between 
strong and weak depending on whether subjects participate in an identity-building activity or 
not, and vary the session size between small and large (with 8 and 24 subjects, respectively). 
Our identity-building activity combines the features of the above-described two approaches: 
all participants in one session play a face-to-face “human knot” game to induce one common 
identity, and then they are randomly assigned to fixed groups of four to interact in the public 
good game. 3 Our activity hence adopts the merit of the identity-building approach where no 
outgroup is needed for creation of an identity conflict,4 and furthermore controls for the 
potential interactive effect of session size on identity. The same identity-building activity is 
used by Weng and Carlsson (2014), who study how induced identity together with 
endowment distribution and peer punishment interactively affects individual cooperative 
behavior.  
Given the design of our identity-building activity, we expect identity to have a positive 
impact on individual cooperation, and this positive impact to decrease with session size. A 
task conducted with all participants in a session like ours where participants share a common 
goal and help each other to achieve the goal likely renders a better feeling of connection, and 
they will as a result cooperate more. Increasing the number of participants in such a task may 
tend to make them consider those who are not spatially close or physically connected an 
outgroup and hence weaken the influence of the common identity on cooperation. The 
importance of session size for the effect of identity on cooperation also has real-world 
implications. Participants in an experimental session can be viewed as representing the total 
sum of workers in a firm. Hence, session size captures firm size in terms of employment. 
Building a common identity of the workers is one way to urge the sense of firm spirit and 
loyalty, which helps reduce shirking and pursue the firm goal. When the identity is built at 
the firm level, and the intervention activity and other conditions are kept identical, the effect 
of the identity tends to be greater for small than for large firms. This may be because in 
smaller firms workers have more chances of interacting with others even if they belong to 
different task performing groups.   
                                                            
3 Eight is used as the small session size because it is the minimum number of participants that allows for 
anonymous and random group assignment to fixed groups of four subjects. Twenty-four is chosen as the large 
session size given that the capacity of the laboratory where the experiment took place is 25. These two numbers 
also represent the lower and upper bounds of session size in many of the public goods experiments that we are 
aware of. 
4 Chen and Li (2009) investigate the extent to which the presence of an outgroup affects behavior and find no 
significant difference from no outgroup.    
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Some psychological experiments have studied the interactive effect of group size5 and 
induced identity in social dilemmas, and have confirmed the existence of such an effect. For 
example, Brewer and Kramer (1986) find that in a small-group public good game (i.e., 8 
people), individuals for whom a collective identity is made salient keep less for themselves 
compared to individuals with an individual-level identity, yet this outcome is reversed in a 
large-group condition (i.e., 32 people). De Cremer and Leonardelli (2003) on the other hand 
demonstrate that when social constraints that promote cooperation, such as accountability, 
personal identifiability and felt responsibility, are absent, members of small groups (i.e., 4 
people) are more likely to contribute to a public good than members of large groups (i.e., 8 
people) when the psychological need to belong to a group6 is low, whereas the opposite is 
true when need to belong is high.   
A related series of experiments have tested the direct effects of group size on public 
goods provision. A well-grounded conjecture is that a group’s ability to provide the optimal 
level of a public good is inversely correlated with group size (e.g., Olson, 1965; Buchanan, 
1968). The basis for this conjecture is that increasing group size tends to diminish the 
marginal per capita return (MPCR) from a contribution to an “impure” public good to all 
consumers (Isaac and Walker, 1988), and to make people feel less efficacious (Kerr, 1989), 
less identifiable and differentiable (Hamburger et al., 1975), and less responsible for the 
pursuit of group welfare (Stroebe and Frey, 1982). The empirical test results of the inverse 
relationship between group size and cooperation depend on whether the influences of 
variation in the MPCR and of a pure change in the number of group members are separated. 
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac et al. (1994) examine the efficiency of public goods 
provision in groups of size 4, 10, 40 and 100, and find that the above conjecture is supported 
in the smaller groups (i.e., 4 and 10 people) if increases in group size generate a smaller 
MPCR, whereas holding MPCR constant, mean percentage of contributions is greater in 
larger groups (i.e., 40 and 100 people) than in smaller groups when the MPCR is low, and 
there is no discernible difference when the MPCR is high. This paper hence also tries to see 
whether there is any pure effect of session size, as an analogue to group size, on public goods 
contributions, while keeping MPCR constant.  
                                                            
5 Group size is equivalent to session size when there is only one group in a session.  
6 According to the authors, psychological need to belong to a group is reflected in people’s desire to form and 
maintain social relationships with others. It is measured using a Need to Belong Scale (Leary et al., 2001), 
which includes 10 items rated on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating “not at all characteristic of me” and 5 
indicating “extremely characteristic of me”.      
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We find that induced identity significantly enhances cooperation only when session size 
is small and only in the initial period. In all other periods, induced identity does not have a 
significant effect on cooperation in either small or large sessions. The null result could arise 
from the relatively low strength of identity rooted in the cultural setting in China where the 
experiment took place. The same null effect of identity in small and large sessions suggests 
that session size is not a confounding factor of identity in repeated interaction settings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental 
design, section 3 presents the results and discussions, and section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Experimental design  
The experiment uses a 2×2 design. One dimension is to vary session size with either 8 or 24 
subjects to establish a small or large session. The other is to manufacture the strength of 
identity to be strong or weak by conducting an identity-building activity or not. This 
generates four different combinations of conditions, each of which is a treatment of the 
experiment as summarized in Table 1. 
<Table 1 about here> 
The experiment was conducted in two stages. The first was an identity-building stage, 
which was only implemented in the two treatments with strong identity, i.e., Small-Strong 
and Large-Strong. A “human knot” game was played with all subjects in one session in 
another room before they entered the laboratory. Subjects stood shoulder to shoulder, in a 
circle, facing each other. They were first asked to form a knot by lifting both hands and 
reaching across the circle to hold the hands of two other subjects who were not standing 
directly beside them, left hand to left hand and right hand to right hand. After ensuring that a 
knot had been constructed, subjects were then asked to untangle the knot to form one or a 
couple of circles without crossing arms anymore. They were not allowed to let go of any 
hands in the process. Anyone who let go of a hand was required to immediately grab the 
same hand again. The game lasted for approximately ten minutes. The reason for choosing 
such an identity-building activity was that it fits the aim of the exercise, and also that it is a 
typical activity undertaken in orientation and training programs in real-world organizations. 
Communication was allowed during the course of the game. The experimenters observed that 
the communication closely surrounded the game. After finishing the identity-building activity, 
the subjects were led to the laboratory. In the two treatments with weak identity, i.e., Small-
Weak and Large-Weak, subjects entered the laboratory directly once all 8 or 24 of them had 
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arrived, yet they did have a chance to meet each other while waiting for the experiment to 
start. 
The second stage was a decision-making stage, which was conducted in the laboratory in 
all four treatments. Subjects were seated in partitioned computer terminals and were then 
given written instructions while the experimenter read the instructions aloud. They first 
individually solved a quiz consisting of 20 general knowledge questions. The quiz was used 
only to legitimize the receipt of the endowment (see, e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; 
Gächter and Riedl, 2005), but the quiz performance did not affect the endowment level in the 
public good game that followed. Then the 8 or 24 subjects in one session were randomly 
assigned to groups of four members and each group played a public good game framed as a 
team production problem for 10 periods. The subjects knew that their groups consisted of 
themselves and three other individuals, whereas their identities were kept anonymous 
throughout the experiment.  
At the beginning of each period, each subject was endowed with 50 experimental 
currency units (ECUs). They decided simultaneously and without communication how to 
allocate the endowment between individual and team work (i.e., the public good). By freely 
choosing an amount to contribute to the team work, 𝑐𝑖, where 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 50, the remaining 
endowment, 50 − 𝑐𝑖 was automatically considered the allocation to the individual work. Each 
ECU that a subject kept for individual work generated one ECU for herself, whereas the 
payoff from the team work was 50% of the group’s total contribution. That is, the MPCR 
from a contribution to the public good was equal to 0.5. The period payoff for subject 𝑖 was 
hence given by 𝜋𝑖 = (50 − 𝑐𝑖) + 0.5∑ 𝑐𝑗4𝑗=1 .  
The payoff function, the duration of the experiment (10 periods), and the instructions 
were common knowledge to all participants in each treatment. Before the commencement of 
actual decision making, the subjects were required to answer control questions to ensure that 
they had understood the features of the game correctly. At the end of each period, the subjects 
were informed of their group’s total contribution, their own earnings, and the contributions of 
other group members in the current period. To prevent the possibility of individual reputation 
formation, each of the four subjects in a group was randomly assigned an identification 
number from 1 to 4 to identify her actions in a given period and these numbers were 
randomly shuffled across periods.  
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the experimental 
laboratory at Beijing Normal University in May and June 2011. This university is located in 
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the center of Beijing and has approximately 20,000 full-time students. The subjects were 
recruited via announcements on a bulletin board system and bulletin boards in teaching and 
accommodation buildings at the university. In total, we had observations from 192 subjects7, 
48 for each treatment. All subjects were allowed to participate in only one session, and they 
did not know about any treatments other than the one in which they participated. To control 
for experimenter effect, the same two individuals, who were unknown to the participants, ran 
all sessions. To keep the outcome of the experiment anonymous, subjects were informed at 
the beginning that they would be paid confidentially and individually in another room and 
that they would leave the laboratory successively so that they would not meet and 
communicate with other subjects after completing the session. The final earnings from the 
experiment totaled the sum of the period payoffs at an exchange rate of 1 ECU to 0.1 Chinese 
Yuan (CNY) plus a show-up fee of 10 CNY. The experiment lasted an average of about 63 
minutes, including above-described stages and a post-experimental survey covering questions 
on demographics, academic background, past donation behavior, and perceptions about their 
group in the experiment. The subjects on average earned 84.5 CNY8 including the show-up 
fee.  
 
3. Results and discussions 
The impact of session size and identity on average contributions over time can be identified 
in Figure 1. Average contributions start at similar levels in the Small-Weak, Large-Weak, and 
Large-Strong treatments, ranging from 45% to 48% of the total endowment. They follow 
each other closely in the first five periods, and then contributions in the Large-Strong 
treatment start exceeding those in the other two treatments until the ninth period. The Small-
Strong treatment displays the highest contributions during the entire course of the experiment 
except in the sixth period. Moreover, average contributions in all treatments rise in the early 
periods and then decline, although the peaks appear at different points in time and the rates of 
change differ across treatments.  
<Figure 1 about here> 
Table 2 reports, in the left panel, the cumulative period average contributions across 
treatments and, in the right panel, p-values of the pair-wise treatment comparisons using 
Mann-Whitney U tests on the null hypotheses that average contributions are equal in two 
                                                            
7 All subjects were Chinese citizens and university students, but with various academic majors. 
8 The average exchange rate in May and June 2011 was 1 USD = 6.48 CNY. The average hourly wage for 
university students in Beijing at the time of the experiment was approximately 50 CNY. 
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different treatments. The unit of observation is subject for period 1 and group average for the 
relevant cumulative periods.9 As shown in the left panel, average contributions in the Small-
Weak, Large-Weak, and Large-Strong treatments do not differ much in any entries, and they 
are all lower than the contributions in the Small-Strong treatment. The non-parametric test 
results in the right panel confirm the general pattern. We find that there exists no statistically 
significant difference in contributions between small and large sessions over the entire course 
of the experiment, regardless of the strength of identity (p-value > 0.1 for all entries of 
columns (5) and (6)). This corresponds to the finding from the group size literature of no pure 
group size effect when the MPCR is held constant. Strong identity significantly raises 
contributions in small sessions in the first period (p-value = 0.083 in the first entry of column 
(7)), whereas this effect fades from the second period onwards (p-value > 0.1 for the rest of 
the entries in column (7)). This could be because identity built on a small group of people has 
an impact on behavior when individuals meet initially, but this effect is increasingly 
dominated by other factors in repeated interactions, such as group norm adherence. However, 
identity fails to exert any effect in large sessions over the entire course of the experiment (p-
value > 0.1 for all entries of column (8)). Our results suggest that the effect of induced 
identity on cooperation is stronger in small than in large sessions, which is in line with the 
finding from existing experiments. Studies that show a strong effect of identity usually have a 
small number of people who share the same identity. For example, Smith (2011) and 
Drouvelis and Nosenzo (2013) explicitly write that there are 12 and 18 subjects, respectively, 
in one session of their experiments, and 6 in each identity group. Chen and Li (2009) on 
average have 16 subjects in one session, and 6 and 1010 in each identity type. The small 
number of subjects guarantees the successful enhancement of identity. 
<Table 2 about here> 
To control for subjects’ individual cross-period contribution differences and the 
interaction of group members across periods, we estimate a random effects generalized least 
squares (GLS) model with robust standard errors clustered at the group level to analyze the 
interplay between session size and identity again. Table 3 presents the regression results. We 
use the following independent variables: Small is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
                                                            
9 Since subjects in a group interact for the first time in period 1, the contribution from each subject is an 
independent decision in this period. From period 2 onwards, a subject’s contribution decision may also be 
affected by her and other group members’ behavior in the previous period(s). This history dependency makes 
individual contributions no longer independent. Therefore, group average contribution, which takes account of 
this dependency within a group and is still independent across groups, is the appropriate unit of observation.     
10 In the post-experimental survey, Chen and Li (2009) report the proportion of subjects belonging to the Klee 
group being 40% and Kandinsky group being 60%.   
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the observation comes from small sessions and zero otherwise; Strong is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation comes from the strong identity treatments and zero otherwise; 
and Small×Strong is their interaction term. Period dummies are also included to control for 
time order effects. In order to test whether strong identity significantly increases 
contributions in small sessions in the initial period as found in the non-parametric test, 
regression (2) introduces interaction terms between Period 1, Small, Strong and 
Small×Strong. The regression results are fully consistent with the non-parametric test results: 
average contributions over the entire course of the experiment are similar between any two 
session size and identity strength combinations (column (1) coefficients on Small, Strong, and 
bottom panel (i)-(ii)); and contribution is significantly higher in small sessions when identity 
is strong than weak in the first period (column (2) panel (iii)).  
<Table 3 about here> 
A concern may be raised that our results are driven by the possibility that identity is 
stronger in small than in large sessions in the two strong identity treatments because the 
“human knot” is easier to untangle with fewer participants. However, we believe that the 
effect of identity comes from the action of participating in the task per se, not from the 
success of accomplishing the task. On the one hand, we controlled for the length of the game 
in each session to be approximately ten minutes and terminated it regardless of whether or 
not the knot was successfully untangled when it was time. On the other hand, we witnessed 
the entire course of the game and sensed no dramatic distinction in the process and procedure 
of solving the task between small and large sessions. This anecdotal evidence could at least to 
some extent relieve this concern. 
Our results hence convey an important message to the literature studying the effect of 
induced identity on individual behavior. In a repeated interaction setting, the effect of 
induced identity on individual behavior does not differ depending on the number of people 
with whom a manufactured identity is shared. Consequently, variation in experimental 
session size does not generally affect subjects’ perception of group membership or their 
behavior. However, on the other hand, the effect of identity does vary between small and 
large number of people who share the identity in the initial interaction, which implies that 
session size should be particularly controlled in one-shot interactions.  
 It is also worth noting that our results lend support to a general finding in the induced 
identity literature that the extent to which induced identity affects individual behavior 
depends on the salience of identity (see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 
2007). Our finding that identity does not significantly affect individual cooperative behavior, 
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regardless of experimental session size, except in the first period in small sessions may be 
explained by the relatively low strength of identity even in our strong identity treatments. 
This low strength could be rooted in the Chinese culture. Since Chinese people tend to be 
more conservative and connotative compared to westerners, it may take longer for them to 
get acquainted and identified with one another, which may be beyond the timeframe of an 
experiment. Weng and Carlsson (2014) induce identity by allowing communication in 
solving a group task via an online chat program in public good game playing groups with 
Chinese university students, and again fail to find any significant effect of identity, whereas 
such method is effective among university students in the U.S. (Chen and Li, 2009) and New 
Zealand (Morita and Servátka, 2011).   
 
4. Conclusions 
In previous studies on the impact of group identity where the identity has been induced in all 
subjects in an experimental session, the effect of session size has largely been ignored. Since 
interactions often take place between/among some of the subjects, variations in the total 
number of subjects may affect their perception of the extent of the interactions and 
consequently the results of the interactions. The present paper investigates how the effect of 
induced identity on individual cooperative behavior differs depending on session size in a 
repeated public good experiment. We find that induced identity significantly enhances 
cooperation only when session size is small and only in the initial period. That the difference 
in the effect of identity in small and large sessions disappears already in the second period 
suggests that the role of session size may become dominated by other factors, and that session 
size does not confound the effect of identity in repeated interaction settings.  
Our study attempts to raise attention to controlling session size in laboratory experiments 
which involve activities conducted with all subjects in a session. The activities include not 
only identity building but also others that could affect people’s perception in a similar manner. 
A natural extension is to use another identity-building activity or method to test the 
robustness of our findings. It would also be interesting to consider a broader range of session 
size variations in different games to identify the potential thresholds to behavioral differences.   
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Table 1. Summary of the experimental design 
Treatments Session size Identity   
Small-Weak  8 Weak   
Large-Weak  24 Weak   
Small-Strong  8 Strong   
Large-Strong  24 Strong   
Notes: “Small-Weak” refers to the small session/weak identity treatment; “Large-Weak” refers to the large 
session/weak identity treatment; “Small-Strong” refers to the small session/strong identity treatment; “Large-
Strong” refers to the large session/strong identity treatment. 
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Table 2. Cumulative period average contributions across treatments  
  Treatment average contributions   P-values from Mann-Whitney U tests  
Period Small-Weak 
Large-
Weak 
Small-
Strong 
Large-
Strong  
Small-
Weak =  
Large-
Weak 
Small-
Strong = 
Large-
Strong  
Small-
Weak = 
Small-
Strong 
Large-
Weak = 
Large-
Strong 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 22.40 24.13 27.67 23.08  0.616 0.129 0.083 0.764 
1-2 23.79 25.18 29.13 24.65  0.729 0.214 0.149 0.954 
1-3 24.85 26.72 29.77 26.00  0.751 0.387 0.248 0.908 
1-4 25.48 26.79 29.86 26.47  0.931 0.419 0.341 0.954 
1-5 25.90 26.66 29.90 26.69  0.840 0.564 0.341 0.863 
1-6 25.61 26.37 29.59 27.04  0.931 0.603 0.371 0.773 
1-7 25.55 25.71 29.35 26.91  0.885 0.729 0.453 0.817 
1-8 25.00 24.91 29.06 26.86  0.954 0.773 0.419 0.686 
1-9 24.26 24.10 28.48 26.35  0.954 0.863 0.470 0.644 
1-10 23.19 22.93 27.13 24.81   0.954  0.817  0.583  0.644  
Notes: The left panel reports the cumulative period average contributions across treatments, starting from period 
1 only, to first two periods, to all ten periods. The right panel reports the p-values of the pair-wise treatment 
comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests.  
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Table 3. Determinants of contributions 
Dependent variable: contribution of subject i in period t, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡     
 (1) (2) 
Small 0.265 0.486 
 (4.339) (4.677) Strong 1.883 2.208 
 (3.789) (4.087) Small×Strong 2.056 1.583 
 (5.946) (6.355) Period 1×Small  -2.215 
  (3.871) Period 1×Strong  -3.250 
  (3.688) Period 1×Small×Strong  4.729 
  (5.196) Period 1 11.359*** 12.910*** 
 (1.620) (3.344) Period 2 14.094*** 14.094*** 
 (1.459) (1.461) Period 3 16.182*** 16.182*** 
 (1.426) (1.427) Period 4 15.141*** 15.141*** 
 (1.476) (1.477) Period 5 14.865*** 14.865*** 
 (1.469) (1.470) Period 6 13.521*** 13.521*** 
 (1.539) (1.540) Period 7 12.297*** 12.297*** 
 (1.339) (1.340) Period 8 10.531*** 10.531*** 
 (1.469) (1.470) Period 9 7.557*** 7.557*** 
 (1.092) (1.093) Constant 11.370*** 11.215*** 
 (3.264) (3.458) 
Observations 1920 1920 
Wald Chi2 194.59*** 204.13*** 
Linear combination of the model coefficients:   
(i) Small + Small×Strong 2.321  
 (4.065)  (ii) Strong + Small×Strong 3.940  
 (4.582)  (iii) Strong + Small×Strong + Period 1×Strong +  
       Period 1×Small×Strong  
5.271* 
  (3.045) 
Notes: Table reports the regression results for random effects GLS model with robust standard errors clustered 
at the group level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The bottom panel shows the Wald test results of linear 
hypotheses about the model coefficients. Period 10 is used as the base period and omitted from the regression. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of average contributions across treatments 
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Appendix A. Instructions  
Here we provide a sample copy of the experimenter’s instructions we used in our Large-
Strong treatment. The instructions for the other treatments were adapted accordingly. The 
instructions were originally written in Chinese. The first part of the experiment is conducted 
without using computers in an activity room. Instructions are read by an experimenter to the 
participants. After this part, participants are led to the laboratory, and the remaining part is 
conducted using computers. The instructions are read aloud by an experimenter as the 
participants follow along on their own copies.  
  
In the Activity Room 
Hello, everyone! You are now taking part in an economic experiment. During the experiment, 
all of you will be asked to do some activities and make some decisions. You can earn money 
by making these decisions. The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions you 
make and on the decisions that other participants make.  
 
The experiment has two parts and 24 participants. We will first play a game here, and then go 
to the laboratory to conduct the second part using computers. The experiment will in total last 
for approximately 65 minutes. 
 
The game we will play is called the “human knot.” The rules are as follows: Everyone please 
stand shoulder to shoulder, facing each other in a circle. First, please lift your left hand and 
reach across the ring to take the hand of someone standing on the other side. Next, please lift 
your right hand and reach across the ring to take the hand of another person standing on the 
other side. Please make sure that you are not holding hands with someone standing directly 
beside you, and that you are not holding two hands with the same person. Ok, you have 
formed a knot. Now let’s try to untangle the knot to form one or a couple of circles of people 
without letting go of any hand. If you let go of a hand, please grab that hand again 
immediately. You will have 10 minutes to do the untangling. You are free to discuss how to 
untangle the knot.  
 
Next we will conduct the experiment in the laboratory. Please take all your belongings with 
you and go to the laboratory with me.  
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In the Laboratory 
The rest of the experiment is computerized. It consists of two parts. The instructions you have 
now are for the first part. I will read the instructions aloud, and you can follow along on your 
copies. All your decisions and answers to questions will remain confidential and 
anonymous.     
 
It is prohibited to communicate in any way with the other participants during the 
experiment. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the experiment and denied 
all payments. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the 
experimenters will come to help you.  
 
During the experiment we will not speak in terms of Renminbi (RMB), but of experimental 
currency units (ECUs). At the end of the experiment, the total amount of ECUs you have 
earned will be converted to RMB at the following rate: 
1 ECU = 0.1 yuan RMB 
Your entire earnings from the experiment plus the show-up fee of 10 yuan RMB will be 
immediately paid to you in cash in private in another room. 
 
The first part 
In the first part of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a quiz individually. You are 
given 6 minutes to answer 20 general knowledge questions. For each question we will 
provide 3, 4, or 5 response alternatives, but only one of them is correct.  
 
Each screen will display five questions. In the top right corner of your screen you can see 
how much time remains for you to answer the questions on the current screen. You may 
change your answers as many times as you want; your final decision must be made before the 
time displays 0 seconds by clicking the “Submit” button. Once you have done this, your 
answers can no longer be changed. You may leave the answer blank for any question; the 
response will then be considered a wrong answer. Even if you do not answer any questions 
on a screen, please still click the “Submit” button to show that you have finished. If you 
finish before the time is up, please wait for the other participants to answer the questions. 
After all participants have submitted their responses, the next screen of questions will appear 
automatically. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.   
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Quiz screen 
 
 
The second part 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 separate periods. Four participants in this 
room will be randomly assigned to a team. The composition of the teams will stay the same 
throughout the experiment. It is not possible to identify each other. The total income from 
the experiment will equal the sum of the period income.  
 
At the beginning of each period, each member of your team will receive 50 ECUs, from here 
on referred to as the endowment. You and your fellow team members are asked to allocate 
the endowment between two activities - individual work and team work. In particular, your 
task is to decide how much of your endowment to allocate to the individual work and to the 
team work, respectively. You (and the other members of your team) can allocate any 
proportion of the endowment to the individual work or the team work. At the beginning of 
each period, the following input screen will appear: 
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Input screen 
 
 
The period number appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right corner, you 
can see how much time remains for you to make your allocation decision. You will have 90 
seconds in the first two periods and 60 seconds in the remaining periods. You make your 
decision by typing an integer number between 0 and 50 as your allocation to the team work. 
The remaining endowment will automatically be considered your allocation to the individual 
work. You can revise your decision as many times as you want, but your final decision must 
be made before the time displays 0 seconds by clicking the “Submit” button. Once you have 
done this, your decision can no longer be revised. If you finish before the time is up, please 
wait for other team members to make the decision. 
 
Your income at the end of each period consists of two parts: 
(1) Your income from the individual work. The individual work yields 1 ECU for each ECU 
you allocated.  
(2) Your income from the team work. Your earning (and everyone else’s in your team) is 
equal to 0.5 times the total allocation by all members of the team to the team work.     
 
Your income of a period = 1 × (allocation to the individual work) + 0.5 × (team total 
allocation to the team work) 
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Each team member’s income from the team work is calculated in the same way. This means 
that each team member receives the same income from the team work. Suppose that the sum 
of the allocation to the team work from all team members is 60 ECUs. In this case, each 
member of the team receives an income from the team work of 0.5×60=30 ECUs. 
 
After all members of your team have made their decision, the following screen will show you 
the total amount of endowment allocated by all four team members to the team work as well 
as your income for the period. In the first two periods you will have 45 seconds and in the 
remaining periods 30 seconds to view this income screen. If you finish before the time is up, 
please click the “Continue” button.  
 
Income screen 
 
 
Next, the information screen will appear. It shows how much each team member allocated to 
the team work as a percentage of his/her endowment in the period; that is, the allocation rate. 
At the beginning of each period, each team member will be randomly assigned a number 
from 1 to 4 as his/her identification number. Your allocation rate will be shown under the text 
“You.” Those of the other team members will be displayed under the corresponding 
identification numbers. Although the team composition stays fixed, the identification 
numbers are changed randomly in each period. Hence, the same identification number may 
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represent a different member for each period. You will have 45 seconds in the first two 
periods and 30 seconds in the remaining periods to view this screen. Do you have any 
questions? 
 
Information screen 
 
 
 
The decision making is over now. Please remain seated, and complete a survey that is shown 
on your screen in a moment.  
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Control questions:  
Before making your actual decision, please first answer all control questions. They serve as a 
test of your understanding of payoff calculations. There is no time limit on answering the 
control questions. 
 
1. Each team member has an endowment of 50 ECUs. The other three team members 
together allocate a total of 40 ECUs to the team work. What is: 
a. Your income at the end of the period if you allocate 0 ECUs to the team work? ………. 
b. Your income at the end of the period if you allocate 10 ECUs to the team 
work? ………. 
 
2. Each team member has an endowment of 50 ECUs. You allocate 18 ECUs to the team 
work. What is: 
a. Your income at the end of the period if the other team members together allocate a 
further total of 16 ECUs to the team work? ……….  
b. Your income at the end of the period if the other team members together allocate a 
further total of 52 ECUs to the team work? ……….   
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Appendix B. Post-Experiment Survey 
Please answer the following survey questions. All your answers will remain confidential and 
anonymous. (Summary statistics are in italics in parentheses.) 
 
1. What is your age? _____ (Mean 21.7, Std Dev 2.2, Median 21.5, Min 17, Max 33) 
2. What is your gender?  
(a) Female (73.4%) 
(b)  Male (26.6%) 
3. What is your ethnic group?  
(a) Han (85.9%) 
(b) Zhuang (0.5%) 
(c) Man (3.7%) 
(d) Hui (3.1%) 
(e) Miao (0.5%) 
(f) Weiwu’er (1.0%) 
(g) Tujia (1.0%) 
(h) Yi (0.5%) 
(i) Menggu (0.0%)  
(j) Zang (0.5%) 
(k) Other, please specify _____ (3.1%)  
4. Which kind of household registration did you hold before enrolling into university?  
(a) Rural (46.3%) 
(b) Urban (53.7%) 
(c) No household registration (0.5%)  
5. What was your permanent home address before enrolling into university?  
Province (City) _____ City (District) _____ County _____ (Subjects are from 30 
provinces of mainland China, excluding Shanghai) 
6. How many biological siblings do you have excluding yourself (if you are the single child, 
please write 0)? _____ (0 siblings 40.1%, 1-2 53.6%, 3 or more 6.3%) 
If you have any biological siblings, please specify your order in the siblings _____ 
(a) First (47.0%) 
(b) Second (33.9%) 
(c) Third (13.0%) 
(d) Fourth (3.5%) 
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(e) Fifth (2.6%) 
(f) Sixth (0.0%) 
7. How many siblings, half-blood siblings, cousins have you been living with for more than 
six months of a year (including six months) before enrolling into university (if none, 
please write 0)? _____ (0 siblings 42.7%, 1-2 40.6%, 3 or more 16.7%) 
8. Have you been to a boarding high school?  
(a) Yes (60.4%) 
(b) No (39.6%) 
9. Please choose in which of the following categories that your family (with which you lived 
before enrolling into university) current monthly before-tax total income falls into? _____ 
<400 
401-
1000 
1001-
2000 
2001-
3000 
3001-
4000 
4001-
6000 
6001-
8000 
8001-
10000 
10001-
20000 
20001-
30000 
30001-
40000 
> 40001 
2.6% 8.9% 17.7% 14.6% 15.6% 17.7% 8.8% 6.8% 4.7% 1.0% 1.6% 0.0% 
10. What is your major?  
School/Institute/Center___________ Department___________ Major___________ 
11. Are you an undergraduate or graduate student?  
(a) Vocational degree student (1.0%) 
(b) Bachelor student (71.4%) 
(c) Master student (27.6%) 
(d) PhD student (0.0%) 
(e) Post-doctoral student (0.0%)  
12. Which year are you in your program? _____ (Mean 2.1, Std Dev 1.1, Median 2, Min 1, 
Max 5) 
13. Are you a member of the Communist Party?  
(a) Yes (26.6%)  
(b) No (73.4%) 
14. Are you a member of any civic voluntary association (e.g. political, interest groups, 
sports, culture, nonprofit, etc.)?  
(a) Yes. (44.8%) Please specify the full name of all associations that you are a member of, 
with a comma between the names _____ 
(b) No (55.2%) 
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15. Have you ever participated in any economics experimental studies before?  
(a) Yes. (19.3%) Please specify the number of times _____ (Mean 1.1, Std Dev 0.4, 
Median 1, Min 1, Max 3) 
(b) No (81.5%) 
16.  Have you ever participated in any psychology experimental studies before?  
(a) Yes. (66.1%) Please specify the number of times_____ (Mean 3.1, Std Dev 3.3, 
Median 2, Min 1, Max 30) 
(b) No (33.9%) 
17. How many other participants in the session do you know from before (if none, please 
write 0)? _____ (0 other participants 78.7%, 1-2 20.8%, 3 or more 0.5%) 
18. In the past twelve months, have you donated money or goods to or done volunteer work 
for charities or other nonprofit organizations?  
(a) Yes. (75.5%) Please specify the total amount ¥_____ (Mean 145.2, Std Dev 194.1, 
Median 100, Min 0, Max 1200) and/or the number of hours _____ (Mean 40.5, Std 
Dev 74.3, Median 15, Min 0, Max 500)  
(b) No (24.5%) 
19. On a scale from 0 (least) to 10 (most), please rate how closely attached you felt to your 
own team throughout the experiment. _____ (Mean 4.3, Std Dev 3.0, Median 4, Min 0, 
Max 10) 
 Least                                                                                                                                   Most                      
                                                                                           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
20. (For strong identity treatments only) On a scale from 0 (least) to 10 (most), please rate 
how much you think the “human knot” game helped enhance the sense of being in a team. 
_____ (Mean 5.8, Std Dev 3.0, Median 6, Min 0, Max 10) 
 Least                                                                                                                                   Most                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Product selection matters for a firm's productivity and long-run growth. Recent theoretical and
empirical studies indicate that an important margin of adjustment to policy reforms is the
reallocation of output within firms through changes in product mix decisions. This paper
examines the frequency, pervasiveness and determinants of product-switching and upgrading
activities in firms located in China's state-owned forest areas during a period of gradual
institutional and managerial reforms (2004–2008). We find that changes to the product mix
are pervasive and characterized by adding or churning products rather than only shedding
products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant contribution to the
aggregate output growth during our sample period. We also find that firms with different
characteristics, human capital and market conditions differ in their propensity to diversify and
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1. Introduction
A rapidly growing literature indicates that what a country makes matters for its growth. In the endogenous growth models,
such as those in Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), long-run growth tends to depend on economic
structure and the rate at which it is being transformed. These models suggest that specializing in the production of some products
is more growth promoting than specializing in others. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) construct a quantitative index that
ranks traded goods in terms of their implied productivity, and show that countries that latch on to higher productivity goods will
perform better subsequently. UNIDO (2009) also finds that there is a strong and positive relationship between the sophistication
level of a country's industrial production structure (in terms of technology, organizational quality, design and logistics) and its
subsequent growth.
As this literature suggests, an important channel for fostering economic growth is to move up the product sophistication
ladder by altering the production structure to products that embody high productivity and generate positive learning spillovers to
the rest of the economy. However, product switching may be costly. Production of a new good requires investment, the costs of
which are borne by the pioneer entrepreneur in full whereas the gains may not be fully appropriated. This occurs in both
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technology innovation and importation processes. Hence, if the inducements such as investment subsidies or anti-competition
policies to discover costs in new activities are inadequate, product switching may not happen and the investment already made
may well be sunk (Acemoglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti, 2006; Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). Besides, unfavorable institutions and
regulations on input and/or output markets tend to retard product switching due to the associated high sunk costs (Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, & Topalova, 2010). Under such circumstances, economic growth is likely to be slowed down.
The link between a country's product sophistication and economic growth applies at the industry and firm level too (UNIDO,
2009). However, there are still few studies on the characteristics and product mix decisions of multi-product firms from
developing country settings. The present paper examines patterns of product selection, switching and upgrading, and the
determinants of the changes at the firm level. First, it analyzes how firms located in China's state-owned forest areas adjust
product lines over a period during which gradual institutional and managerial reforms occurred. Whether a reform can induce a
reallocation of resources within industries that will render gains in aggregate output is a core issue for assessing the effect of the
reform. Until quite recently, research into industry dynamics has addressed this issue by focusing exclusively on firm entry and
exit where each firm is treated as producing a single product, and the adjustments of extensive margins undertaken by multi-
product firms through adding and dropping products are ignored (Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2010). Some recent papers
empirically examine the contribution of firms’ product mix changes to the changes in firms’ output over time and find it
significant (e.g., see Bernard et al. (2010) for the US, Goldberg et al. (2010) for India and Navarro (2008) for Chile).
The second question this paper seeks to address is how firm-level characteristics drive the decision of a continuing firm to
alter and upgrade the product mix under the institutional and managerial reforms. We model both product growth rate and the
probability of a continuing firm to change product mix against three sets of variables—firm characteristics (ownership, firm age,
size, technology level measured by research and development (R&D) intensity and computerization level, productivity level,
and product scope), human capital (age, experience, education and political connections of the manager, and education of
workers) and market environment variables (credit constraints and perceived raw material supply constraints measured by
perceived wood, energy, and other raw material supply constraints). In order to investigate the drivers of upward moves of the
product portfolio in the productivity hierarchy, we model the likelihood that a continuing firm will upgrade its product
structure as a function of the same variables. An increase in the firm's detrended overall productivity associated with the whole
product bundle computed as a firm-level analogue to the index in Hausmann et al. (2007) is used as the measure for product
upgrading.
The analysis is based on a unique firm-level panel dataset for the years 2004 and 2008 coming from surveys conducted in
China's state-owned forest areas. China's state-owned forests account for 42% of the country's total forest area, 68% of total timber
volume, and almost all of the nation's natural forest resources. They mainly locate in the upper reaches of large river basins and
mountainous regions, and provide various forest-related products and important environmental services (Xu, Tao, & Amacher,
2004). While historically having contributed enormously to China's economic development, these areas have relapsed into the
problem of “two crises”—ecological degradation and economic loss-making. In order to alleviate this problem, the government
has implemented a series of gradual institutional and managerial reforms in recent years that altered the conditions in which the
firms operated. While all firms used to be state- or collective-owned workshops of state forest bureaus (SFBs) which are the key
economic and political actors in the state-owned forest areas, some of the firms have been privatized, and restructuring of the
remaining ones is still ongoing. These areas hence provide an interesting case and an attractive setting. In addition, this dataset
contains very detailed product information, not available in most other Chinese dataset, which allows our investigation on
product switching and output growth. Moreover, firms in the forest areas usually engage in activities that do not require massive
sunk cost investment in new state-of-the-art technology, which implies product switching is not prohibitively expensive andmay
happen.
We find that there is considerable variation in the value-added associated with different products. Within the same industry
multi-product firms in our sample are larger, more productive and more likely to export than single-product firms. In addition,
product mix changes are frequent in our sample. Such changes are characterized by adding or churning products rather than only
shedding products, and multi-product firms are more likely to change product mix than single-product firms, especially through
product churning. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant contribution to the aggregate output growth
during our sample period.
The econometric results further indicate that some firms are more prone to diversify and upgrade their product mix than
others. Firms that are older, have an R&D department, produce a single product, have a lower proportion of workers with college
degree or above, have separate manager and Communist Party leader, and face wood supply constraint in 2004 have higher
product growth rate between 2004 and 2008. Firms that are less computerized, produce multiple products, have a manager
with college degree or above, and have less difficulty in accessing external finance are more likely to change their product mix.
Moreover, firms that are less productive, whose manager has no experience of working in governmental organizations but
works concurrently as the Party leader, and that are not confronted with constraints in either external finance or energy
supply tend to have higher probability to upgrade product portfolio subsequently. These results hold when we control for
attrition also.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on firm-product level heterogeneity, and
the link between productivity of a country's industrial production structure and growth. Section 3 introduces the background of
China's state-owned forest areas and ongoing reforms, and describes the data. Section 4 documents the firm-product level
patterns. Section 5 presents the nature of product mix changes between the sample years. Section 6 discusses the econometric
models and reports the results. Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion on policy implications.
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2. Literature review
This paper relates primarily to two strands of a rapidly growing literature. One studies patterns of heterogeneity observed at
firm-product level to understand how firms respond to changes in their economic environment. The other examines the link
between productivity of a country's industrial production or export structure and growth.
Developments in the first strand of literature have been stimulated by the need to ameliorate the drawbacks in the previous
research in industry dynamics, where studies focus almost exclusively on the contribution of firm entry and exit to resource
reallocation, treat each firm as producing a single product and ignore the adjustments of the extensive margins undertaken by
multi-product firms through adding and dropping products in response to policy reforms (Bernard et al., 2010). The analysis on
multi-product firms’ product mix decisions is intriguing since the intra-firm resource reallocation can potentially be a significant
source of productivity increase at the firm level (Aw & Lee, 2009).
Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg et al. (2010) and Navarro (2008) document patterns of firm characteristics and product mix
changes for the US, Indian and Chilean manufacturing firms over the period of 1987–1997, 1989–2003 and 1996–2003
respectively.2 Though differences in their product classifications and design of firm-level surveys make it difficult to compare
results related to firm and product characteristics across countries, some similar patterns are observed. One common finding is
that multi-product firms are stronger performers: multi-product firms are larger in terms of output,3 more productive and more
likely to export than single-product firms. In addition, they all find that product switching is a very common activity: 54% and 28%
of surviving firms alter their product mix every five years in the US and Indian firms, and three quarters of Chilean firms change
product composition in the sample period. Furthermore, changes in firms’ product mix have made a considerable contribution to
aggregate output growth: it accounts for 25% and 55% of the net increase in Indian and Chilean manufacturing output during the
sample period, respectively. These findings stress the importance of product-switching activities for output growth and justify the
focus on firms’ product margin in empirical work (Goldberg et al., 2010; Navarro, 2008).
This firm-product level heterogeneity is usually related to international trade liberalization in this strand of literature. While
differing in their assumptions regarding firm-product characteristics and dynamics, recent theoretical models of multi-product
firms all predict that the range of products within a firm (i.e. firm scope) is an important margin of adjustment in response to
trade policy changes (see Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2009; Eckel & Neary, 2010; Nocke & Yeaple, 2006). A common approach in
this literature is to treat product switching as a selection process based on the efficiency (trade costs) of the products. Firms drop
their least efficient products, hence reduce scope, and concentrate resources on their core competence. Some empirical analyses
provide support for the theoretical predictions. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) find that fringe products are more likely to be shed
than core products in Mexican manufacturing firms during the period of 1994-2003 after the implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Aw and Lee (2009) document trends of specialization in the Taiwanese electronics sector during
the 1990s under the circumstances of increased foreign competition.
Relocation of firms across industries or product lines is also empirically relevant in industry dynamics (Plehn-Dujowich,
2009). Dunne, Klimek, and Roberts (2005) study plant exit patterns in seven industries in the US using Census of Manufactures
data for the period from 1963 to 1997. They distinguish two modes of exit: a plant exits the market by entirely shutting down its
operation, or the plant remains open but shifts its production toward other products. Averaging across all industries and census
intervals, product-line shifts in ongoing plants account for 22% of all exits, while plant closures account for the remaining 78%.
When identifying the factors influencing the choice between the modes of exit, Dunne et al. (2005) find that larger and more
productive firms are more likely to exit by changing their product lines. On the other hand, market demand has no effect on the
decision of a firm to shift out of an industry versus shutdown.
The emerging literature focusing on the link between productivity of a country's industrial production or export structure and
growth originates from the work of Hausmann et al. (2007). The principal message conveyed is that what countries produce
matters. While the argument that specializing in the production of some products is more growth promoting than specializing in
others is not new, Hausmann et al. (2007) establish a quantitative index by which learning-by-doing effects—a cornerstone in
endogenous growth models—can be empirically verified. They first rank traded goods in terms of their implied income or
productivity, constructed as the weighted average of per-capita GDPs of the countries exporting a particular product (which they
call PRODY). They then construct the income or productivity level corresponding to a country's export basket as a measure of that
country's specialization pattern (which they call EXPY), by calculating the export-weighted average of all the PRODYs for that
country.4 This approach attempts to classify products according to the outcomes of structural change they embody rather than the
process technology they use (UNIDO, 2009). They find that after controlling for standard covariates countries that specialize in
producing and exporting more sophisticated products, those that are primarily manufactured and exported by countries at higher
income levels, tend to grow faster subsequently. Two prominent examples are China and India, whose industrial productivity
levels are much higher than what would be predicted based on their income levels. The economic mechanism behind this link is
that growth is a result of transferring resources from lower-productivity goods to higher productivity goods identified by the
entrepreneurial “cost discovery” process that generates positive knowledge spillovers from the pioneer entrepreneur into new
activities to emulators. Since the positive externalities imply that investment levels in “cost discovery” among private economic
2 The unit of observation for Navarro (2008) is plant rather than ﬁrm.
3 Bernard et al. (2010) and Navarro (2008) also report that multi-product ﬁrms are larger in terms of employment.
4 Hausmann et al. (2007) focus on exports rather than on production partly because they have more detailed data on exports.
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agents are sub-optimal, Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest government-led industrial policies to promote entrepreneurship and
investment into new activities. UNIDO (2009) provides support to the aforementioned positive relationship.
3. Data
3.1. Background of China's state-owned forest areas and its reforms
Accounting for 42% of China's total forest area, 68% of total timber volume and almost all of the nation's natural forest
resources (Xu et al., 2004), China's state-owned forest areas are an important part of the forest sector.5 The formation of state-
owned forest areas dates back to the early 1950s, when the vast natural forests mainly in northeastern and southwestern China
were decreed to be owned by the state. SFBs, which are actually state-owned enterprises, serve as the key economic and political
actors in the state-owned forest areas, with timber logging and transportation, wood processing and silviculture as three primary
business sections. 6 They were set up in the 1950s and 1960s by the government to harvest the nationalized natural forests for
industrial use. There are 135 such SFBs in China,7 each of which administers hundreds of thousands of hectares of forest area, and
employed up to a total of one million people throughout the 1980s and 1990s (China Forestry Statistical Yearbook, 1987–2000).
These SFBs as part of the state-owned enterprise system, were also responsible for providing social services for the communities
where they located, many of which came into existence due to the establishment of the bureaus (Bennett, Jiang, & Xu, 2008).
To facilitate wood processing and related product manufacturing, the SFBs set up thousands of smaller mills, which located in
geographical vicinity and were often part of the so-called integrated forestry system. Although a majority of them produce wood
related products, there are also a host of mills operating in other sectors, such as food and beverage manufacturing, or providing
ancillary services to the processing mills, such as machine manufacturing and maintenance. In the planned economy era, the SFBs
were both owners and managers, and were the only legal agents to deal with the state over taxation and profit-contracting and
with external economic agents (Zhang, 2000). The mills acted only as workshops of the bureaus with all land, capital and other
material inputs supplied through budgetary channels, and all profits required to be remitted to the bureaus.
Up through the late-1980s to mid-1990s, the operating expenses and social welfare responsibilities of the bureaus could
generally be covered by the revenues generated from timber production and processing from natural forests, despite in many
cases via unsustainable harvesting practices (Bennett et al., 2008). However, like other sectors in the planned economy, most SFBs
suffered from low efficiency, overstaffing and weak competitiveness and up to the 1990s most of them run into net losses. The
state forest sector relapsed into the problem of “two crises”—ecological degradation and economic loss-making. Hence since the
mid-1990s the attempts to restructuring the processing section have never ceased. In general, the reforms have followed more or
less the same course as in other state-owned industrial sectors (Zhang, 2000), but at a lower rate. They have focused primarily on
the implementation of “managerial responsibility systems” and on the transformation of organizational models, and then
switched to privatization.
“Managerial responsibility systems”were introduced to depoliticize the mills. Under these systems, managers were delegated
autonomy to make many decisions, and both managers and workers were given financial incentives—primarily bonuses—
contingent on mill performance which was measured by the sum of turned-in taxes and profits to the SFB. In addition, new
managers were not exclusively appointed by the SFBs anymore, but through auctioning-off to select competent candidates. The
mills became independent cost accounting units, which was a step toward the modern form of firm management. Manifold
organizational reform was also widely implemented, including multi-mill corporation formation, joint-stock reform, contracting
management, lease management, etc. (Li & Zhang, 2000). All these arrangements reflected the attempts to maximize the value of
the processing business section and to align the interests of the managers and workers with those of the owners.
However, the agency problem was still prevalent and the residual claim of rights was unclear in the state-ownedmills. A gradual
process of privatization was hence initiated in the late 1990s, partly evoked by the introduction of the Natural Forest Protection
Program (NFPP) due to the severe floods in 1998, which called for a logging reduction in state-owned forests and exacerbated the
situation ofmillswhose rawmaterialwasmainly bought from local SFBs.Marketizing themills and removing the political influence of
the SFBs were the main policy changes purporting to alleviate the “two crises”. The privatization process is still ongoing.
3.2. Data collection
This study uses combined panel data on firms and SFBs located in China's Northeast-Inner Mongolia state-owned forest area,
collected in face-to-face interviews with firms’management and SFBs’ officials in 2005 and 2009 by the Environmental Economics
Program in China. The survey area covers Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and the
dataset includes information for 2004 and 2008.
The sampling frame for the SFBs and firms is as follows. The forests in this area are, based on geographical locations, under the
jurisdiction of seven regional SFBs and managed by 84 subordinated SFBs. The survey covered all seven regional SFBs. At each
5 The other part of China's forest sector is collective forest areas.
6 In China's state-owned forest areas, besides the administrative functions, SFBs operate as corporate enterprises. Their enterprise feature mainly embodies
timber production and processing for revenue. This differs from the role of forest bureaus in collective forest areas whose sole responsibility is regional forest
resource administration.
7 There are 20 other SFBs in China's state-owned forest areas operating only for afforestation and reforestation.
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level the samples were randomly selected to guarantee representativeness. In each regional SFB, the subordinated SFBs were
stratified into three groups by the size of the forest area administered, and one was randomly selected from each group.8 Ten
firms were then randomly selected from each of the chosen SFBs. In total 206 firms were finally included in the survey.9 Since 32
firms did not provide detailed product information or data on other major variables, they are excluded from our analysis. As a
follow-up survey, the 2009 survey tracked the same SFBs and firms that were interviewed in 2005 and no new entrants were
taken into consideration. Systematic reasons (e.g. shutdown, merger and acquisition, temporary suspension of production) and
random dropouts (e.g. non-reachable, decline to answer, missing values in major variables) rendered a reduction in the number
of firms to 97 in the 2008 data.10
While the sample size is small, the information collected is rather rich. At the SFB level, it contains information on SFBs’ forest
resource, production and sales, financial status, employment, leadership and ongoing projects. At the firm11 level, the
questionnaire consists of two parts. One part, designed to be answered by the firm manager, asks questions about the firm's basic
characteristics, ownership structure and privatization process, histories of manager turnover, managerial arrangements, and
contractual relations with the SFBs. The other part, directed to the accountant, covers details about the firm's major financial
sheets and use of inputs (capital, workers and wage bills, material and energy). The survey also records detailed information on
each firm's product list including names, production and sales prices, quantities and thereby values. In addition, general
information on product market and rawmaterial market environments is also collected. Hence, this dataset is well suited to study
how firms in the state-owned forest areas adjust their product lines over time and how their choices may be related to the firm-
level characteristics.
3.3. Product classiﬁcation
While our sample firms are located in forest areas, they do not exclusively produce wood related products. The reporting of
products by our sample firms is not governed by any particular product classification. Since the names of products reported by the
firms could differ in aggregation or the way firms called them, we standardize the product names and define product, industry
and sector according to two national standards. One is China's Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities (2002),
henceforth ICNEA, which categorizes economic activities in China into four levels, using English alphabets, two-, three- and four-
digit codes respectively.12 The other is China's Products Classification for Statistical Use (2010), henceforth CPC, which classifies
products to a more disaggregated level. CPC uses a five-level coding system, with two-, four-, six-, eight- and ten-digit codes.
ICNEA and CPC are harmonized at the two- and four-digit code levels.13 We map all reported product names into six-, eight- or
ten-digit CPC codes and take this as the definition of a “product”.14 We refer to the three-digit ICNEA categories as “industries”
and two-digit ICNEA categories as “sectors”. There are a total of 90 products linked to 26 industries across 17 sectors in our data.
Table 1 reports the distribution of industries and products by sector in the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. The number of
products by sector is highly heterogeneous. The number of products ranges from one in seven sectors to 47 in the Processing of
timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products sector (ICNEA 20), henceforth wood processing. Similarly,
the average number of products per industry within sectors ranges from one in ten sectors to 16 in wood processing. As observed
in the table, 71.9% of the sample firms operate in the wood processing sector. Comparing the distributions of industries and
products by sector between pooled all firms and pooled continuing firms,15 the patterns are similar. However, in the latter sample
the total number of products reduces to 74 related to 19 industries and 14 sectors, and the share of firms operating in wood
processing sector falls to 70.6% (results not shown). For continuing firms the number of products and industries increases from 62
to 66, and from 17 to 18, respectively, between 2004 and 2008. In addition, the share of firms operating in wood processing sector
drops from 72.2% to 69.1%.
An example of the mapping hierarchy of sectors, industries and products is given in Table A1 in the Appendix A. The table
reports two industries within the wood processing sector (ICNEA 20): Processing of sawnwood and wood chips (ICNEA 201),
which contains 17 products, and Manufacture of panel board (ICNEA 202), which contains 10 products. As with all classifications,
the degree of detail varies across industries and sectors. Even so, we refer to firms producing only one product by our definition as
single-product firms and multi-product firms otherwise. A complete list of sector, industry and product classification is available
in an Online Appendix.16
8 To account for the fact that the number of SFBs under the jurisdiction of Yichun regional SFB in Heilongjiang Province doubled that in other six regional SFBs,
one more set of sample SFBs was selected. Consequently, ﬁfteen, six and three SFBs were selected from Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia, respectively.
9 According to the sampling frame, 240 ﬁrms were supposed to be interviewed. However, due to the limited number of ﬁrms in some SFBs, not up to ten ﬁrms
could be reached in all SFBs. In such cases, all entities were interviewed.
10 Systematic reasons account for 56% of the observation reduction and random dropouts for the remaining44%.
11 The unit of observation in our sample is ﬁrm. It is rarely the case that a ﬁrm has more than one plant in our sample area.
12 ICNEA is comparable to the UNSD: 1989, International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Activities, NEQ.
13 At the four-digit level, ICNEA and CPC assign the same code to most, but not all economic activities. However, this does not matter for our analysis, since we do
not use the four-digit codes as our classiﬁcation for product, industry or sector.
14 Eight-digit codes are our primary standard of classiﬁcation. Two products are classiﬁed at the ten-digit level. Since for some products six-digit codes that are
the most disaggregated level in CPC are not disaggregated enough for our analysis, we create the eight-digit codes by ourselves. This applies to eight products.
15 Number of observations for the pooled all ﬁrm sample is 271, 174 for year 2004 and 97 for year 2008. Number of observations for the continuing ﬁrm sample
is 194, 97 ﬁrms for each year.
16 The web address is http://www.economics.handels.gu.se/english/staff/phd_candidates/qian_weng/.
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4. Firm-product level patterns
The overall aims of this paper are to document how firms in China's state-owned forest areas adjust their product lines over a
period of institutional and managerial reforms and to identify firm-level characteristics that may affect product switching and
upgrading. In this section, we portray product level value-added, and compare single- and multi- product firms in terms of their
economic significance and main firm characteristics.
First of all, we investigate how products differ in terms of their value-added. This is done by estimating a log-form value-added
Cobb–Douglas production function with product dummies as follows:
lnvalueaddedit ¼ αL ln Lit þ αK ln Kit þ∑
j
θjPij þ αtyeart þ εit ð1Þ
where valueaddedit is firm i's value-added level in year tmeasured as total sales revenue17 minus the value of total material inputs
(i.e. sum of the non-labor expenses on raw materials and energy), Lit is firm i's labor in year tmeasured by number of workers, Kit
is firm i's capital in year tmeasured by the net value of fixed assets, Pij is firm i's product dummy for product j, and yeart is the year
dummy. The product dummy is equal to one over the number of product(s) for each product that firm i produces and zero
otherwise. The time dimension of the product dummies is suppressed since we assume that the value-added associated with each
product (θj) is prevailing during the whole sample period. Value-added and capital in 2008 are converted to 2004 constant values
using different price indices as deflators to capture the real value changes.18 The estimated coefficients θ^s hence indicate
differences in the value-added level associated with different products, conditional on the other explanatory variables in the
model. Table 2 presents the estimation results of Eq. (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS). The Wald test result of the coefficient
estimates associated with the product dummies indicates that the products are jointly significant at less than 1% level. The
standard deviation of these estimates is around 2, implying that there is a wide dispersion of the product-specific value-added.
This result suggests that product selection does matter for the value-added level for a firm as a whole.
17 We focus on revenue-based measures of productivity rather than quantity-based measures because data on physical units of quantity are not available for all
products and physical units of output are not comparable across ﬁrms for many products, e.g. wooden furniture. We are fully aware of the possible problems of
revenue-based productivity measures as pointed out by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) and Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2009). It is somewhat soothing
that Foster et al. (2008) ﬁnd a highly positive correlation between revenue- and quantity-based measures of productivity for a sample of 11 homogenous
products using the US Census of Manufactures data.
18 Different variables in 2008 are adjusted by different price deﬂators to the 2004 price level. Sales revenue is deﬂated primarily by sectoral producer price indices
for manufactured goods, together with producer price index for sector Forestry (ICNEA 2) and Husbandry (ICNEA 3), and country-level retail price index for sector
Storage services (ICNEA 58). Capital is deﬂated by provincial price indices for investment in ﬁxed assets. Material input is deﬂated by purchasing price indices for
timber and pulp paper sector. The reason for choosing this price index is that timber and related stuff is the main material for our sample ﬁrms. Energy input is
deﬂated by country-level purchasing price indices for fuel and power. All the price indices are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (2006–2009) and based
upon authors’ calculation.
Table 1
Sectors, industries and products.
ICNEA Sector Products
(1)
Industries
(2)
Products per industry
(3)
Share of ﬁrms
(4)
2 Forestry 2 2 1.00 0.006
3 Husbandry 2 2 1.00 0.011
13 Processing of food from agricultural products 3 1 3.00 0.029
14 Manufacture of food 1 1 1.00 0.001
15 Manufacture of beverages 7 2 3.50 0.038
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan,
palm and straw products
47 3 15.67 0.719
21 Manufacture of furniture 10 2 5.00 0.082
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 3 2 1.50 0.015
24 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sport activities 1 1 1.00 0.010
26 Manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical products 1 1 1.00 0.002
27 Manufacture of medicines 4 1 4.00 0.021
31 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 3 3 1.00 0.018
35 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 1 1 1.00 0.007
37 Manufacture of transport equipment 1 1 1.00 0.007
41 Manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for
cultural activity and office work
1 1 1.00 0.006
42 Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 2 1 2.00 0.020
58 Storage services 1 1 1.00 0.007
Total 90 26 3.46 1
Notes: Table reports the distribution of industries and products by sector. Column (1) reports the number of products by sector. Column (2) reports the number of
industries within each sector. Column (3) is the first column divided by the second column. Column (4) reports the share of firms producing in each sector. If a
firm produces products in multiple sectors, the share in each sector the firm produces is calculated as the number of the product(s) in that sector to the total
number of products the firm produces.
Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample and the number of observations is 271.
806 M. Söderbom, Q. Weng / China Economic Review 23 (2012) 801–818
We then explore the relative economic significance of single- and multi-product firms in China's state-owned forest areas.
Table 3 reports the average breakdown of single- and multi-product firms in terms of number and aggregate output (i.e. total
sales), and also the average number of products, industries and sectors multi-product firms produce across 2004 and 2008. As
indicated in the table, multi-product firms account for 47% of the firms and 50% of the aggregate output. They are relatively more
important, but not as dominant as found in the US (Bernard et al., 2010) and Indian (Goldberg et al., 2010) cases.19 Multi-industry
andmulti-sector firms exert similar influence, responsible for 34% and 9% of the firms and 43% and 25% of the output, respectively.
Column (3) of Table 3 reveals that multi-product firms on average manufacture 2.76 products, that multi-industry firms on
average operate in 2.25 industries and that multi-sector firms on average are present in 2.08 sectors.
Table 4 compares the characteristics of single- and multi-product firms in the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. Each cell reports
a separate OLS regression coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the (natural logarithm of) firm characteristics (except
probability of export which is a binary dummy) on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm produces more than one product (i.e.
multiple products, column (1)), operates in more than one industry (column (2)), and operates in more than one sector (column
(3)), respectively, with industry and year fixed effects controlled. As reported in the table, multi-product firms in our sample are
significantly larger than single-product firms within an industry in terms of output (0.751 log points), employment (0.569 log
points) and capital (0.753 log points).20 21 Multi-product firms are also more likely to export and have higher revenue-based total
factor productivity (TFP)22 and labor productivity23 than single-product firms in the same industry, though the differences are
statistically insignificant. This is in general consistent with the cross-section evidence reported by Bernard et al. (2010) and
Goldberg et al. (2010). Similar patterns are discovered with respect to firms producing in multiple industries and sectors, except
that the differential in probability to export turns out to be marginally significant.
The model presented in Bernard et al. (2009) predicts that firms possess “core competencies”, implying that firms should have
highly skewed distribution of output towards products for which they have particular expertise. We find support for this
prediction in our data that the distribution of output across products within the firms is uneven and firms possess a “core
competent” product, as shown in Table 5. The average share of the “core competent” product ranges from 73% to 46% in total
output in firms that produce from 2 to 6 products. These results are comparable to what Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg et al.
(2010) and Navarro (2008) find for the US, Indian and Chilean manufacturing firms, respectively.
19 Though it is nice to link our results to the ﬁndings from other studies in the literature, we have to admit that comparisons between our study and other
studies must be conducted with great caution since the sample coverage, size and economic environments in which the ﬁrms operate differ tremendously.
20 The Average size of the ﬁrms, measured by output, employment and capital across the two years, is 10,385 thousand CNY (1 USD=6.32 CNY in January 2012),
160 employees and 6001 thousand CNY, respectively. The standard deviation is 24,237 thousand CNY, 362 employees and 17,790 thousand CNY, respectively,
indicating that the range of ﬁrms covered in this dataset is large. Firms range in size from 6 to 192,314 thousand CNY in output, from 2 to 4992 in employees, and
from 2 to 176,300 thousand CNY in capital.
21 At ﬁrst glance it seems to be contradictory with the ﬁnding from Table 3 that single- and multi-product ﬁrms are similar across size. When comparing the
distribution of size (output, employment and capital) between single- and multi-product ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that the means are very similar, whereas the median of
multi-product ﬁrms is twice as large as that of single-product ﬁrms. Therefore, the similarity across size can be explained as driven by some exceptionally large
single-product ﬁrms.
22 Revenue-based TFP is measured as the residual of the log-form Cobb–Douglas production function
TFPit ¼ lnYit−αLlnLit−αK lnKit−αM lnMit
where Yit is ﬁrm i's output in year t measured by total sales revenue, Lit is ﬁrm i's labor in year t measured by number of workers, Kit is ﬁrm i's capital in year t
measured by net value of ﬁxed assets, and Mit is ﬁrm i's materials in year t measured by the value of non-labor raw material and energy inputs. Instead of
estimating the production function and obtain the estimates of input coefﬁcients, we assume constant returns to scale and compute the factor cost shares. Factor
share of labor is calculated as the share of total annual wage bill in the ﬁrm's total sales revenue, and factor share of materials is calculated as the ratio of the total
expenditure on material inputs to the ﬁrm's total sales revenue. The factor share of capital is hence the residual share after deducting the shares of labor and
materials from one. We then take the median of the factor shares, and they are 0.19 for labor, 0.14 for capital and 0.67 for materials.
23 Labor productivity is measured as value-added per worker.
Table 2
Product-specific value-added.
Ln(value-added)
Ln(employment) 0.744 (0.109)***
Ln(capital) 0.189 (0.063)***
Product dummy Yes
Year dummy Yes
Observations 271
R-squared 0.71
Wald test for joint significance of product dummies (P value) 0.000
Standard deviation of product-specific value-added estimates 1.994
Notes: Table presents the regression result of Eq. (1). Coefficient on the constant is not reported. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level.
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5. Product mix changes over time
In this section, we follow the empirical product mix change literature (e.g., Bernard et al., 2010; Goldberg et al., 2010; Navarro,
2008) to examine the importance of changes in firms’ product margin over time. The average number of products across firms in
our sample increased from 1.71 in 2004 to 2.03 in 2008.
We first illustrate the nature of product mix changes between 2004 and 2008 that resulted in the observed expansion of the
extensive margin. We classify continuing firms into four mutually exclusive groups based on the manner in which they alter their
product mix according to the 2004 data. The possible activities are: (1) no change—the firm does not change its product mix; (2)
add only—the firm only adds products, i.e. some products are produced in 2008 but not in 2004; (3) drop only—the firm only
drops products, i.e. some products are produced in 2004 but not in 2008; (4) both add and drop—the firm both adds and drops
products, i.e. “churns” products.
Table 6 reports results based on this classification. The top panel displays the share of continuing firms engaging in each type
of product-switching activity, and the bottom panel shows a similar breakdown but weighting each firm by its output. Three
findings can be obtained. Above all, product mix changes are frequent among our sample firms and adding or churning products is
more common than only shedding products. As indicated in the first column of the top panel, over the four year period 61% of the
surviving firms alter their product mix, 26% by adding at least one product, 8% by dropping at least one product, and 27% by both
adding and dropping at least one product. This suggests that the costs are relatively low to alter product lines. Secondly, smaller
firms are more likely to switch product lines. Column (1) in the bottom panel suggests that product-switching firms that account
for 61% of the firms only account for 36% of the total output. Thirdly, by comparing results in columns (2) and (3) we find that
multi-product firms are more likely to change product mix than single-product firms, especially through product churning. When
our results are compared to the findings from the US, India and Chile, the third result is similar, however Indian firms experience
much less product switching than firms in our dataset, and in the US and India larger firms are more prone to alter product mix in
comparable time intervals.
In order to investigate the contribution of changes in product mix to changes in output of continuing firms, we then
decompose the aggregate changes in output into changes in output due to changes in product mix (i.e. the extensive margin) and
changes in output due to existing products (i.e. the intensive margin). Let Yijt be the output of product j produced by firm i in
period t, E be the set of products that a firm produces only in period t or t−1 (i.e. the extensive margin), and I be the set of
products that a firm produces in both periods t and t−1 (i.e. the intensive margin). The changes in a firm's aggregate output
between periods t and t−1 can be decomposed as ΔYit=∑ j∈ EΔYijt+∑ j∈ IΔYijt. We can further decompose the (net) extensive
margin and (net) intensive margin: the former into the margins due to product addition (A) and product dropping (D), and the
Table 4
Single- and multiple-product firm characteristics.
Multiple product
(1)
Multiple industry
(2)
Multiple sector
(3)
Output 0.751 (0.257)*** 0.965 (0.263)*** 1.564 (0.539)***
Employment 0.569 (0.173)*** 0.741 (0.184)*** 1.157 (0.325)***
Capital 0.753 (0.304)** 1.021 (0.328)*** 1.932 (0.519)***
Probability of export 0.087 (0.058) 0.125 (0.061)** 0.207 (0.122)*
TFP 0.107 (0.111) 0.017 (0.102) −0.070 (0.157)
Labor productivity 0.083 (0.188) 0.197 (0.200) 0.205 (0.434)
Notes: Table summarizes the characteristics differences between single- and multiple-product, single- and multiple-industry, and single- and multiple-sector
firms. Each cell reports a separate OLS regression coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the (natural logarithm of) firm characteristics (except probability
of export which is a binary dummy) on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm produces multiple product (column (1)), industry (column (2)) and sector
(column (3)), respectively. Data for all regressions are from the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. Regressions also include industry and year fixed effects.
Coefficients on the constant and fixed effects are not reported. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Number of observation for each regression is
271. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3
Prevalence of single- and multiple-product firms.
Type of ﬁrms Share of ﬁrms
(1)
Share of output
(2)
Mean products, industries
or sectors per ﬁrm
(3)
Single product 0.53 0.50 1.00
Multiple product 0.47 0.50 2.76
Multiple industry 0.34 0.43 2.25
Multiple sector 0.09 0.25 2.08
Notes: Table classifies firms according to whether they produce single product, multiple products, multiple industries and multiple sectors. Columns (1) and
(2) summarize the share of firms in each category in terms of firm number and aggregate output, respectively. Column (3) reports the mean number of products,
industries and sectors in each category. The unconditional mean product per firm is 1.83. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample and the number of
observations is 271.
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latter into the margins due to product growing (G) and product shrinking (S). Hence the change in aggregate output among
continuing firms in our sample is
ΔYt ¼∑
i
∑
j∈A
ΔYijt þ∑
j∈D
ΔYijt
 !
þ ∑
j∈G
ΔYijt þ∑
j∈S
ΔYijt
 !" #
ð2Þ
Table 7 presents the decomposition. Column (1) reports the aggregate output growth. Columns (2)–(4) report the contribution
to growth from the firms’ extensive margin. Columns (5)–(7) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ intensive margin.
As shown in the first column, aggregate output of continuing firms increases 59% from 2004 to 2008. (Net) extensive margin and
(net) intensive margin contribute to 86% (0.51/0.59) and 14% (0.08/0.59) of the growth, respectively. This finding is at odds with
those from the US and India, where firms’ intensive margin accounts for the majority of the output growth during their sample
periods. When looking at the decomposition within extensive and intensive margins, we find that our data indicate a high level of
“excess reallocation” (as coined by Bernard et al., 2010) which highlights the fact that gross changes in product output are
substantially larger than the associated net changes.24 As can be seen from columns (2)–(4), both product additions and
subtractions contribute to output changes so that the gross extensivemargin (0.72+0.21=0.93) is almost twice as large as the net
extensive margin (0.72–0.21=0.51). A similar pattern can be found in the resource reallocation away from shrinking products to
growing products within the intensive margin.
6. Product mix changes and ﬁrm-level characteristics
6.1. Econometric models and results
In this section, we identify the factors that may affect the decision of a continuing firm to alter and upgrade product mix.
Before presenting the econometric model, we first discuss our measures for product mix changes and upgrading.
We measure product mix changes in two ways. The first indicator is the growth rate in distinct products, calculated as the
number of products produced by a continuing firm in 2008 divided by the number of products produced in 2004, minus one. The
second indicator is a binary dummy which is equal to one if a continuing firm adds and/or drops products between 2004 and
2008, zero if not. This variable reveals the likelihood of a continuing firm to alter product mix, either in terms of changes in
product number or changes in product portfolio composition with product number kept constant.
To determine whether product mix changes amounts to upgrading, we construct an index analogous to EXPY in Hausmann
et al. (2007) but at the firm level. The key underlying assumption here is that productive firms produce more sophisticated
products and unproductive firms produce less sophisticated goods. An index PRODVADj, similar to PRODY in Hausmann et al.
(2007), is calculated as
PRODVADj ¼∑
i
sji
∑ksjk
⋅VADi ð3Þ
where sji is the value share of product j in firm i's total sales,∑k sjk is the aggregate of value shares across all firms producing and
selling the product, and VADi is the value-added per worker of firm i. This index hence represents the weighted average
productivity level associated with product j among its producers. Compared to the value-added associated with each product
24 Within extensive and intensive margins, gross change in output is deﬁned as the sum of the absolute values of the breakdowns for output change, and net
change is deﬁned as the sum of the values of the breakdowns for output change.
Table 5
Mean distribution of within-firm output shares.
Number of products produced by the ﬁrm
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average share of product in firm's output (high to low) 1 1.00 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.46 0.50
2 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.21
3 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14
4 0.05 0.10 0.08
5 0.04 0.05
6 0.02
Notes: Columns indicate the number of products produced by the firm. Rows indicate the share of the product in firm's total output, in descending order of size.
Each cell is the average across the relevant firm-products in the sample. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample and the number of observations is 271.
Here the number of products is truncated at six since the survey asked product information up to six products. If a firm manufactured more than six products,
some aggregation of the products was already taken place at the survey stage.
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derived from estimating Eq. (1), this product level productivity measure takes the relative importance of each product in a firm
into consideration. The productivity level associated with firm i's entire product portfolio, SALEVADi, is in turn defined by
SALEVADi ¼∑
j
sji ⋅PRODVADj ð4Þ
This is the weighted average of PRODVADj for that firm. PRODVAD and SALEVAD indices are calculated for 2004 and 2008
respectively.25 In order to take account of the co-variation in different firms’ overall productivity in a given year, we detrend this
index by computing the percentage difference between SALEVADi and median SALEVAD in respective years as
DeSALEVADi ¼
SALEVADi−median SALEVADð Þ
median SALEVADð Þ ð5Þ
Product upgrading is hence defined as a positive change in a firm's DeSALEVADi between the sample years, and represented by a
binary dummy taking the value of one if a continuing firm experiences such a positive change and zero otherwise.
Wang, Wei, and Wong (2010) have identified some weaknesses associated with the PRODY and EXPY indices proposed by
Hausmann et al. (2007). In particular, Wang et al. (2010) argue that the key assumption underlying PRODY—the more advanced
countries produce more sophisticated products—may not be true. More advanced countries may often produce a larger set of
products than poor countries. Moreover, larger countries may also often produce a larger set of goods than smaller countries.
These features suggest that the PRODY index may overweight advanced and large countries. Secondly, detailed diversity in the
quality and variety of goods within a product category may not be revealed by the indices. As analogues to the PRODY and EXPY
indices, our measures PRODVAD and SALEVAD may suffer similar weaknesses. However, our product upgrading measure tries to
partly mitigate the first pitfall mentioned above. The possible overweighting of productive and large firms in PRODVAD may
render an upward biased computation of both SALEVADi and median SALEVAD, but the differencing procedure in DeSALEVADi
construction tends to offset the upward bias.
The econometric model is specified as
changeit ¼ β0 þ β1f irmcharit1 þ β2Hit1 þ β3marketit1 þ β4secit1 þ εit ð6Þ
changeit denotes the dependent variable of interest—product growth rate, the probability of a continuing firm to change product
mix, and the probability of a continuing firm to upgrade product portfolio between the sample years. All models are estimated by
OLS, and the initial year's data are used for all explanatory variables to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Firm
characteristics include ownership (private vs non-private), firm age, firm size (measured by capital stock) and technology level
(measured by R&D intensity and computerization level). We also control for firm productivity level (measured by the natural
logarithm of TFP) and product scope (single- vs multi-product). Human capital variables include age, experience, education and
political connections of the manager, and education level of workers. Market environment variables include credit constraint and
perceived rawmaterial supply constraints (measured by perceived wood, energy and other raw material supply constraints). The
definitions of these variables are listed in the top panel of Table 8. We also control for sector dummies to account for sector-
specific market demand conditions and shocks.
Amongst the firm characteristics variables, ownership is one important variable. Compared to non-private firms, private firms have
more discretion over product choice and less interference from the SFBs in their production decision-making. In all private firms the
direct managerial group, consisting of manager, Communist Party leader, board chairman or partners, controls production decision-
25 We suppress the time dimension of the indices to keep the expressions simple.
Table 6
Firm activity for continuing firms.
All ﬁrms
(1)
Single-product ﬁrms
(2)
Multiple-product ﬁrms
(3)
Percent of firms
No change 0.39 0.54 0.22
Add only 0.26 0.33 0.18
Drop only 0.08 na 0.18
Add and drop 0.27 0.13 0.42
Output-weighted percent of firms
No change 0.64 0.72 0.55
Add only 0.20 0.24 0.15
Drop only 0.03 na 0.05
Add and drop 0.13 0.04 0.25
Notes: The top panel displays the share of continuing firms engaging in each type of product-switching activity between 2004 and 2008. The bottom panel shows
a similar breakdown but weighting each firm by its output. Continuing firms are classified into four mutually exclusive groups: no change, add only, drop only,
and both add and drop. This classification suggests that a single-product firm cannot drop a product only.
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making, whereas this is true for only two thirds of the non-private firms. Some studies have shown that restructuring of state-owned
enterprises in China has had positive effects on labor productivity and profitability (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2009; Dong, Putterman, & Unel,
2006), as well as on innovative effort and returns to capital (Jefferson & Su, 2006). In addition, technology level captures the
investment and sunk costs associated with innovation. Firms with an R&D department are expected to undertake more innovative
activities and hence have a higher chance of improving future productivity. Fisher-Vanden and Jefferson (2008) find that in-house
R&D, together with autonomous technical change and purchase of imported technology are three sources driving technical change in
Chinese industry. In-house R&D tends to be used for existing products, whereas foreign technology transfer focuses on new product
development. However, computerization level may have two counteractive effects: on the one hand, it may be more costly for firms
more highly computerized to switch from the production of one product toward alternative products; on the other hand, more highly
computerized firms are more efficient in management of production hence are more likely to improve future productivity.
A growing body of literature shows that political connections can help firms obtain favorable regulatory conditions (Faccio,
2006), overcome institutional difficulties (Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006), and achieve secure access to resources such as bank loans (Bai,
Lu, & Tao, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and courts to settle business disputes (Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). This will eventually
increase the value of firms or improve their performance (Fisman, 2001; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). To control for political
connections, we include in the econometric specification dummy variables indicating whether the current manager has ever been
a government official and whether the manager also works as the leader of the Communist Party of China in that firm .26
Market environment variables measure two types of constraints on firm development—raw material supply constraints and
credit constraint. The former capture some market and state failures particularly pertaining to the context of our sample area
partly due to the practice of NFPP and the transitional nature of the economy. The latter measures a common phenomenon in the
world. Many papers study the role of limited access to external finance and find that credit constraints hamper investment in
high-return activities (Banerjee & Duflo, 2004; De Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2006; Poncet,
Steingress, & Vandenbussche, 2010).
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of continuing firms. Product scope grows 27% among continuing firms from 2004 to
2008. Sixty-one percent of continuing firms alter their product mix and 60% of them actually upgrade their product bundle. Forty-
six percent of the firms produce multi-products in 2004.
Table 10 presents the regression results of the product mix change models. We first investigate the determinants of product
growth rate in column (1). The first set of variables we examine is firm characteristics. Older firms have higher product growth
rate. An increase of one standard deviation in firm age will boost product growth rate by roughly 18.8% (15.665*0.012=0.188).
This may be because older firms have more operating experience, so they are likely more able to discern and cater for the market
demand shift. Alternatively, it could be that the product portfolio chosen by old firms, perhaps a long time ago, needs to be
modified in the light of new economic incentives. Firms with an R&D department (in 2004) also tend to experience greater
product expansion rate than firms without one. Existence of an R&D department suggests that more stable R&D activities are
undertaken, and the chance that new ideas are tried out for new product development may be higher. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient on multi-product indicates that product growth rate is lower in firms that produce multiple
products in the initial year than those produce single product. This result resembles the prediction of conditional convergence in
the neoclassical growth models that a country will grow faster if it has lower initial per capita income. All the other firm
characteristics, including ownership, firm size, computerization and productivity level, play no significant roles in determining
product growth rate. The second set of variables represents controls for human capital of firms. Firms that have a higher
proportion of workers with college degree or above, and that are managed by an individual who works concurrently as the
Communist Party leader, experience significantly lower subsequent product growth rate than firms without these characteristics.
Firms with a higher proportion of well-educated workers tend to be more highly specialized in the production of certain existing
product(s), suggesting that it is more costly for them to develop new products. The combination of manager and Party leader in
one person reduces the number of top decision-makers in a firm, possibly implying more dictatorial and stereotyped production
decisions. All the other human capital variables, including manager age, tenure, education and experience as a governmental
26 According to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Articles 29, 30 and 32), in whatever working unit where there are three or more Party
members, a branch of primary Party organization should be established and one leader and one vice leader be elected by the general member meeting. The main
duty of the branch Party leader is to monitor the implementation of Party and state policies in ﬁrms, to participate in decision-making in key issues, and to
supervise the manager, shareholders, or board of directors in exercising power.
Table 7
Decomposition of output growth for continuing firms.
Period Aggregate
output growth
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Net Product entry Product exit Net Growing products Shrinking products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2004–2008 0.59 0.51 0.72 −0.21 0.08 0.33 −0.25
Notes: Table reports the decomposition of aggregate output growth of continuing firms in our sample between 2004 and 2008 into contribution of the extensive
and intensive product margins. Column (1) reports aggregate output growth. Columns (2)–(4) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ extensive
margin. Columns (5)–(7) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ intensive margin.
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official, have no significant effects on product growth. The third set of variables measures the market environment in which firms
operate. Only perceived wood supply constraint is marginally significant and the positive coefficient indicates that firms that
perceive themselves to confront with wood supply difficulties in 2004 grow faster in product scope between 2004 and 2008 than
firms that do not. This may imply that firms with such a perception shift away from producing wood related products to exploring
new non-wood related product possibilities more rapidly in order to overcome this constraint.
We then move to analyze the determinants of the probability of a continuing firm to alter product mix in column (2). As
discussed earlier, product mix changes measure either changes in product number or changes in product portfolio composition
with product number holding constant. Some different patterns emerge when this more comprehensive product-switching
indicator is used. Examining firm characteristics, the results suggest that firms equipped with a higher computerization level in
the initial year have a significantly lower probability of changing their product mix in the following years. This may be because
computerization is associated with high initial costs. Once these have been incurred, it is presumably profitable for the firm to
stick to the initial product plan and not to change the product mix. In addition, firms that produce multiple products in the initial
year are more likely to change product mix subsequently than single-product firms, which is consistent with the finding from
Table 6. This may be because multi-product firms that are already selling their outputs in different product markets tend to have
more experience in establishing distribution or sales networks or contacts. However, ownership type, firm age, size, having an
R&D department or not, and productivity level of the initial year indicate no significant effects on the likelihood of following
changes of product mix. Regarding human capital variables, only manager's education exerts a marginally significant impact on
Table 8
Variable definitions.
Variable name Deﬁnition
Firm variables
Firm characteristics
Private 1 if at the beginning of year 2004 the firm is private-owned, 0 otherwise. A firm is categorized as "private-owned"
if private owner(s) hold a dominant share in the equity. The original ownership type collected in our survey includes
state-owned, collective, share-holdings, joint-venture, domestic private, and foreign private-owned.
Firm age Number of years between year 2004 and the year a firm was established.
Firm size Natural logarithm of a firm's net value of fixed assets in year 2004 (CNY).
R&D 1 if a firm has a research and development department in year 2004, 0 otherwise.
Computerization Number of computers per worker in year 2004.
TFP Total factor productivity measured as the residual of the log-form Cobb–Douglas production function.
Multi-product 1 if a firm produces more than one product defined by our definition, 0 otherwise.
Human capital
Manager age Age of the current manager of a firm in year 2004.
Manager tenure Number of years the current manager has been in office until the end of year 2004.
Manager education 1 if the manager has a college education or above, 0 otherwise.
Worker education Proportion of workers who have a college education or above in year 2004.
Manager been government
official before
1 if the current manager has been a governmental official before, 0 otherwise. The government could be central or
local government, and regional or subordinated SFB.
Manager also Party leader 1 if the current manager also works as the Communist Party leader in that firm in year 2004, 0 otherwise.
Market environment
Credit constraint 1 if a firm has applied for a loan in any of the formal financial institutions but got rejected in 4 years until year 2004,
0 otherwise.
Wood supply constraint 1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for wood as input cannot be met, 0 otherwise.
Energy supply constraint 1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for energy as input cannot be met, 0 otherwise.
Here energy includes solid (e.g., coal and charcoal), liquid (e.g., heavy oil, gasoline, diesel and kerosene) and gas fuels
as well as electricity, 0 otherwise.
Other raw material supply
constraint
1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for other raw materials as input cannot be
met, 0 otherwise.
Wood related product
production
1 if a firm operates in a sector producing wood related products, 0 otherwise.
SFB variables
Industrial gross output Natural logarithm of an SFB's total industrial output value in year 2004 (CNY).
Private property rights
development
Number of years an SFB has privatized part of its state-owned or collective-owned properties until year 2004.
SFB director age Age of the current bureau director in year 2004.
SFB director tenure Number of years the current bureau director has been in office until the end of year 2004.
SFB director also
Party leader
1 if the current bureau director also works as the Communist Party leader in the bureau in year 2004, 0 otherwise.
Change of SFB directorship
in 2004
1 if there is a change of SFB directorship in 2004, 0 otherwise.
Note: Table presents the definitions of explanatory variables used in the econometric models.
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the probability of a continuing firm to change product mix. Firms whose manager has received a college degree are 24% more
likely to change product mix subsequently than firms managed by a less educated individual. The negative and marginally
significant coefficient on credit constraint suggests that a higher incidence of getting rejected when applying for a loan in a formal
Table 10
Determinants of product switching and upgrading.
Product growth
(1)
Mix changes
(2)
Upgrading
(3)
Firm characteristics
Private 0.042 (0.189) 0.185 (0.123) −0.132 (0.133)
Firm age 0.012 (0.007)* 0.0004 (0.004) −0.006 (0.004)
Firm size −0.054 (0.037) −0.040 (0.030) −0.024 (0.030)
R&D 0.424 (0.219) * 0.098 (0.115) 0.207 (0.131)
Computerization −2.385 (1.934) −3.449 (1.470)** 0.750 (1.909)
TFP 0.031 (0.121) 0.004 (0.054) −0.113 (0.062)*
Multi-product −0.470 (0.156)*** 0.337 (0.099)*** 0.101 (0.122)
Human capital
Manager age −0.005 (0.017) −0.015 (0.012) −0.014 (0.011)
Manager tenure −0.010 (0.024) 0.002 (0.019) −0.003 (0.020)
Manager education 0.225 (0.220) 0.244 (0.146)* 0.075 (0.157)
Worker education −1.694 (0.868) * −0.354 (0.550) −0.443 (0.728)
Manager been government official before −0.252 (0.289) 0.082 (0.184) −0.315 (0.145)**
Manager also Party leader −0.413 (0.176)** −0.063 (0.122) 0.249 (0.131)*
Market environment
Credit constraint −0.188 (0.247) −0.359 (0.205)* −0.461 (0.245)*
Wood supply constraint 0.317 (0.174)* 0.078 (0.119) 0.060 (0.129)
Energy supply constraint −0.276 (0.334) −0.160 (0.190) −0.327 (0.194)*
Other raw material supply constraint 0.324 (0.274) 0.161 (0.222) 0.199 (0.232)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97 97 97
R-squared 0.38 0.47 0.34
Joint significance test: F-stat (P value) 5.59 (0.000) 50.69 (0.000) 22,284.57 (0.000)
Notes: Table presents the regression results of Eq. (6). The dependent variable for each regression is reported in the columnheading. All explanatory variables are using year
2004 data. Coefficient on the constant is not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and1% levels, respectively.
Table 9
Summary statistics of continuing firms.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Product growth rate 2004–2008 0.274 0 0.691 −0.833 3
Product mix changes 2004–2008 0.608 1 0.491 0 1
Product upgrading 2004–2008 0.598 1 0.493 0 1
Firm characteristics
Private 0.320 0 0.469 0 1
Firm age 14.866 9 15.665 0 58
Firm size 14.215 14.310 2.166 7.695 18.988
R&D 0.278 0 0.451 0 1
Computerization 0.028 0.019 0.034 0 0.167
TFP 2.611 2.463 0.851 0.034 7.529
Multi-product 0.464 0 0.501 0 1
Human capital
Manager age 44.351 44 5.403 30 56
Manager tenure 4.010 3 3.435 0 14
Manager education 0.722 1 0.451 0 1
Worker education 0.070 0.028 0.110 0 0.650
Manager been government official before 0.773 1 0.421 0 1
Manager also Party leader 0.237 0 0.428 0 1
Market environment
Credit constraint 0.113 0 0.319 0 1
Wood supply constraint 0.423 0 0.497 0 1
Energy supply constraint 0.103 0 0.306 0 1
Other raw material supply constraint 0.093 0 0.292 0 1
Notes: Table presents the summary statistics of variables for continuing firms used to estimate Eq. (6). For firm characteristics, human capital and market
environment variables, 2004 data are used. The number of observations for all variables is 97.
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financial institution leads to a lower chance of product-line switching afterwards. This result is consistent with the general finding
in the literature that difficulty in accessing external finance hampers the investment in potential high-return activities.
We finally examine the determinants of the probability of a continuing firm to upgrade product mix in column (3). While not
being an important determinant of product switching, initial productivity level plays an important role in determining subsequent
product portfolio upgrading probability. Firms with lower initial productivity are more likely to upgrade product portfolio
subsequently. An increase of one standard deviation in TFP will lower the probability of upgrading product mix by 9.6%
(0.851*0.113=0.096). The key human capital variable in determining the probability of product mix upgrading is the political
connections of the firmmanager. However, the experience ofworking in government and the duality ofworking as bothmanager and
Party leader have opposite impacts. One possible explanation could be exerted on the negative coefficient on experience of being a
government official. Being government official and firm manager requires different sets of capabilities and skills, with the former
focusing on administrative and coordinative ones and the latter on profit seeking and managerial ones. Therefore, the human capital
accumulated from working in the governmental organizations might not be useful for doing business, and may instead shackle the
thinking and practice. The positive coefficient on manager and Party leader in one person, however, reflects the advantage of
centralization of power and of political connections in resource mobilization. Concerningmarket environment, difficulty in accessing
external finance and in obtaining enough energy significantly reduces the likelihood of upgrading the product portfolio.
The lack of a relationship between ownership and firms’ product switching and upgrading activities is somewhat surprising. A
potential explanation is that what is important for product switching and performance improvement is not the ownership per se
but the intrinsic differences of firms and differential treatments associated with ownership, such as corporate governance, access
to know-how, credits and markets etc., as pointed out by Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2009). The short panel of two
years and small sample size restrict the analysis from addressing the effect of ownership change on product-line changes. In the
continuing firms, 32% of them were private in 2004, of which 26% were privatized before 2004. Twenty-eight percent were
privatized between 2005 and 2008, whose impact cannot be taken into consideration by using our current model.
6.2. Robustness analysis
The analysis in the previous section is based on continuing firms between 2004 and 2008. The OLS estimates may suffer from
selection bias posed by endogenous attrition if random factors that affect a firm's survival to 2008 also affect its product switching
and upgrading during the time period. For example, some unobserved firm-specific characteristics, such as intrinsic managerial
skills or a demand shock that maintain the firm in the market may also induce it to switch or upgrade products and thus introduce
correlation between survival and product mix changes. To investigate whether endogenous attrition results in biased OLS
estimates, we use Lee's (1983) method, which is a generalization of the approach proposed by Heckman (1976, 1979). We begin
by estimating a multinomial logit modeling the probabilities that a firm remains in operation, exits due to systematic reasons, and
exits due to random dropouts in 2008. That is,
Pr yit ¼ jjxit−1ð Þ ¼
exp xit−1γj
 
1þ∑2h¼1 exp xit−1γhð Þ
; j ¼ 1; 2
Pr yit ¼ 0jxit−1ð Þ ¼
1
1þ∑2h¼1 exp xit−1γhð Þ
ð7Þ
where yit is the survival variable: yit=0 if a firm exits due to random dropouts, yit=1 if a firm exits due to systematic reasons, and
yit=2 if a firm remains in operation in 2008; xit−1γ=γ0+γ1 firm charit−1+γ2Hit−1+γ3marketit−1+γ4wood productit−1+
γ5SFB charit−1, and γ denotes the parameter vector to be estimated. This model is estimated using all firms present in 2004 in our
sample.
Besides firm characteristics, human capital and market environment variables controlled for in the product switching Eq. (6),
the survival model (7) includes a set of variables that determines selection but has no direct effect on product switching and
upgrading behavior. To facilitate identification, instead of controlling for sector dummies, we use a binary dummy differentiating
whether a firm operates in a sector producing wood related products or not. We also include some SFB characteristics, i.e.
industrial gross output, private property rights development, human capital (age, tenure, political connections)27 of the bureau
director, and change of directorship in 2004. The definitions of these variables are listed in the bottom panel of Table 8. Industrial
gross output represents the economic status of a bureau. Better economic status may be positively associated with firm survival,
for example, because economically sound bureaus are better equipped to bail out loss-making firms. However, bureau
performance and firm survival may be negatively correlated if, for example, strong bureaus choose not to help out struggling
firms. Private property rights development indicates how well the idea and practice of private property rights have been
developed, spread and recognized in an SFB. Firms administered by an SFB that has a longer history of private property rights
development tend to be less affected by the turmoil caused by transition of ownership and be better prepared in terms of
institutions and technologies to survive in the market without help from superior authorities. The human capital of the bureau
director may also impact on the likelihood of a firm to survive. Similar as the case for firm manager but at a higher level, bureau
director and Party leader in one person may have two counteractive effects: for one thing, this duality reduces the number of top
27 We do not control for education of bureau director deﬁned in the same way as manager education, because all directors have a college education or above.
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decision-makers in a bureau and loses the supervision function of the Party leader, which may lower his or her motivation and
impetus to make effort for the development of the bureau, which in turn may reduce the probability of survival of its
administered firms; for the other, the concentration of power and the affiliation with the ruling Party may make it easier for the
director to mobilize resources so as to develop the bureau, which on the other hand may raise the likelihood of survival of the
firms. Change of directorship in 2004 measures the stability and continuity of the top administrative function. Such a change may
disrupt the consistency of policies towards firms a bureau administers, and the adaptation to new managerial style or new rules
may increase the probability of firm exit in subsequent years. The summary statistics of all firms are reported in Table A2 in
Appendix A.
Table 11 reports the regression results of the Lee's (1983) model. Columns (1) and (2) show the log-odds (i.e. logged relative
probability) estimates of the survival equation for randomly dropped-out firms and systematically exited firms respectively,
where the survival firms are used as the base category omitted from the estimation. When comparing the results, we can see that
for randomly dropped-out firms only two firm-level variables are statistically significant and no exclusion restrictions are
significant at conventional levels, whereas for systematically exited firms three firm-level variables and four SFB level variables
are significant. This difference suggests that systematic exit can well represent exit. Hence, in the following we focus our
discussion on the systematically exited firms. Four significant exclusion restrictions out of six indicate that they are relevant. As
predicted, the log-odds between exited firms and surviving ones decreases by 11% with one year increase in private property
rights development, whereas the log-odds increases by 97% for one year longer tenure of bureau director and increases by 412% if
the bureau under which a firm is administered changed directorship in 2004. Bureau director and Party leader in one person
significantly increases the log-odds between exited and surviving firms, indicating that the disadvantage of power centralization
dominates the advantage. Besides SFB characteristics, firm age, size and productivity level are also significant determinants of a
firm's relative chance of survival. The log-odds between exited and surviving firms is reduced by 6%, 44% and 104% with one year
Table 11
Determinants of product switching and upgrading using Lee's (1983) method.
(1)
Random dropout
(2)
Systematic exit
(3)
Product growth
(4)
Mix changes
(5)
Upgrading
Firm characteristics
Private 0.240 (0.649) 0.461 (0.639) 0.041 (0.191) 0.182 (0.125) −0.134 (0.132)
Firm age −0.007 (0.022) −0.057 (0.033)* 0.013 (0.007)* 0.002 (0.004) −0.006 (0.004)
Firm size −0.212 (0.128) * −0.444 (0.142) *** −0.046 (0.040) −0.027 (0.032) −0.014 (0.040)
R&D −0.601 (0.656) −0.031 (0.637) 0.432 (0.217)* 0.112 (0.117) 0.218 (0.130)*
Computerization −13.180 (9.688) 6.393 (6.050) −2.396 (1.964) −3.467 (1.591)** 0.736 (2.047)
TFP −0.185 (0.268) −1.043 (0.400)*** 0.046 (0.134) 0.030 (0.063) −0.092 (0.064)
Multi-product −0.008 (0.529) −0.232 (0.576) −0.461 (0.159)*** 0.352 (0.098)*** 0.113 (0.122)
Human capital
Manager age −0.065 (0.054) −0.055 (0.052) −0.003 (0.018) −0.012 (0.012) −0.012 (0.012)
Manager tenure 0.034 (0.077) 0.003 (0.086) −0.012 (0.025) −0.0002 (0.018) −0.005 (0.020)
Manager education −0.327 (0.579) −0.781 (0.627) 0.248 (0.220) 0.281 (0.156)* 0.105 (0.165)
Worker education −0.999 (2.943) 0.025 (2.113) −1.691 (0.895)* −0.348 (0.582) −0.438 (0.719)
Manager been government official before −0.116 (0.610) 0.947 (0.670) −0.258 (0.293) 0.073 (0.191) −0.322 (0.142)**
Manager also Party leader −0.096 (0.618) −0.128 (0.709) −0.417 (0.176)** −0.070 (0.123) 0.243 (0.129)*
Market environment
Credit constraint 0.261 (0.760) 0.524 (0.637) −0.199 (0.245) −0.376 (0.199)* −0.474 (0.241)*
Wood supply constraint 0.891 (0.569) 0.372 (0.578) 0.295 (0.190) 0.042 (0.134) 0.031 (0.137)
Energy supply constraint 0.270 (0.841) 1.391 (0.911) −0.282 (0.334) −0.168 (0.188) −0.334 (0.193)*
Other raw material supply constraint 0.475 (0.939) −0.891 (1.181) 0.336 (0.274) 0.180 (0.224) 0.214 (0.233)
Wood related product production −1.512 (0.815)* −0.462 (0.855)
SFB characteristics
Industrial gross output 0.107 (0.385) 0.158 (0.381)
Private property rights development −0.025 (0.046) −0.111 (0.059)*
SFB director age −0.011 (0.060) 0.046 (0.063)
SFB director tenure −0.262 (0.268) 0.970 (0.315)***
SFB director also Party leader 0.542 (0.747) 2.011 (0.795)**
Change of SFB directorship in 2004 1.069 (0.967) 4.115 (1.430)***
Sector dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 174 174 97 97 97
Inverse Mills ratio 0.109 (0.234) 0.180 (0.196) 0.145 (0.299)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.47 0.35
Joint significance test: LR chi2 /F-stat (P value) 102.66 (0.000) 5.58 (0.000) 45.69 (0.000) 116.77 (0.000)
Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is reported in the column heading. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the survival equation. Columns
(3)–(5) report the results for the product switching equation. All explanatory variables are using year 2004 data. Coefficient on the constant is not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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older in firm age, one log point larger capital stock and one log point higher TFP, respectively. These findings are consistent with
those of Jovanovic (1982)'s learning model and those from many firm-level empirical studies in both developed and developing
countries.
Columns (3)–(5) of Table 11 report the results of the product-switching equation. The results are very similar to those from
the OLS estimations presented in Table 10. The insignificant coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio in all three models suggest that
the issue of endogenous exit of firms has little effect on the parameters of the product-switching equation. That is, there is no
strong evidence of a sample selection problem or that OLS estimates are biased by endogenous attrition.
7. Conclusions
We analyze how firms in China's state-owned forest areas select, switch and upgrade their product mix during a period of
gradual institutional and managerial reforms. We find that product-specific value-added has a very wide dispersion, indicating
that what type of product firms produce matters for their overall efficiency and long-run development. Within the same industry,
multi-product firms tend to be larger, more productive and more likely to export than single-product firms. We also find that
changes in firm's product mix are pervasive among our sample firms and can be mainly attributed to adding or churning products
rather than only shedding products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant contribution to the
aggregate output growth during our sample period, accounting for approximately 86% of the net increase in the aggregate output
(the remaining 14% is attributable to growth at the intensive margin).
We estimate the effects of firm characteristics, human capital and market environment on a continuing firm's decision to alter
and upgrade product portfolio. The empirical results indicate that some firms are more prone to diversify and upgrade their
product mix than others. Firms that are older, have an R&D department, produce single product, have a lower proportion of
workers with college degree or above, have separate manager and Communist Party leader, and face wood supply constraint in
2004 have higher product growth rate between 2004 and 2008. Firms that are less computerized, produce multiple products,
have a manager with college degree or above, and have less difficulty in accessing external finance are more likely to change their
product mix. Moreover, firms that are less productive, whose manager has no experience of working in governmental
organizations but works concurrently as the Party leader, and that are not confronted with constraints in either external finance
or energy supply tend to have higher probability to upgrade product portfolio subsequently. These results hold when we take the
factors affecting firms’ survival into account.
More generally, quantifying the impacts of firm characteristics, human capital and market environment is fundamental to
improving our understanding of the factors underlying the observed patterns of product switching and upgrading within firms.
Therefore, findings of this paper provide the basis for directions of future reforms in China's state-owned forest areas in order to
enhance efficiency and better handle volatilities in the markets. However, we recognize that the small sample size hinders us
from obtaining results of more explanatory power from the econometric analysis. Moreover, the short longitudinal dimension of
the data restricts us from addressing the effects of the dynamics of the institutional and managerial reforms on product portfolio
adjustment. Future research could be directed to this field as bigger and longer panel data become available.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Examples of sectors, industries and products.
ICNEA CPC Description
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products (Sector)
201 Processing of sawnwood and wood chips (Industry)
20110101 Products Regular size sawnwood
20110204 Sawnwood for bunton
20110205 Sawnwood for packing cases
20110301 Not impregnated sleepers
20110302 Impregnated sleepers
20120101 Wood chips
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Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.04.002.
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ICNEA CPC Description
202 Manufacture of panel board (Industry)
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20250101 Sliced veneer
20250102 Rotary cut veneer
20250103 Micro veneer
20250199 Other veneer
202503 Glued laminated timber
Notes: Table presents an example of sector, industry and product mapping hierarchy considered in this study. For ICNEA 201 there are a total of 17 products, but
only a subset are listed in the table. For ICNEA 202, all products are listed in the table. CPC 20110101 is based on author created eight-digit codes that are only
disaggregated to the six-digit level in CPC. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample.
Table A2
Summary statistics of all firms.
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max
Firm variables
Survival 2004–2008 0.557 1 0.498 0 1
Firm characteristics
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Human capital
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SFB variables
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Private property rights development 5.534 4 6.480 0 21
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SFB director tenure 2.983 3 1.571 0 6
SFB director also Party leader 0.207 0 0.406 0 1
Change of SFB directorship in 2004 0.167 0 0.374 0 1
Notes: Table presents the summary statistics of variables for all firms used to estimate Eq. (7). For all variables except survival 2004–2008, 2004 data are used. The
number of observations for all variables is 174.
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This appendix presents the full list of sector, industry and product classification considered in this 
study. The classification procedure is as follows. Since the reporting of products by our sample firms 
is not governed by any particular product classification, and the names of products reported could 
differ in aggregation or the way firms called them, we standardize the product names and define 
product, industry and sector according to two national standards. One is China’s Industrial 
Classification for National Economic Activities (2002), henceforth ICNEA, which categorizes 
economic activities in China into four levels, using English alphabets, two-, three- and four-digit codes 
respectively. ICNEA is comparable to the UNSD: 1989, International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities, NEQ. The other is China’s Products Classification for 
Statistical Use (2010), henceforth CPC, which classifies products to a more disaggregated level. 
CPC uses a five-level coding system, with two-, four-, six-, eight- and ten-digit codes. ICNEA and 
CPC are harmonized at the two- and four-digit code levels. At the four-digit level, ICNEA and CPC 
assign the same code to most, but not all economic activities. We map all reported product names into 
six-, eight- or ten-digit CPC codes and take this as the definition of a “product”.  Eight-digit codes are 
our primary standard of classification. Two products are classified at the ten-digit level. Since for 
some products six-digit codes that are the most disaggregated level in CPC are not disaggregated 
enough for our analysis, we create the eight-digit codes by ourselves. This applies to eight products and 
they are marked with * in the list. We refer to the three-digit ICNEA categories as “industries” and 
two-digit ICNEA categories as “sectors”. There are a total of 90 products linked to 26 industries 
across 17 sectors in our data. In our sample there are four products that ICNEA and CPC assign 
different codes at the four-digit level. We take the CPC codes as our standard and use the 
corresponding 3-digit codes in ICNEA as our classification for industries. 
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Is R&D cash-flow sensitive? Evidence from Chinese industrial firms 
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Abstract 
We hypothesize that research and development (R&D) is sensitive to cash-flow fluctuations 
due to asymmetric information and agency problems in the credit market. We adopt a variant 
of the Q model for R&D investment using the value of the firm, physical capital and 
employment to capture firm fundamentals as proxies for investment opportunities. We add 
cash flow to this specification, and estimate the augmented model separately for R&D 
participation and spending using data on Chinese industrial firms for the period 2001-2006. 
We find that R&D spending is sensitive to cash-flow fluctuations, conditional on firm 
fundamentals. We also find that the cash-flow sensitivity of R&D varies across firms 
depending on ownership. We conclude that credit market imperfections pose a constraint for 
R&D in Chinese industry.   
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1. Introduction 
Research and development (R&D) is considered one of the essential driving forces of 
endogenous economic growth (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
Like in other parts of the world, R&D has become an increasingly more important type of 
investment in China during the past decades. Figure 1 plots the gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D as percentage of GDP for Japan, the US, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU, 15 countries) and China for the past 
twenty years. In the early 1990s there was a significant gap between China and other 
economies represented in the graph. This gap has been gradually reduced over the last 20 
years, and by 2012 the difference between the EU and China was negligible. The boom in 
R&D in China after 2000 is the result of two broad developments: First, the advantage of 
cheap labor, which played a central role in China’s rapid economic growth since its economic 
reforms starting in 1979, has gradually been eroded due to the rise in labor costs since the late 
1990s (Li et al., 2011). Second, moving up the product sophistication ladder by altering the 
production structure to products that embody high productivity and generate positive learning 
spillovers to the rest of the economy requires R&D (Hausmann et al., 2007).  
<Figure 1 about here> 
A natural question to ask then is how R&D gets financed. R&D has distinct features from 
investment in tangible assets. First, the spillover of R&D output across firms or even 
countries leads to protection of proprietary information from competitors and even from 
potential investors or creditors in order to appropriate the returns (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 
1983). Second, R&D projects are riskier and more difficult to assess for outsiders (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). Third, R&D is harder to collateralize than investment in fixed capital. These 
features suggest that firms that invest in R&D tend to face more pronounced asymmetric 
information and agency problems, and hence it may be more costly to finance R&D through 
external funds (Hall and Lerner, 2010). There is a rich empirical literature on the role of 
internal finance in determining firm-level physical investment, typically documenting a 
significant and positive relationship between proxies for changes in internal funds and 
investment (see, e.g., Schiantarelli, 1996, Hubbard, 1998, and Bond and Van Reenen, 2007 
for surveys of this literature). However, there are relatively few studies investigating the cash-
flow sensitivity of R&D, and the results in these studies are inconclusive depending on 
countries and types of firms (see, e.g., Hall and Lerner, 2010 for a review). 
In this paper, we estimate the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow conditional on controlling 
for investment opportunities for Chinese industrial firms over the period 2001-2006. The 
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dataset, developed and maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), 
covers all “above-scale” Chinese industrial firms (i.e., all state-owned firms and non-state-
owned firms with annual sales above 5 million Chinese yuan (CNY)1). The firms are mainly 
unlisted and there is significant variation across the firms in terms of age, size, ownership and 
industry. We adopt a variant of the Q model for R&D investment using the value of the firm, 
physical capital and employment to capture firm fundamentals as proxies for expected future 
profitability of capital (i.e., investment opportunities).2 Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1995), we estimate a log-linear forecasting equation using firms’ stream of profits to date to 
construct the expected future profits and consequently the value of the firm. We subsequently 
estimate regressions separately for R&D participation and spending decisions controlling for 
firm value, physical capital and employment, with and without cash flow added to the 
specifications. The simple idea behind this strategy is that, if R&D is sensitive to changes in 
cash flow conditional on firm value, this can be considered evidence of capital market 
imperfections.  
Our study complements previous research in the following aspects. Existing evidence of 
R&D-cash flow sensitivity is typically drawn from estimation of a Tobin’s Q model, Euler 
equation or reduced-form investment models such as error correction or accelerator models. 
These approaches have often proved problematic, however. Tobin’s Q, constructed using 
stock market data, may not adequately capture future investment opportunities, hence the 
evidence on sensitivity of investment to cash flow cannot be decisively interpreted as 
suggesting the existence of capital market imperfections (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). 
The Euler equation approach has often proved non-robust to seemingly minor alterations to 
the specification (Whited, 1998; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995).3 Reduced-form investment 
models tend to lack clear theoretical underpinnings. Moreover, studies to date in the literature 
are mostly based on the largest and most important publicly traded manufacturing firms from 
advanced economies. There are still few studies from developing countries. Most research on 
                                                            
1 The average exchange rate in April 2014 was 1 USD = 6.16 CNY.  
2 While the Q model is traditionally developed to study physical capital investment, it can accommodate R&D 
investment if we assume that the production function includes not only stocks of physical capital and labor but 
also a stock of technology which is acquired and accumulated through R&D investment (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994). 
3 In fact, in an early phase of this project we estimated Euler equations along the line of Bond and Meghir (1994). 
This approach did not work well, for several reasons. First, since we do not have continuous R&D data, in order 
to estimate a dynamic equation without losing too many observations, we would need to impute R&D data for 
the gap year. This imputation led to potentially large measurement errors in R&D. Second, our results turned out 
to be very sensitive to the instruments chosen, and overidentifying restrictions were nearly always rejected. Third, 
parameter estimates were often extremely high, and the standard errors were also very high. In the end, we 
learned little from the results obtained from this approach. 
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the effects of financing frictions for Chinese firms focuses on physical investment and the 
research on R&D is limited.  
China’s stock markets were developed in the early 1990s and only the largest and most 
prominent firms are publicly listed. Most firms rely on internally generated profits, credit 
from banks and/or other sources for investment. A typical Chinese phenomenon as a legacy 
from the planned economy era is banks’ differential treatments to firms of distinct ownerships. 
Chinese banks, which are predominantly state-owned or state-influenced, were instructed by 
law to lend only to state-owned firms that serve political and social functions other than only 
pursuing profits until 1998. The “political pecking order” in credit allocation where private 
Chinese firms were considered low in political status and discriminated against should in 
principle have been mitigated after the system was liberalized at the end of 1990s. However, 
private firms are still found to rely exclusively on internal funds for investment (Poncet et al., 
2010; Guariglia et al., 2011).  
We find that, for the full sample, firm fundamentals significantly affect R&D 
participation and spending decisions. Moreover, controlling for investment opportunities, 
R&D is sensitive to cash flow. Hence, the hypothesis of perfect capital markets is rejected. 
Firms of different ownerships are heterogeneous in the degree of dependence on internal 
finance. For private firms we find that R&D participation and spending are cash-flow 
sensitive, but not for foreign firms. For state-owned and collective firms the results are mixed: 
we find cash-flow sensitivities for the R&D spending of state-owned firms (but not for 
participation), and for R&D participation of collective firms (but not for spending).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the link between internal finance and R&D. Section 3 introduces our empirical model and 
describes the estimation procedure. Section 4 describes the dataset and presents summary 
statistics. Section 5 reports the econometric results, and section 6 concludes with a brief 
discussion on policy implications. 
 
2. Internal finance and R&D 
There is a large empirical literature concerned with the issue of whether investment spending 
is sensitive to fluctuations in internal finance. Under perfect capital markets, the firm’s 
financial structure is irrelevant for its real investment decisions, because internal and external 
funds are perfect substitutes (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, because of transaction 
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costs, asymmetric information and agency problems, capital markets may not be perfect4. In 
such a case, internal funds have a cost advantage over external funds, and so the firm’s 
financial structure may matter for investment. In particular, if the firm’s investment is 
sensitive to fluctuations in internal funds, conditional on the fundamental driving factors of 
investment, this would be consistent with the notion that the firm is financially constrained. 
Starting with Fazzari et al. (1988), the standard approach for studying financing constraints 
has been to add a measure of cash flow to Tobin’s Q model and estimate investment-cash 
flow sensitivities. Numerous studies have found that investment responds strongly to cash 
flow, especially for firms categorized as financially constrained based on criteria such as size, 
age, dividend policies, etc. (see, e.g., Hubbard, 1998 for a review). The high explanatory 
power of cash flow together with the low explanatory power and the small coefficient 
estimate of Tobin’s Q suggest that Tobin’s Q is not a “sufficient statistic” for investment (see, 
e.g., Bond and Van Reenen, 2007 for a review). If Tobin’s Q does not summarize all the 
information about expected future profitability that is relevant for the current investment 
decision, then sensitivity may merely reflect current cash flow as a firm fundamental rather 
than providing convincing proof for the existence of capital market imperfections.  
Several methods have been explored to remedy these problems. Some studies find that the 
empirical performance of Tobin’s Q model improves if an estimator that corrects for the bias 
resulting from measurement errors in Tobin’s Q is used (see, e.g., Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; 
Blundell et al., 1992; Erickson and Whited, 2000, 2002, 2012; Almeida et al., 2010). A 
second approach is to estimate the firms’ intertemporal first-order condition, the Euler 
equation, directly. One advantage of this approach is that marginal q, which is unobservable, 
does not enter the empirical specification (see, e.g. Bond and Meghir, 1994). Unfortunately, 
results from estimated Euler equations have often proved to be non-robust (Whited, 1998; 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). A third approach attempts to measure marginal q itself by 
estimating an auxiliary model to forecast the future marginal profits to investment based on 
the information observable to researchers and discounting them back to the current period, i.e., 
to construct the “Fundamental Q” as Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) coin it (see, e.g., Abel 
and Blanchard, 1986; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Bond and Cummins, 2001; Cummins 
et al., 2006). This approach avoids the use of share price data and can in principle relax the 
assumptions imposed in the Q model such as perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
(Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Our approach is similar to the third approach. 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hubbard (1998).   
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A number of papers have estimated the cash-flow sensitivity of investment for Chinese 
firms. Investment has been found to be insensitive to cash flow in state-owned firms but  
sensitive to cash-flow in private firms, suggesting that state-owned firms are not financially 
constrained but private firms are (e.g., Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 
2013).5 Hence, these studies are consistent with the notion of a “political pecking order” in 
the allocation of credit in China. Furthermore, foreign capital has been found to help alleviate 
the financial constraints faced by domestic private firms (e.g., Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; 
Poncet et al., 2010).  
The financing of R&D has received growing interest in the past decades. However, R&D 
is different in nature from fixed capital. First, there may be R&D spillovers to other firms or 
even countries. Therefore, firms tend to protect proprietary information from competitors and 
even from potential investors or creditors in order to appropriate the returns to R&D 
investment (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). Second, investment in intangible assets is riskier 
and it is more difficult for investors to discover the quality of long-term R&D projects than 
that of other short-term or low-risk projects (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Third, R&D is harder to 
collateralize than investment in fixed capital. These differences suggest that it may be 
relatively more expensive to finance R&D than physical investment through external finance. 
Consequently, internal finance may play a more important role for R&D than for fixed capital 
investment (Hall and Lerner, 2010).  
Similar to the studies of fixed capital investment, studies of R&D investment have 
primarily been based on Tobin’s Q model, the Euler equation and reduced-form models. In 
contrast to the investment literature, the findings for R&D are mixed. While a small number 
of papers find evidence of sensitivity of R&D to cash flow for the US manufacturing firms 
(e.g., Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall et al., 1999; Mulkay et al., 2001), 
most other papers report weak or no evidence that internal finance matters for R&D, 
especially those studying European firms (e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Harhoff, 1998; Bond 
et al., 2005). Some recent studies augment this analysis with external sources of finance, such 
as debt and/or equity, and largely find a strong link between both cash flow and external 
equity and R&D in both US and European publicly traded firms (e.g., Brown et al., 2009 on 
US firms; Martinsson, 2010 on European firms).  
The ability to innovate, acquire and diffuse new technologies has been shown to play a 
critical role in China’s improvement of firm productivity, economic growth and convergence 
                                                            
5 Guariglia et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2013) also find investment-cash flow sensitivity in collective and 
foreign firms.  
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to the world’s advanced economies. Jefferson et al. (2006) investigate the relations between 
R&D, innovation and firm performance in China’s large and medium-sized manufacturing 
firms for the period 1997-1999. They find that approximately 12% of the returns to R&D 
expenditure can be attributed to the production of new products, and returns to R&D 
expenditure appear to be at least three to four times the returns to fixed production assets. 
Examining the contributions of three avenues of technological advance to productivity within 
Chinese industry using the same dataset over 1995-1999, Hu et al. (2005) show that in-house 
R&D significantly complements technology transfer irrespective of domestic or foreign origin, 
whereas foreign direct investment (FDI) does not facilitate the transfer of market-mediated 
foreign technology. Girma et al. (2008) study the link between FDI, access to finance and 
innovation activity in Chinese manufacturing firms of different ownerships for 1999-2005, 
and report that when the effect of FDI on technology transfer and the effect of FDI on 
domestic credit opportunities are distinguished, better access to credit is an important channel 
through which FDI affects the innovation of non-state-owned firms. De Waldemar and Poncet 
(2013) use data on more than 200 Chinese cities for the period 1997-2009, and find that cities 
specializing in more complex goods subsequently grow faster. Their results indicate that 
growth benefits pertain exclusively to the capabilities of domestic firms engaged in ordinary 
trade, which highlights the importance of technology advance in China via in-house R&D 
rather than via technology acquisition from assembling activities and FDI.   
 
3. Empirical model and estimation  
3.1 An R&D investment model 
We assume that the firm’s investment in R&D equates the marginal cost of investing in an 
additional unit of technology, denoted 𝐺𝑟𝑑(. ), with the expected shadow value of having an 
additional unit of technology, 𝜆𝑖,𝑡: 
                                              𝐺𝑟𝑑 �
𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡 � = 𝜆𝑖,𝑡,                                                                      (1) 
where 𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is investment in technology (R&D) and 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the technology stock (the price of 
technology is normalized to unity). We specify the marginal cost function as  
                                              𝐺𝑟𝑑 �
𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡 � = 𝑏𝑖 �𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑖,𝑡 �𝜌,                                                            (2) 
where 𝑏𝑖 and 𝜌 are strictly positive parameters. This equation has a natural interpretation as a 
marginal adjustment cost function. The shadow value of having an additional unit of 
technology is not directly observed in our data. Under constant returns to scale and perfect 
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competition, 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 can be written as the ratio of the value of the firm (𝑉𝑖,𝑡) to the technology 
stock (𝑇𝑖,𝑡) (Hayashi, 1982), where 
                                                𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡�∑ 𝛽𝑠∞0 𝛱𝑖,𝑡+𝑠�                                            (3)  
and 𝛽 = 1
1+𝜎
< 1 is the one-period discount factor. Hence, the optimal investment model can 
be written in logarithmic form as  
                                                ln 𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌 (ln 𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝑇𝑖,𝑡) = ln𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝑇𝑖,𝑡.                        (4) 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function where output depends on technology, physical 
capital (K) and labor (L), where the latter two are flexible inputs, the first-order conditions for 
optimal capital and labor imply that ln𝑇𝑖,𝑡 can be written as a linear function of ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡 and ln 𝐿𝑖,𝑡. Hence, we can write our investment equation as  
                                               ln 𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖0 + 𝛾1 ln𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3 ln 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 .                    (5)       
This simple equation forms the basis for our empirical analysis. Our goal is not to estimate 
structural parameters. Indeed, we will have to modify Equation (5) to acknowledge the fact 
that there is a large proportion of zero R&D investments in the data, a point to which we 
return below. Because the value of the firm, 𝑉𝑖,𝑡, is not directly observable in our data, we 
estimate it based on an auxiliary log-linear forecasting model for firm’s profits. We assume 
that the logarithm of profits evolve according to a stationary stochastic process with a finite-
order autoregressive representation. We specify this process in AR(2) form as follows,   
                                            𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌1𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                     (6) 
where 𝛼𝑖  is a vector of firm-specific effects to capture unobserved cross-sectional firm 
heterogeneity in the conditional and unconditional means of logarithm of profits, 𝜏𝑡 is a vector 
of time-specific effects to account for business cycle shocks common to all firms, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
an idiosyncratic shock. The value of the firm (𝑉𝑖,𝑡) is estimated using Equation (3), plugging 
in current and future expected profits according to the procedure described in section 3.2 
below. Once we have an estimate of 𝑉𝑖,𝑡, we can easily obtain an estimate of Tobin’s Q, by 
dividing 𝑉𝑖,𝑡  by the value of the capital stock. To check whether our general approach for 
controlling for the fundamental driving factors of investment decisions appears appropriate, 
we will investigate how estimates of a standard physical investment Q model compare to 
existing results in the literature. We will also use our measure of Q to identify outliers. 
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3.2 Estimation 
Estimation of the model proceeds in three steps. We first estimate the AR(2) process based on 
the stream of profits to date to obtain the parameters that will be used to forecast expected 
future profits. To account for the sector-specific shocks, we estimate one AR(2) model for 
each sector. It is estimated by first-differenced GMM using lagged 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡 levels dated t-3 and 
t-4 as instruments.6 If the error term is iid, instruments starting from dated t-2 will be valid. 
However, we use these more conservative instruments in case the error term follows a firm-
specific MA(1) process. We show the AR(2) regression results in Appendix A and discuss the 
validity of the instruments and the model specification in section 5. After we have obtained 
the parameter estimates 𝜌�1, 𝜌�2 and a vector of estimates on the period dummies 𝜃�𝑡, we take 
the within-firm average over time to generate the firm fixed effects 𝛼�𝑖, that is,  
                                                𝛼�𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌�1𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜌�2𝑙𝑛Π𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝜃�𝑡𝜏𝑡� ,                        (7) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 /𝑇.  
The second step is to use the estimated parameters of the AR(2) process to construct 𝑉𝑖,𝑡. 
We start with calculating the expectation of 𝛱𝑖,𝑡+𝑠 given 𝛱𝑖,𝑡 for 𝑠 ≥ 1. For example, 𝛱𝑖,𝑡+1is 
derived by exponentiating Equation (6) and moving forward one period, namely, 
                               𝐸𝑡(𝛱𝑖,𝑡+1) = �𝛱𝑖,𝑡�𝜌�1 ∙ �𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1�𝜌�2 ∙  𝑒𝛼�𝑖  ∙ 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝜏𝑡+1) ,            (8) 
which is a function of realized profits and parameter estimates multiplied by two adjustment 
factors. Assuming homoskedasticity across periods, 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1) is equal to 𝐸𝑡�𝑒𝜀�𝑖,𝑡� computed 
as the sample mean of the exponent of the error term. 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝜏𝑡+1) captures the expected value of 
the exponent of the trend growth, which is assumed to be constant across periods and equal to 
the sector weighted average trend growth rate over the sample period. This growth rate is 
calculated as the total growth rate measured by the coefficient on the last period dummy 
divided by the number of periods covered in the sample and taking the sector size weighted 
average. We conduct repeated substitution in Equation (8) s times to generate 𝐸𝑡(𝛱𝑖,𝑡+𝑠). In 
principle, the horizon for calculating the value of the firm should be infinity. Here we set s to 
100 for simplicity. We then calculate the value of the firm as the sum of the discounted 
expected future profits, assuming that the one-period discount rate 𝜎 is 10%.  
                                                            
6 We have tried system GMM estimator which jointly estimates first-differenced and level equations with the 
lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation and lagged differences as instruments for the level 
equation. A Difference-in-Hansen statistic that specifically tests the additional moment conditions/instruments 
used in the level equation rejects their validity at conventional levels. This hence suggests the use of the first-
differenced rather than the system GMM estimator. 
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The last step is to estimate the R&D investment model. A high proportion of R&D 
expenditure observations are zero in our data, so Equation (5) cannot literally be the correct 
specification for R&D investment for all firms. We view Equation (5) as an appropriate 
specification for positive R&D investment, and assume that the determinants of the decision 
to carry out any R&D investment are the same as those determining the amount of investment 
conditional on positive investment. We thus model the decision to invest in R&D and R&D 
expenditure using two separate equations, specified as follows: 
                       𝑅&𝐷 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖0 + 𝛿1 ln𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2 ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3 ln 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , (9)   
                              ln 𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖0 + 𝛾1 ln𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3 ln 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡,                   (10) 
where 𝑅&𝐷 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm invests in R&D in 
period 𝑡  and zero otherwise. The large number of zero R&Ds may reflect high fixed 
adjustment costs firms need to bear to start an R&D project. Alternatively, the zeroes could be 
measurement errors. 7 It should be noted that our estimation framework is similar to the 
“exponential type II tobit model” discussed by Wooldridge (2010; section 17.6.3). The only 
difference is that we use a linear probability model, rather than a probit, to estimate the 
participation equation.   
Equations (9) and (10) give the empirical specifications that we will estimate under the 
null hypothesis that capital markets are perfect. To test for sensitivity of R&D to cash flow, 
we add cash flow into above specifications. A positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on cash flow indicates a rejection of the null.  
 
4. Data and sample descriptive statistics 
4.1 Dataset  
This study uses annual survey data for all “above-scale” Chinese industrial firms for the 
period 1998-2007. These data are developed and maintained by the NBS 8. Over 160,000 
firms per year are included in the dataset, spanning 39 two-digit industries in the mining, 
manufacturing and public utilities sectors and all 31 provinces or province-equivalent 
municipal cities. They are used to compile the “industry” section of the China Statistical 
Yearbook, and account for most of China’s industrial value added. The dataset contains firm 
                                                            
7 R&D expenditure can be reported as zero because (i) firms did not invest in R&D; (ii) the person answering the 
survey did not know about the information and arbitrarily reported zero; or (iii) firms did not report any 
information and the statistical authority converted blank observations to zero (Nie et al., 2012). It is not possible 
to distinguish between the non-performers and non-reporters directly from the dataset. 
8 The unit of analysis is firm, not plant. Brandt et al. (2012) suggest that more than 95% of all observations in the 
survey are single-plant firms. 
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identification information, and rich operation and performance information extracted from 
balance sheets and income statements.  
We clean the dataset according to the following criteria. First, we delete firms whose 
identification number is missing or not unique in any sample year. Second, we drop firms that 
have a negative value for one of the following key variables in any sample year: R&D 
expenditure, sales, total assets, total liquid assets, total fixed assets, current depreciation, total 
assets minus liquid assets, total assets minus total fixed assets, accumulated depreciation 
minus current depreciation, total liabilities, current liabilities, and non-current liabilities. We 
also drop firms whose equity is not equal to the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities in any sample year. Third, observations with sales below 1 million CNY are 
excluded. Fourth, firms that have negative cash flows over the whole sample period are 
eliminated. Fifth, the reported establishment year must be valid. Firms in which the opening 
year is after 2007 or the opening year in a given sample year is after that year are dropped. 
Firms that report establishment before 1900 are also excluded. Sixth, we eliminate 
observations that have a Q value greater than 20. Finally, to reduce the influence of outliers, 
we trim the one percent tails of each of the regression variables except R&D participation.  
For our analysis, we focus only on firms operating in the manufacturing and mining 
sectors. We adapt the method used by Brandt et al. (2012) to classify one or several two-digit 
industries into one sector and estimate the AR(2) model for each sector. Table A1 in 
Appendix A provides a complete list of our industry-sector correspondence. There are 36 
industries classified into 13 sectors. It is possible that a firm changes the sector it operates in 
during the sample period. Since the sector classification only affects the parameter estimates 
in the AR(2) model, in our subsequent analysis, we use a time-invariant measure of sector. 
That is, we classify a firm into a sector based on the sector it operates in for most years over 
the sample period. Data on R&D expenditure were recorded for the first time in 2001 and in 
2006 China’s Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises was amended which affected 
how R&D would be recorded. Moreover, no R&D data were collected for 2004. For these 
reasons we use data for 2001-2003 and 2005-2006 to estimate the R&D investment equations. 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 494,091 observations representing 193,445 firms9. All 
monetary variables are expressed in 1998 constant prices.10  
                                                            
9 Most of these firms are unlisted. According to Guariglia et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2013), there are only 
slightly over 1000 listed firms operating in the manufacturing and mining sectors during our sample period. 
Publicly listed firms in China are not treated separately by the NBS.  
10 Industry-specific producer price indices taken from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook are used 
to deflate the variables. 
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The NBS dataset has previously been used to investigate issues such as productivity 
growth and its contributing factors (e.g., Jefferson et al., 2008; Cai and Liu, 2009; Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2009; Song et al., 2011; Brandt et al., 2012), international trade (e.g., Sun, 2009; Yu, 
2010; Feenstra et al., 2013; Yu, 2013), FDI (e.g., Sun, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2012; 
Xu and Sheng, 2012), causes and consequences of privatization (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2007; 
Bai et al., 2009; Tong, 2009), determinants and impacts of industrial agglomeration (e.g., Lu 
and Tao, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Li et al., 2012), etc. These studies complement our paper and 
altogether provide an overarching picture of Chinese industrial economy.   
  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
R&D expenditure is the expenses attributable to the firm’s research and development of new 
products, technologies, and processes in its production and operation in a fiscal year. 
According to China’s Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises in 2001, R&D is 
expensed as it is incurred rather than capitalized and depreciated, constituting part of the 
firm’s management expenses.11 The dash line in Figure 2 plots gross R&D expenditure for 
our sample firms as percentage of gross value added. It shares the smooth upward trend with 
the aggregate R&D intensity for China represented by the solid line, but is in general a bit 
higher than the country aggregate. As noted above, there is no data point for 2004. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the sample used in 
the R&D participation regressions.12 We first show statistics for the full sample, and then for 
the subsamples of firms sorted into different ownership groups. Besides the ownership 
registration code, the NBS dataset provides a continuous measure of ownership based on the 
fraction of paid-in capital owned by six different types of investors, namely, the state, 
collective investors13, legal entities14, private individuals, investors from Hong Kong, Macao 
                                                            
11 The Accounting Standards was amended in 2006 and from 2007 a firm’s in-house R&D expenditure is 
expensed if it is incurred during the research phase of a project and is capitalized during the development phase.    
12 Table A2 in Appendix A presents the definitions of the variables. Because R&D is treated as a current expense 
for accounting purposes, it is net out from profits and consequently from our (net) cash flow variable (after-tax 
profits plus depreciation). While a typical cash flow measure in studies using R&D data is constructed by adding 
back R&D expenditure to the net cash flow (e.g., Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown et al., 
2009; Brown et al., 2012), we share the concern of Bond et al. (2005) that using gross cash flow could generate a 
positive endogeneity bias since R&D would appear on both sides of the investment equation, and it may disguise 
the different composition of net cash flow and R&D expenditure across firms.    
13 Collective firms are owned collectively by the working people of communities in urban or rural areas. Those 
in rural areas are known as Township and Village Enterprises.  
14  Legal entities represent a mixture of various types of domestic institutions, including industrial and 
commercial enterprises, banks, other financial institutions, etc., which are mainly joint stock companies.    
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and Taiwan, and foreign investors excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan15. 
Following Guariglia et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2013), we derive ownership using this 
continuous measure since registration codes are not entirely reliable. 16 We further follow 
these papers and group all foreign-owned firms either from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
or from other parts of the world into a single category which is labeled foreign, and all firms 
owned by legal entities and private individuals into a single category which is labeled private. 
We use a time-invariant measure of ownership, constructed by classifying firms into one of 
the four ownership categories based on their majority (i.e., greater than 50%) average 
ownership share calculated over the sample period. 17 
<Table 1 about here> 
Column (1) provides information for the full sample. On average 13.3% of our sample 
firms perform R&D. For firms carrying out any R&D (subsequently referred to as “R&D 
performers”), the average log R&D expenditure is 5.131, which corresponds to 169.2 
thousand CNY. Dividing R&D expenditure by sales, we obtain a similar intensity as those 
from previous studies examining Chinese manufacturing firms (e.g., Jefferson et al., 2006; 
Girma et al., 2008). Turning to the sample splits by ownership (columns (2) to (5)), we find 
some notable differences across these groups. First, the proportion of R&D performers is the 
highest in state-owned firms (22.4%). This is more than twice as high as the proportion of 
R&D performers in collective firms (9.4%) and foreign firms (10.6%). However, conditional 
on incurring the fixed cost to perform R&D, foreign firms on average spend the most on R&D 
investment (the average log value corresponds to 219.2 thousand CNY), followed by state-
owned firms (193.8 thousand CNY). Second, when it comes to the firm fundamentals, we see 
that state-owned firms typically have lower firm values (the average of the log value 
corresponds to 16.4 million CNY), but larger size, regardless of whether size is measured by 
physical capital (average log value corresponds to 11.9 million CNY) or employment 
(average log value corresponds to 217.9 workers). Since Q is defined as the value of the firm 
over beginning-of-period physical capital, state-owned firms have a much lower average Q 
value than the other ownership groups. Third, looking at internal source of finance, we again 
                                                            
15 The rationale for differentiating foreign investors between those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and 
those from other parts of the world is that the former measures the “round-tripping” FDI that domestic firms may 
register as foreign invested from nearby regions simply to take advantage of the tax or legal benefits granted to 
foreign owned firms (Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013).      
16 Registration codes are usually updated with considerable delay (Dollar and Wei, 2007) and firms might have 
an incentive to falsely register foreign investment to take advantage of tax or legal benefits. 
17 If the largest average ownership share is less than 50%, then the firm does not have a majority average share, 
and it is excluded from the sample split analysis. This accounts for 4.0% of the sample observations. 
14 
 
find that state-owned firms display the lowest cash flow-physical capital ratio, whereas 
foreign firms exhibit the highest.  
Table A3 in Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables only 
for the R&D performers. R&D performers tend to have higher firm value, larger size in terms 
of both physical capital and employment and greater profitability as reflected in cash flow 
than non-performers. We can hence infer that R&D performers tend to have stronger 
fundamentals than non-R&D performers.  
 
5. Econometric results  
In this section, we report the results from estimating the AR(2) model, the R&D investment 
model under the assumption of perfect capital markets, and the model augmented with cash 
flow. To check whether our general approach for controlling for the fundamental determinants 
of investment decisions (firm value) appears appropriate, we will also investigate how 
estimates of a physical investment Q model compare to existing results in the literature. After 
presenting our baseline model results, we extend the discussion to the ownership subsamples.  
 
5.1 AR(2) results 
Table A4 in Appendix A reports the first-differenced GMM regression results for the AR(2) 
profit model, for each sector for the period 1998-2007. We can see that the coefficients on 
𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1  and/or 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡−2  are statistically significant in most sectors at conventional levels. 
While in two sectors none of them is significant individually, they are jointly significant (sum 
𝑙𝑛Π p-value). The instruments are lagged 𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡 levels dated t-3 and t-4, which are valid even 
if the error structure is MA(1). The p-values for the m1 statistics show first-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced error terms in most sectors, which is expected in the 
first-differenced estimation. The m2 statistics reject the null of no second-order 
autocorrelation in only one sector. The Hansen tests reject the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions in four sectors at the 5% significance level; for the other sectors the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions is not rejected. The results provide strong evidence that profits are 
persistent, which suggests that expectations about future profits are formed taking current 
profits into account.  
 
5.2 Physical investment full sample 
Before estimating the R&D investment model, we first estimate a standard physical 
investment Q model for the corresponding time span of R&D for 2001-2006. The purposes of 
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doing so are twofold. First, we wish to compare our coefficient estimate on Q with existing 
evidence from studies using the same modeling approach. Such a comparison sheds light on 
whether our way of constructing measures of firm value is sensible. Second, we also estimate 
this model augmented with cash flow to compare the estimate on cash flow with those from 
other studies on Chinese industrial firms to see whether our findings with respect to capital 
market imperfections are consistent with theirs.   
Table 2 presents the regression results for the physical investment Q model for the full 
sample estimated with firm fixed effects. In both the baseline and the cash flow augmented 
models, the Q coefficient is statistically significant, and it is similar in magnitude to what has 
been reported in previous studies using “Fundamental Q” (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 
1995; Bond and Cummins, 2001; Cummins et al., 2006) and greater than that found from 
studies using Tobin’s Q (Hubbard, 1998). This suggests that our method of proxying firm’s 
present net worth by its expected discounted stream of profits captures firms’ investment 
opportunities reasonably well. Consequently, we will have more faith to designate the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a sign of the existence of capital market 
imperfections. Turning to the augmented model, the statistically significant coefficient on 
cash flow indicates that physical investment in Chinese industrial firms on the whole is 
sensitive to internal finance. This result is consistent with findings from Poncet et al. (2010) 
and Guariglia et al. (2011), although they estimate an Euler equation and a reduced-form 
dynamic asset growth model, respectively. 18  The result that cash flow adds additional 
explanatory power to the investment equation even after we control for its forecasting role 
through Q supports a financing role of cash flow. In addition, the magnitude of the cash flow 
coefficient is comparable to that in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). Overall, these results 
are encouraging. We now proceed to the R&D investment model estimations.            
<Table 2 about here> 
 
5.3 R&D investment full sample  
Table 3 reports the regression results for R&D investment for the full sample. Columns (1) 
and (2) contain the estimation for the decision of performing R&D or not from a linear 
probability model with firm fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) show results from fixed effects 
regressions modeling R&D expenditure conditional on positive expenditures. Under the 
                                                            
18 Poncet et al. (2010) and Guariglia et al. (2011) estimate the investment model only for each ownership group, 
not for the full sample. We will report the regression results for the ownership sample splits in Table 4 and make 
comparison to their results in section 5.4. 
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assumption of perfect capital markets (column (1)), we find that the value of the firm and the 
factor inputs physical capital and employment are all statistically significantly and positively 
correlated with the probability of conducting R&D. These results are as expected: firms with 
better prospect and bigger size face better investment opportunities, they hence are more 
likely to invest in R&D. When cash flow is introduced (column (2)), the coefficient on the 
firm value becomes less statistically significant, whereas the estimates on the factor inputs 
have the same sign, magnitude and significance as before. Cash flow adds significant 
explanatory power to the model, suggesting that firms’ R&D participation decision is affected 
by cash flow.   
<Table 3 about here> 
When R&D expenditure is considered, provided that an R&D program is set up (column 
(3)), the estimated coefficients on the variables reflecting firm fundamentals are again all 
positive and highly significant. These coefficients are larger compared to those in the R&D 
participation estimation. When the model is augmented with cash flow (column (4)), the 
coefficient estimates on the firm fundamentals remain positive and highly statistically 
significant. Cash flow is again found to add significant explanatory power, which indicates 
sensitivity of R&D expenditure to cash flow. Our results on R&D investment once again 
manifest cash flow as a direct source of finance besides its role in providing information on 
investment opportunities. 
We note that in contrast to Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) the inclusion of cash flow 
does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on Q in physical investment. In addition, 
comparing the magnitude of the coefficients on Q and cash flow reveals that physical 
investment is relatively more responsive to cash flow than to Q. These findings suggest that 
physical investment decision is more likely to be influenced by more short-run strategy based 
on the firm’s most recent profit experience rather than by its long-term consideration based on 
firm fundamentals. However, this is not the case for R&D investment. The inclusion of cash 
flow does not reduce the magnitude of the coefficients on the value of the firm or on the 
factor inputs in R&D participation or expenditure estimations, and R&D is not more 
responsive to cash flow than to firm fundamentals. The difference may reflect high 
adjustment costs for R&D (e.g., Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall and Lerner, 2010). A 
sizable proportion of a firm’s R&D investment is payment to highly trained scientists, 
engineers and other specialists. The temporary hiring and firing of these human resources in 
response to a transitory shock to finance is very costly. The costs include training new 
workers to acquire firm-specific knowledge and preventing proprietary information from 
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dissemination by fired workers to competitors, etc. High adjustment costs hence imply that 
firms tend to maintain a relatively stable R&D status and a relatively smooth flow of R&D 
spending in accordance with the “permanent” level of available finance in face of transitory 
finance shocks. 
 
5.4 Physical investment sample splits by ownership 
We now test whether there is heterogeneity in the sensitivity of physical investment to cash 
flow across ownership subsamples. While this analysis may seem off track given the main 
theme of the paper, we include it to verify findings from other studies on Chinese industrial 
firms. The conventional wisdom for China or even many transition economies is that state-
owned firms are less dependent on internal finance than firms of other ownerships, because 
they tend to face soft budget constraints and enjoy favoritism from state-owned or state-
influenced banks for loans to serve their political and social functions (Bai et al., 2006; Poncet 
et al. 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011). However, using Chinese-listed firms over 1999-2008 and 
accounting for firms’ equity financing behavior, Lin and Bo (2012) do not find that state-
ownership necessarily help reduce firms’ financing constraints on investment via the state 
controlled banking sector. 
Table A5 in Appendix A reports descriptive statistics for physical investment regression 
variables for the full sample and the ownership subsamples. We see a different pattern from 
that in R&D investment. State-owned firms exhibit the lowest fixed capital investment rate, 
although they have the highest proportion engaged in R&D and high R&D expenditure. 
Private firms on the other hand display the greatest investment opportunities measured by Q.  
Table 4 presents the regression results for the physical investment Q model for the full 
sample split by ownership estimated with firm fixed effects. Overall, the Q coefficients are 
statistically significant and positive in all ownerships, even when cash flow is controlled for. 
For the cash flow augmented models (columns (2), (4), (6), (8)), cash flow adds additional 
explanatory power to investment for all ownerships. Therefore, we reject the baseline Q 
model for firms of all ownerships. Our results are broadly in line with findings from Guariglia 
et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2013) who use the same dataset and the same ownership 
categorization,19 with the only exception that they find investment in state-owned firms to be 
insensitive to internal finance. Our result lends support to the finding in Lin and Bo (2012) 
                                                            
19 Instead of using the majority average ownership share of the paid-in capital over the sample period to define 
firm ownership as Ding et al. (2013) and we do, Guariglia et al. (2011) adopt the largest average ownership share 
and the 100% rule.  
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that Chinese listed firms with the state as the largest shareholder or with a higher state share 
do not necessarily face no or less financing constraints. Since listed firms are less likely to be 
financially constrained due to the possibility of acquiring external funds from new equity 
issuance besides bank loans, our results for mainly unlisted firms are not unreasonable. It 
could be because, as Lin and Bo (2012) claim, China’s corporatization movement has been 
effective in terms of removing the soft budget constraints once enjoyed by state-owned 
enterprises and throwing firms into the market.  
<Table 4 about here> 
 
5.5 R&D investment sample splits by ownership 
Having identified the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow for firms of various 
ownerships, we proceed by investigating the sensitivity of R&D investment. Table 5 reports 
the regression results for R&D investment for the full sample split by ownership. We observe 
some heterogeneity across ownership groups. For state-owned firms, firm value is not a 
determinant of R&D participation decision (columns (1)-(2)), whereas firm size in terms of 
both physical capital and employment is statistically significantly and positively correlated 
with R&D participation. In addition, cash flow does not add any explanatory power to R&D 
participation. The insensitivity to internal finance suggests that the decision of state-owned 
firms to set up an R&D program responds primarily to firm fundamentals rather than to most 
recent profit experience. When it comes to R&D expenditure, under perfect capital markets 
(column (3)), firm value and employment significantly affect R&D expenditure, whereas 
physical capital does not. When cash flow is added to the specification (column (4)), the 
coefficient on employment is still significant, whereas the estimate on the value of the firm 
becomes insignificant, and the coefficient on physical capital becomes significant. Moreover, 
cash flow adds additional explanatory power to R&D expenditure. These results suggest that 
internal funds are important for R&D spending, and that the result that physical capital does 
not matter for R&D spending in column (3) is spurious. These findings further indicate that 
the effects of cash flow on R&D participation and expenditure decisions are very different.  
<Table 5 about here> 
For collective firms, firm fundamentals and cash flow also exert different effects on R&D 
participation and expenditure. While firm size in terms of both physical capital and 
employment is positively and statistically significantly correlated with R&D participation 
(columns (5)-(6)), physical capital is not correlated with R&D spending (columns (7)-(8)). A 
counter-intuitive result is that the probability of conducting R&D responds negatively to the 
19 
 
value of the firm. Moreover, cash flow adds additional explanatory power to R&D 
participation, but not to R&D expenditure. In contrast to the finding for state-owned firms, 
this result suggests that only when collective firms have and expect to have strong cash flow 
they are more likely to set up an R&D program. When the decision to engage in R&D is made, 
they are able to conform to the long-term commitment to financing an inflexible R&D budget.  
For private firms (columns (9)-(12)), the estimated coefficients on all explanatory 
variables are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that both R&D participation and 
spending decisions are affected by firm fundamentals and cash flow. The coefficients are no 
less in magnitude than those for state-owned and collective firms. These results are not 
surprising. On the one hand, private firms came into existence only after the economic 
reforms and for the sole purpose of pursuing profits. Hence, they are more responsive to the 
market, and economic fundamentals should be more important for long-term investment 
decisions for them than for state-owned firms. On the other hand, while private firms have 
enjoyed high productivity and profitability (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2007; Bai et al., 2009), 
their political status has been weak. Furthermore, private firms are considered riskier than 
their state counterparts due to shorter credit history and lower chance of being bailed out by 
the government in case of management difficulty (Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011). 
For these reasons, private firms rely more extensively on internal capital for investment. This 
is particularly pronounced for R&D investment due to the significant asymmetric information 
and agency problems and lack of collateral value.  
For foreign firms, firm fundamentals significantly determine R&D participation 
regardless of whether cash flow is controlled for (columns (13)-(14)). When R&D 
expenditure is considered, employment is no longer a significant determinant, and its 
coefficients are much smaller than those for firms of other ownerships in corresponding 
models (columns (15)-(16)). In addition, the close to zero and insignificant coefficients on 
cash flow show that there is no evidence of sensitivity of R&D participation or spending to 
cash flow. This suggests that R&D in foreign firms is not responsive to profits that they 
generate internally, since they can finance investment through their foreign parent company 
that can raise funds outside China. Furthermore, judged by the estimated coefficient on firm 
value in the cash flow augmented R&D expenditure equation, the value of the firm seems to 
be more important for foreign firms than for private firms, and more important for private 
firms than for state-owned firms. This may reflect the difference in the degree of 
corporatization in firms of different ownerships. Although China has made a progress of 
corporatization since its economic reforms, the government could still intervene in, or 
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influence, firm decisions, especially for state-owned firms. Therefore, the objective and 
governance structure of state-owned firms are least like modern corporations, and 
consequently their R&D investment decisions are least determined by the long-term prospect. 
On the other hand, the governance structure and management philosophy from the foreign 
parent company may well have rooted in those of foreign firms, and the expected future 
profitability may hence play a more important role in their R&D spending decisions. 
Following this logic, the importance of firm value in the R&D decision for domestic private 
firms is between that for state-owned firms and for foreign firms.            
     
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimate R&D regressions with and without controls for cash flow, to assess 
the importance of capital market frictions for Chinese industrial firms. We find that for the 
full sample, firm fundamentals significantly affect R&D participation and expenditure, and 
that R&D is sensitive to cash flow conditional on such fundamentals. We therefore reject the 
hypothesis that capital markets are perfect. The R&D investment of Chinese industrial firms 
on the whole depends on internal finance. Moreover, firms of differing ownership are 
heterogeneous in the degree of dependence on internal finance. For private firms, both R&D 
participation and spending are found to be dependent on internal finance. In contrast, for 
foreign firms both decisions are independent of internal finance. For state-owned firms and 
collective firms the results are mixed.  
Our findings contribute to the literature on the connections between finance and 
economic growth. While R&D in domestically owned firms (86% of the firms in our sample) 
is sensitive to internal finance , these firms’ ability to generate cash flow may on the other 
hand provide an explanation for why the Chinese economy has grown at dramatic rates in 
recent years, especially so for private firms. However, in order to maintain the growth 
momentum of the Chinese economy, measures need to be taken to introduce a more 
widespread access to external finance, including both institutional debt and new equity 
generation.   
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Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics for R&D investment  
Variables and 
statistics 
Full State-owned Collective Private Foreign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D participation     
     Mean 0.133 0.224 0.094 0.134 0.106 
     Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Std. Dev. 0.339 0.417 0.291 0.341 0.308 
𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 5.131 5.267 4.463 5.122 5.390 
     Median 5.074 5.278 4.430 5.061 5.369 
     Std. Dev. 1.946 2.037 1.743 1.916 2.060 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 9.992 9.704 9.750 9.901 10.633 
     Median 9.950 9.629 9.754 9.869 10.567 
     Std. Dev. 1.521 1.836 1.489 1.448 1.548 
𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 8.720 9.383 8.457 8.573 9.269 
     Median 8.620 9.441 8.391 8.484 9.236 
     Std. Dev. 1.413 1.641 1.302 1.353 1.433 
𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 4.912 5.384 4.891 4.790 5.278 
     Median 4.828 5.394 4.836 4.718 5.257 
     Std. Dev. 1.008 1.182 0.965 0.964 1.026 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)      
     Mean -1.425 -2.091 -1.473 -1.402 -1.252 
     Median -1.376 -2.063 -1.391 -1.359 -1.263 
     Std. Dev. 0.935 1.112 1.009 0.904 0.841 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡      
     Mean 6.103 3.300 6.123 6.324 6.169 
     Median 4.559 1.587 4.567 4.833 4.664 
     Std. Dev. 5.147 4.118 5.216 5.171 5.049 
Observations 398,988 20,331 36,939 269,923 56,026 
Firms 182,329 8,787 15,735 126,781 24,612 
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the sample used in the R&D 
participation regressions for the full sample and the ownership subsamples.  Descriptive statistics for 𝑙𝑛�𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡� 
are for the sample used in the R&D expenditure regressions. The sample coverage is reported in the column 
heading.  
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Table 2. Q model for physical investment 
 Baseline Augmented 
 (1) (2) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.134*** 0.097*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1  0.641*** 
  (0.013) 
Observations 489,936 489,936 
Firms 191,913 191,913 
F statistic  2185.27*** 2194.12*** 
Notes: Table reports the regression results for the physical investment Q model for the full sample estimated 
with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is 𝐼𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1. 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is restricted to no more than 20. Year dummies 
are included in both regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and under firm-level clustering are 
reported in parentheses. The F statistic is an F test of the null hypothesis that the model is jointly insignificant. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Variant of Q model for R&D investment 
 
R&D participation R&D expenditure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑖,𝑡) 0.006*** 0.004* 0.268*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.041) (0.040) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖,𝑡) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.178*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.026) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖,𝑡) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.330*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.038) (0.038) 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)  0.003***  0.105*** 
  
(0.001)  (0.015) 
Observations 398,988 398,988 52,432 52,432 
Firms 182,329 182,329 31,138 31,138 
F statistic 104.77*** 93.54*** 166.84*** 151.63*** 
Notes: Table reports the regression results for R&D investment from our variant of the Q model for the full 
sample. R&D participation is estimated using a linear probability model with firm fixed effects. R&D 
expenditure is estimated with firm fixed effects. Observations with 𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1  (i.e., 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ) greater than 20 are 
dropped. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and under 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. The F statistic is an F test of the null hypothesis that the model 
is jointly insignificant. * and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Q model for physical investment by ownership 
  State-owned Collective Private Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.117*** 0.074*** 0.114*** 0.078*** 0.142*** 0.103*** 0.116*** 0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1  0.629***  0.574***  0.700***  0.495*** 
  (0.059)  (0.038)  (0.017)  (0.027) 
Observations 28,656 28,656 44,410 44,410 326,424 326,424 70,940 70,940 
Firms 10,555 10,555 16,600 16,600 131,715 131,715 26,203 26,203 
F statistic 55.25*** 60.48*** 141.46*** 149.85*** 1660.22*** 1675.55*** 270.18*** 261.15*** 
Notes: Table reports the regression results for the physical investment Q model for the ownership subsamples 
estimated with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is 𝐼𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1. 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is restricted to no more than 20. Year 
dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and under firm-level 
clustering are reported in parentheses. The F statistic is an F test of the null hypothesis that the model is jointly 
insignificant. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1.  Aggregate R&D intensity 
 
Notes: Figure plots the gross domestic expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP for Japan, the US, OECD, EU 
(15 countries) and China from 1990 to 2012. Data for Japan, the US, OECD, EU are obtained from OECD Main 
Science and Technology Indicators database. Data for China are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook 
(1991-2013). 
       
 
  
0
.4
.8
1.
2
1.
6
2
2.
4
2.
8
3.
2
3.
6
G
ro
ss
 d
om
es
tic
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
on
 R
&
D
 a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Japan US
OECD EU
China
32 
 
Figure 2. R&D intensity 
  
Notes: The solid line plots the gross domestic expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP for China. It is the 
same as that plotted in Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure is defined as the total R&D expenditure for all 
firms and public institutions in China that engage in R&D activities. Data are obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook (1991-2013). The dash line plots the sum of R&D expenditure for industrial firms covered in the NBS 
dataset after author’s data cleaning in proportion to the sum of value added over time. There are no data for 2004 
in the sample. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Sector classification 
Sector   Two-digit industry 
 Metallurgical Sector 32 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 
 33 Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 
 34 Manufacture of Metal Products 
  Coal Sector 6 Mining and Washing of Coal 
  7 Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
 8 Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 
 9  Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 
10  Mining and Processing of Nonmetal Ores 
 11 Other mining 
   Petroleum Sector 25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel 
Chemical Sector 26 Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 
27 Manufacture of Medicines 
  28 Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 
  29 Manufacture of Rubber 
  30 Manufacture of Plastics 
  43 Recycling and Disposal of Waste 
  Machine Manufacturing Sector 35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 
 36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 
 37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 
 39 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 
40 Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other 
Electronic Equipment 
41 Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural 
Activity and Office Work 
Building Materials Sector 31 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 
 Timber Sector 20 Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and 
Straw Products 
21 Manufacture of Furniture 
  Food Sector 13 Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 
 14 Processing of Foodstuff 
  15 Manufacture of Beverages 
  16 Manufacture of Tobacco 
  Textile Sector 17 Manufacture of Textile 
Tailoring Sector 18 Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footware, and Caps 
Leather Sector 19 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 
Paper Sector 22 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 
 Cultural, Educational & 
Handicrafts Articles sector 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 
 24 Manufacture of Articles for Culture, Education and Sport Activities 
42 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 
  Note: Table reports the industry-sector correspondence used in the paper. 
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Table A2. Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
𝐼𝑡 Difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets of end of year t and 
end of year t-1 adding depreciation of year t. 
𝑅&𝐷 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm invests in R&D in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
𝑟𝑑𝑡 Expenses incurred during a firm’s research and development of new products, 
technologies, and processes in its production and operation in year t. It includes 
expenses on direct consumption of materials, fuels and power in R&D activities; 
labor expenses of internal R&D personnel of a firm, such as wage, bonus, social 
insurance etc., and labor costs of external R&D personnel; depreciation or lease 
fee of fixed assets, such as apparatus, equipment, buildings, etc., used in R&D 
activities, and maintenance fee of these fixed assets; expenses on experimenting 
and manufacturing of models for new products, adjustment of equipment, and 
testing of trial products; expenses on evaluation of R&D outcomes and patent 
applications; expenditure on R&D commissions to other organizations or 
individuals; other expenses directly related to R&D activities, such as on books, 
conferences, training, consultancy, etc. (Ministry of Finance of China, 2007; Nie 
et al., 2008).  
𝐾𝑡 Book value of tangible fixed assets (including land and building, fixtures and 
fittings, and plant and vehicles) at end of year t. 
𝐿𝑡 Total number of people employed by the firm at end of year t. 
𝐶𝐹𝑡 The sum of after-tax profits and depreciation in year t.  
Note: Table presents the definitions of variables used in the paper. 
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Table A3. Sample descriptive statistics for R&D performers  
Variables and 
statistics 
Full State-owned Collective Private Foreign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 10.818 10.721 10.316 10.733 11.581 
     Median 10.844 10.879 10.320 10.739 11.717 
     Std. Dev. 1.607 1.775 1.561 1.554 1.540 
𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 9.577 10.399 9.063 9.415 10.069 
     Median 9.606 10.669 9.024 9.415 10.193 
     Std. Dev. 1.460 1.386 1.359 1.428 1.377 
𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖,𝑡)      
     Mean 5.433 6.133 5.272 5.316 5.596 
     Median 5.403 6.296 5.220 5.278 5.613 
     Std. Dev. 1.064 1.043 1.020 1.036 1.027 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)      
     Mean -1.385 -1.975 -1.427 -1.343 -1.150 
     Median -1.335 -1.979 -1.341 -1.302 -1.152 
     Std. Dev. 0.908 1.016 0.966 0.870 0.817 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡      
     Mean 6.124 3.310 6.097 6.385 6.908 
     Median 4.659 1.716 4.513 5.019 5.540 
     Std. Dev. 5.092 4.034 5.184 5.084 5.152 
Observations 52,432 4,492 3,428 35,984 5,879 
Firms 31,138 2,312 2,209 21,501 3,667 
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the sample used in the R&D 
expenditure regressions for the full sample and the ownership subsamples. The sample coverage is reported in 
the column heading.  
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Table A5. Sample descriptive statistics for physical investment  
Variables and 
statistics 
Full State-owned Collective Private Foreign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1      
     Mean 0.291 0.175 0.216 0.320 0.262 
     Median 0.083 0.045 0.055 0.093 0.087 
     Std. Dev. 0.831 0.652 0.748 0.875 0.735 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡      
     Mean 5.865 2.908 5.818 6.124 6.023 
     Median 4.280 1.243 4.182 4.601 4.498 
     Std. Dev. 5.155 3.961 5.237 5.180 5.062 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1      
     Mean 0.348 0.206 0.345 0.349 0.403 
     Median 0.244 0.117 0.238 0.249 0.279 
     Std. Dev. 0.385 0.311 0.389 0.373 0.438 
Observations 489,936 28,656 44,410 326,424 70,940 
Firms 191,913 10,555 16,600 131,715 26,203 
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the sample used in the physical 
investment Q model estimations for the full sample and the ownership subsamples. The sample coverage is 
reported in the column heading.  
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